THEORIES AND PRACTICES:

STUDIES OF PRACTICAL REASONING IN EVERYDAY LIFE AND IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis subjects the relation between professional theory and everyday practice to examination. It inquires into the social reflexivity of theorising and practical action, and their essential engagement. The areas of practice which are inquired into are as follows: The construction and use of ideal-typical constructs as central elements in coming to terms with subterranean meanings. This is carried out in relation to the establishment of sexual relationships through 'contact magazines'. The behaviour of pre-school, nursery children is examined in relation to their abilities for and use of language. This is with reference to situations which are organised by adults, and situations organised by the children themselves. The production of a charge by the police, and the subsequent outcome in court is inquired into in respect of the attitude of professional theorising.

The thesis redefines these areas of practice in terms of the theoretical competence displayed and required there. They are seen as areas which are populated by practical sociologists and which produce sociologies themselves. It is taken that these areas of practice display theoretical competences which professional inquiry ignores, takes for granted, and uses yet which are of fundamental importance to inquiring into the social. Professional theory's ideals of clarity and superiority are discussed in relation to the work of T.S. Kuhn and Plato, as being based upon occasional and irregular methods which accomplish for all practical purposes its serious intentions.

Through the continuous use, discussion, and examination of the work of Harold Garfinkel - most notably the use of the concepts of indexicality and reflexivity - the thesis recommends a deeper and more fundamental understanding of human practical action. This is through the establishment of a reflexive sociology, which locates and documents the grounds of creativity and artfulness whereby theory and practice are constituted.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

> At every turn, it [this text] denounces any possible confusion. It rejects its identity, without previously stating: I am neither this nor that. It is not critical, most of the time; it is not a way of saying that everyone else is wrong. It is an attempt to define a particular site by the exteriority of its vicinity; rather than to reduce others to silence, by claiming that what they say is worthless, I have tried to define this blank space from which I speak, and which is slowly taking shape in a discourse that I feel to be so precarious and so unsure. [M. Foucault, 1977]

As an Introduction, this section of the thesis seeks to escape itself. Why? Barry Sandywell has written [1975] that introductions are "tantamount to the provision for the social construction of worlds.". They are the last sections of a writing to be written, yet appear first in that work. The purpose is to provide a set of instructions for the reader for a 'way of seeing' what follows. Yet the given nature of accounts and their reflexivity makes it difficult to see this feature [i.e. providing instructions and a 'way of seeing'], as belonging only to introductions. A consequence of this awareness of the reflexivity of lay and professional accounts, is that this Introduction and the chapters which follow seek to examine it as a topic as well as use it as a resource. In this sense this Introduction seeks to escape its conventional role by making clear and

addressing the problem of constituting and making observable situations. Because of this the focal point for the Introduction is the genesis of the thesis as a piece of practical reasoning. In order to do this it is necessary to discuss it in terms of professional, sociological theorising as method and tradition and everyday, practical actions as reflexive biography.

Sociology as Method and Tradition: In becoming interested in sociology I was concerned with the sociability of people; with relations, purposes, and intentions. Yet I found that an increasing immersion in the professional programme of sociology tended towards an insular attitude; a moving away through professional concepts and methods from the connected, human facet of social relations towards relating 'objects' to 'objects'.

It was within this situation that the project of phenomenology, aimed at understanding human existence, first appealed to me. However its philosophical perspective places it within a specific historical tradition which requires the mundane and routine happenings of everyday life as uninteresting as practical activities. Phenomenology places the act of inquiry (my act) at another level of existence and consciousness (i.e. a transcendental level). Its consequences as method results in a similar distancing from actual, practical activities as following a conventional sociological practice (e.g. functionalism). As a result of following a certain sociological tradition the inquirer has no interest in the reflexive relations he has with others in constructing their daily and professional sociological worlds.

The writings of Harold Garfinkel (1963, 1967) are a tremendous exception to the disinterest which professional inquirers display towards the character of practical actions and the constructive

method which without an awareness of reflexivity, following a tradition brings (cf. P. Attewell, I974. S. Mennell, I975. B. McSweeney, I973). Also, because of the reflexive interest which Garfinkel's writings display they pose a problem of understanding and comprehension. In becoming involved im Garfinkel's theoretic notions, I became aware of the possibility of examining my own surroundings and relations and how I myself made sense of them. The thesis provided the opportunity for an examination of the relations and connections between lay and professional theory and practices, through the use and discussion of Garfinkel's ideas. Consequently they pervade the thesis.

The thesis also attempts to follow Garfinkel's recommendation about not quarrelling with or seeking to correct practical, sociological inquiries. Because of this the thesis continually seeks to use ideas, activities, and arguments in terms of development and progression; towards revealing methods and practices which accomplish practical actions. This formulation is different to that of conventional sociological practice where the discussion of forms of professional argument amounts to a sign or token of professional practice itself, and commitment to some particular school of thought. Professional sociology approaches its work as methodical tradition rather than a form of biographical description which is reflexively produced.

The Thesis as Biography: The actual process of beginning and building the thesis was not a well-planned, professional process. I consistently attempted small pieces of inquiry into areas of social life which impinged on me, according to two concerns: firstly, the exposition of areas of action which were not well documented in the sociological literature; secondly, the inquirer's engagement with these situated conducts in terms of their theoretic

character. This latter feature is not seen as a matter exclusively for professional inquiry, but rather a social process for making sense, understanding, and connecting with others. In other words the thesis regards theory as practice.

The sections of the thesis follow the development of my thoughts. The order in which they appear is the order in which they were written, and in this way they are biographically reflexive. Section I concerns the establishment of sexual relations through the use of contact magazines which I first encountered while working in a factory. At about the same time I was taking my daughter to a day-nursery and became interested in the nature of adult-child interactions. This topic occupies Section II. While researching these areas of experience, I was involved with the police and subsequently had to attend court. It is this encounter with the legal process which is dealt with in Section III.

In the examination of these topics it became apparent that in each a high level of sophistication was required in terms of knowledge and methodicity. This awareness resulted in a reading of T.S. Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" which sought to locate the social means which underpinned and were integral to his theorising about the progress of science. This account forms the first part of Section IV, which treats theorising as an occasion of social practice. As such a paradox is revealed for to be truly professional, theory must epistemologically separate itself from more mundane inquiry. In the second part of Section IV, an examination of how Plato approached and accomplished this separation for his theorising is presented. The final part of Section IV seeks to locate the central and vital element which unites theorisings and practices, both lay and professional, described in the preceding sections. This is the resource of

reflexivity.

The Idea of Reflexivity: I first became aware of the idea of reflexivity through reading Garfinkel's "Studies in Ethnomethodology". He claims that the ways in which people make sense of and describe their surroundings and actions are constitutive of the scenes which they make observable, and that this way of proceeding is inescapable: "am essential reflexivity" (1967). Garfinkel further believes that people rely upom the reflexivity of their accounts and utterances im accomplishing the rationality of their actions.

Edmund Husserl was clearly aware of the existence of social reflexivity in formulating his phenomenology and addressing the problem of the relation between the objective content of knowledge and the acts of meaning or knowing. In seeking to demonstrate that the objective world was dependent and inseparable from an intentional object-constituting consciousness, he fully faced the topic of reflexivity. Husserl reveals this in a negative manner when he states that a phenomenon "is no 'substantial' unity; it has no 'real' properties, it knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality." (1965). More positively Husserl, im discussing the meaning of a word, regards it as residing in "that which is being grasped and 'seen' there" (M. Douglas, ed., 1973. My emphasis.). The intentions of consciousness as objectivities for Husserl "belong to the same stream of consciousness as themselves." (1967). That is, phenomena as meaningful entities are constituted in themselves through themselves, in a reflexive manner.

Though Husserl was aware of the existence of social reflexivity, in his commitment to revealing the presuppositions underlying knowledge he subscribed to the development of the general method of a transcendental phenomenology. Here the use of the phenomenological reduction and the suspension of knowledge about the life-world were

seem as enabling the single ego to rise above its own subjectivity to account for knowledge in general. However the completion of this transcendental programme was Husserl's stumbling block. Alfred Schutz, though following Husserl closely, departed from him at this point. He sought rather to establish a constitutive phenomenology of the social world (1962), which would clarify the methods and assumptions of the cultural sciences.

Husserl and Schutz were both interested in the constitution of knowledge, yet both disregarded the constituting character of practical activities in favour of a more generalised perspective as a tradition. Schutz combined Husserl's phenomenology with Weberian sociology in order to effect his interpretive sociology, while Husserl attempted to establish his transcendental phenomenology as the first philosophy. In doing this Husserl transgressed one of his own dictums: "It is the business of theories to confront data." (1967). What he did do was neglect the practical nature of his and others' actions; the ways in which he and others in fact confronted "data". The effect, for both Schutz and Husserl, of seeking to establish and follow a professional tradition of inquiry was to neglect social reflexivity as a practical activity.

More recently some theorists have become interested in focusing upon reflexivity as a central topic for sociology, though there are differences between them on the part it plays both in sociology and in everyday life. Alvin Gouldner (1970) calls for the establishment of a reflexive sociology. By this he means a sociology which "is concerned with what sociologists want to do and with what, in fact, they actually do in the world." (1970). As such Gouldner is not concerned with social reflexivity but with the production of a sociology of sociology. John O'Neill who has criticised Gouldner's approach (1972), has himself suggested that social scientific

knowledge should adopt a notion of a limited reflexivity within a phenomenological frame in order to be aware of the limits of such knowledge. This view obviously owes much to the work of Husserl and Schutz. O'Neill seeks to regard reflexivity as a social institution: "as tied to the textual structures of temporality and situation through which subjectivity and objectivity are constituted as the intentional unity and style of the world." (1972).

The most comprehensive treatment of reflexivity as a topic for sociology has come in the writings of Harold Garfinkel. These have been the source of inspiration of a rich and varied collection of writings. Though those who have followed Garfinkel's ideas have, for the most part, remained faithful to the central topics of reflexivity and indexicality they have diverged according to their own sets of relevances. For example Zimmerman and Pollner (1970) have remained consistent with the idea of reflexivity in their notion of an occasioned corpus of knowledge: "The features of socially organized activities are particular, contingent accomplishments of the production and recognition work of parties to the activity.". Others however, such as Cicourel (1973) and Sacks (unpublished) have sought generalised answers to reflexivity and indexicality in the deep structures of interpretive procedures and the invariant structures of conversation.

In discussing reflexivity here, it is seen as the basis of all social accomplishments and productions. A consequence of this is that this thesis, and indeed this Introduction, attempts to treat itself as an occasion of reflexive sociology; of presenting the features which in engagement in actual, practical activities result in a particular outcome. Accordingly I have attempted to document the movement of the thesis as a development of ideas about the social which progressed through the thesis and can be

found there. From this perspective the thesis is an occasion which seeks to understand situated, practical activity, professional theory, and itself in terms of a reflexive sociology. This is to resist invoking a professional tradition of inquiry in order to separate this inquiry from more mundane detective work, while regarding understanding (my understanding) as biographically representative of a form of life (my life). To regard given understandings as documents of particular, situated conducts is to begin to treat the processes of accounting, understanding, and formulating histories as practically constituting events rather than pre-given, objective categories generally applicable across all situations. In becoming interested in and dwelling upon the artful ways in which the organisational characteristics of daily life are produced and maintained, the thesis focuses upon reflexivity as a topic. In regarding this topic as central and crucial to its very own inquiry, as well as residing 'out there', is to proceed to the heart of a reflexive sociology. The study of social practices (reflexive ways of making sense) is seen not only as applying to situations of interest, but to be shared between lay and professional sociology. What this means is that all professional sociology relies upon the resource of social reflexivity, just as lay sociology does, to accomplish its outcomes. A reflexive sociology recognises this social engagement, and seeks to examine it in social situations and its own inquiry.

SECTION I

Practices - The Construction Of Ideal Types In Relation To Sexual Contact Magazines

This thesis is dedicated towards reaching an understanding of the relation between and complementarity of theory and practice. It is a quite general assumption that theory and practice are clear-cut and discrete areas of life. Within this assumption theory is characterised by exactness, clarity, complexity, superiority, or some such indicator of professional inquiry; of the ability to locate the 'truth'. Practice and its associated reasonings on the other hand, are regarded as vague, loose, and imprecise; as mere opinion which is available for the inquiry and reordering of theory. One of the devices for doing this is the synthesis of elements of practice into a logical whole. This performs the function for theory of measuring the rationality of particular practices. It is the use of this device in relation to the establishment of sexual contact through magazines that Section I examines.

The use of the ideal type is most commonly associated with Max Weber. However though this method of proceeding was central to Weber's interpretive sociology it is not confined to that order of inquiry. As Alfred Schutz continually pointed out, typicality is a common means for the ordering of daily experiences according to expectancies and relevances. We all in a routine way use, construct, change and develop a whole range of typologies in dealing with everyday experiences. Their construction and use depends upon our relevances and expectancies, and in the sense of forming a base for relevance and expectancy, they help constitute them. As a means for our common orientation towards events and actions,

typicality presents to the theorist a range of factual, existent structures which he can re-order according to his professional commitments. Unfortunately the process of typification is left unexamined im this second order construction. The assumed division between theory and practice is formally replicated im the work of theorising, while it relies upon the common ground of everyday reasoning.

The routine construction and use of typologies is relied upon and left unexamined by theory; the implicit recognition of phenomena for 'what they are' and their unity and difference with 'other' phenomena are the crucial grounds for texturing theory's tracts. Yet this intersubjectivity is of little interest to professional theory. Why? It is a nexus which is not open to quantification. It is a sharing between men which is thoroughly social. A consequence of this is that intersubjectivity does not readily fit with the strictures concerning theory's formal and structural pronouncements about the state of the world and the place of man within it. Also the topic of intersubjectivity requires that the inquirer cease treating his investigations as forays into situations where he is an independent, unbiased force. It forces theory to focus upon its own process of understanding, and im this way can place it in an 'uncomfortable' position in relation to its formal, methodological programmes.

This Section seeks to approach this area of commonness between theory and practice via an examination of the construction and use of a typology of sexual actors. The structure of the Section as such seeks to perform two purposes. Firstly it aims to present the findings of an investigation into sexual contact magazines. Secondly the opportunity is taken to examine the shared methods and practices for the creation and development of typologies. This

latter feature of the Section is seen as a more general contribution to an examination of the methods used in sociological investigation, both lay and professional.

My first encounter with contact magazines came while I was working at a factory. They had been brought into the canteen by someone as, I suppose, a source of interest, speculation, and amusement for the other workers. Prior to seeing these contact magazines I had heard about them, but treated what I heard with some doubt. However when I saw them during a morning's tea-break I was amazed. This feeling changed to an interest in how people could and did put themselves up for sexual use and the social processes involved. Accordingly I decided to attempt to find out more about the world of contact magazines and the people involved. After a period of seeking out contact magazines and answering advertisements I realised that I could recognise advertisements for what they were 'at a glance' and possessed a typology of contact actors. This realisation was heightened by the fact that others, such as my workmates who as far as I knew had no contact involvement, could also bring some set of types into play for the interpretation of advertisements. But how could such recognition be done, and how is a typology of contact actors produced? This Section addresses these questions.

CHAPTER ONE

CRACKING THE CODE

> Do you take me for such a fool to think
> I'd make contact with one who tries to
> hide what he don't know to begin with?
> [Bob Dylan, "Positively Fourth Street"]

In his novel "Cannery Row", John Steinbeck sets down the story of the more or less imaginary inhabitants of a community. These people are "as the man once said, 'whores, pimps, gamblers, and sons of bitches', by which he meant Everybody. Had the man looked through another peep-hole he might have said: 'Saints and angels and martyrs and holy men', and he would have meant the same thing." [1967]. Steinbeck's juxtaposition of two possible accounts of the inhabitants of "Cannery Row" focuses upon the process of making sense.

This process has its place in the creative relation between 'the typical' and 'the essential'; between the Everybody of "Cannery Row" and its various constituting essences such as "a poem, a stink, a grating noise, a quality of light, a tone, a habit, a nostalgia, a dream." [1967]. In everyday life the engagement between the typical and orderly, and the constituting essence is to be found in coming to terms with experience. It is upon this basis of social practice that types and essences are created, constructed, and constituted.

This chapter will present a description of the interpretive negotiations which occur in the use of ideal

typical constructions for understanding experienced events. The area in relation to which this will be done is that of 'making contact'. Here, action revolves around contact magazines which present a range of advertisements of a sexual nature, from which possible sexual partners can be selected. Though this selection is defined by the biographical situation and details of the advertiser and reader, fundamental to the selection process is the problem of understanding. This problem is raised by the features presented by advertisements which require interpreting. This first chapter on making contact will consist of an introduction to the subterranean world of contact magazines, and suggest how a major type of advertiser can be recognised: the prostitute.

CONTACT MAGAZINES: The interest in inquiring into contact advertisements is twofold. Firstly it enables the presentation of knowledge on an area which is socially subterranean and recent in appearance, though one which has a historical progression. For example "The Matrimonial News" in the 1870's had a similar form to modern day contact magazines [lists of advertisements with box numbers], but with a different content of meaning. The emphasis was upon locating people for matrimony rather than for sexual relationships [R. Pearsall, 1971]. Secondly the topic of making contact provides the opportunity for an examination of the ways in which people make sense of and understand experiences at both the level of membership and professional inquiry.

As a viable enterprise making contact requires certain basic materials. A knowledge of the contact process is needed, which depends on the availability of contact magazines. Some 'girlie' magazines, commonly available in

newsagents [e.g. "Private", "Weekend Sex", "New Direction", "Sexpert"], have a contact section. These magazines also contain classified advertisements for more specialised contact magazines which are made up entirely of contact advertisements [e.g. "Rendezvous", "Linkup", "Aquarius", "Pathway"].

The sexual acts portrayed in both types of contact magazines are parallel to their availability. In the 'specialist' magazines more deviant or specialist sexual forms are to be found [e.g. transvestism, humiliation, bondage, slavery]. The specialist magazines however, like the popular type, consist in the main of advertisements from prostitutes, couples, single females, and single males who seek less radical forms of sexual relationship [e.g. a client relationship, wife-swapping, seeking 'genuine' partners of the opposite sex].

As the type of contact magazine mirrors the deviance of the acts portrayed there [i.e. general or specialised], so a similar reflection is cast upon the population of contact makers. In its logical consistency, this reflection is formed as a continuum of the possibilities of contact involvement. At one extreme stands 'the outsider' who has little or no knowledge of making contact, and at the other 'the insider'. A corollary of this picture is that it is along this logical and typical continuum that 'the outsider' must pass in a career of contact involvement [E. Goffman, 1970]. Whether careers follow this ideal conceptual construction is another matter.

The presentation of advertisements and the administrative organisation associated with it is similar in both popular and specialised magazines. Advertisements are listed, often according to sex [e.g. females, males, couples], and given box

numbers. Some advertisements are accompanied by a photograph of the advertiser, generally in some stage of undress or naked. Often the face of the advertiser is hidden or covered. Along with the presentation of advertisements, magazines supply instructions on how to make contact. Repliers have to send their letters to the magazine with the box number of each advertisement replied to written on the back of the envelope. All replies then have to be placed together in an envelope and sent to the magazine with the correct forwarding fee [e.g. twenty five pence for each letter, one pound for five]. The magazine then forwards the replies to the advertisers who then have the choice of contacting the replier directly.

Magazines also specify the cost of advertising. Females advertising for males do so free of charge. Couples are charged one pound for twenty words, extra words being charged at six pence per word. Males are charged two pounds, with the same charge for extra words. These prices are taken from the specialist "Rendezvous" magazine, and represent the basic charge for advertising in the contact world. Other magazines charge more.

For example, for a male to advertise in "Sexpert", a 'girlie' magazine, costs five pounds for twenty words. However, if the advertiser wishes his advertisement to appear in the four other magazines which are associated with "Sexpert" the cost is fifteen pounds. Females' advertisements, though sent only to one magazine, often appear in other associated 'girlie' magazines without the advertiser's consent or permission. For example, one female placed an advertisement in "Sexpert" which appeared in four other magazines. Not only

was her permission not sought, but the advertisement appeared month after month even after she had written to complain.

As a supplement to enable the clear reading of advertisements, magazines provide a list of abbreviations of contact argot:

AC/DC - A male who likes sex with male or female, or a female who likes sex with female or male.

O - Oral sex by the mouth.

CP - Corporal punishment with whips, canes, etc. Bondage is similar.

Transvestite - One who dresses in clothes of the opposite sex.

Voyeur - One who likes to watch sex by others.

DIY - Do it yourself. Some use vibrators, dildos, etc.

ALA - All letters answered.

SAE - Stamped addressed envelope.

WE - Well endowed, large where it matters. ["Rendezvous"]

The above is the knowledge which this chapter takes as a beginning for analysis, together with a more formal and logical ideal typical structure of sexual actors:

TYPOLOGY OF CONTACT ACTORS:

REPLIERS SOUGHT	ADVERTISERS				
	PAYMENT		NONPAYMENT		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Couple
Males	****	P	****	G	3
Females	****	****	G	L	3
Couples	****	****	3	3	S
Females/ Couples	****	****	G3	AC/DC 3	AC/DC 3 S
Males/ Couples	****	****	AC/DC T V	G3	AC/DC 3 S
Males/Females/ Couples	****	****	AC/DC T V	AC/DC 3 G	AC/DC 3 S

Key: **** - Classifications not available.
P - Prostitute.
G - 'Genuine', heterosexual, non-client association.
3 - Three-some; sex between three people.
AC/DC - Bisexual.
L - Lesbian.
T V - Transvestite.
S - Swapping sexual partners.

This typology is drawn from some reading of contact magazines, which was based in and made possible by commonsense knowledge of sexual matters. The genesis of the typology is as yet untraced except to the extent that it in some way satisfies Durkheim's dictum for the construction of types: "a certain number of species should be determined according to their resemblances and differences." [1970]. The definite nature which the typology portrays ascribes a rule-like quality to the actors. This defining characteristic of ideal types requires actors to be monothetic according

to a constant characteristic [A. Schutz, 1972].

In a typology of contact actors one important defining factor is the payment of a fee. This factor is central to the type 'prostitute', whereas its inapplicability is a constitutive part of other types. In actual instances of contact behaviour [e.g. reading advertisements], this broad differentiation resulting from the feature 'a fee' is problematic. The payment of a fee is not a clear cut issue, but is involved with other elements of portraying work.

The existence of ideal types however, indicates that problematic areas of experience such as making contact can be resolved for a person's practical purposes and thereby discovered to have 'objective' features. The resolution of what an advertisement 'is' or what it means lies in the interaction between typical knowledge and new experience. This engagement is grounded in and through interpretive negotiations as an occasion of discovery. 'Discovery' is thus a task faced by the reader of advertisements. For the advertiser it is portrayal. These two elements are features of language which imply one another: to account for a discovery entails examining language for documents of meaning, which can then be expressed through language [i.e. a re-portrayal of what 'was' portrayed].

In order to reach some understanding of the interpretive work which occurs in making contact, it is necessary to examine the argot of making contact as a resource for portrayal and as a topic for discovery. This examination is into the use of members' language and the methods for portraying and discovering contact or "telling the code" [D. L. Weider, 1974].

The interpretive problematic presented by contact advertisements is the rules by which they are to be coded.

This problematic does not rest upon the existence [thatness] but upon the essence [whatness] of advertisements. The resolution of the problematic as the location of essence depends upon coding the features presented by advertisements. This process has as a basis the assumption that behaviour has a 'feature-laden' status. This status amounts to the belief that behaviour is meaningful - it is not mere behaviour but is social action - and that this meaning is signified in the behaviour itself [cf. the documentary method of interpretation, H. Garfinkel, 1967].

Features constituted in this way, as aspects of an underlying pattern, demonstrate the availability and plausibility of that pattern for reportage. The problem presented by advertisements therefore is: What is the code which enables the accomplishment of object status, and what are the features which signify this status?

THE FEATURES OF PROSTITUTES' ADVERTISEMENTS: The majority of advertisements in contact magazines are placed by prostitutes. Their advertisements present various interrelated features which amount to a description for the recognition of the advertisements 'for what they are'. In detailing these features here, use will be made of two prostitutes' advertisements, A and B:

> A: Xmas is coming gentlemen, so why not treat yourself to a little extra goody. I'll cater for your every whim. I'm 23, highly sexed and totally uninhibited. So make your Xmas wish come true with this rather attractive young lady. Will guarantee reply to all SAE's. Any age. Cheshire.

B: Attractive 22 year old blonde, 36-24-36,
would like sexy gents to visit me in my
comfortable home. I will bend over
backwards for the right type. Write soon
I am waiting. s.a.e. for same day reply.
Lancs.

An obvious feature of these advertisements is the portrayal of a possible sexual relationship which specifies those to be involved. This feature is not unique to prostitutes' advertisements, for it is constitutive of any advertisement within the contact domain. It does however, mark an initial judgemental beginning for differentiating out forms of advertisements and advertisers. Having thus located the gender form of an advertisement, as in the above cases female advertisers seeking male repliers, it is then possible to move on to an examination of the advertisement for evidence of it belonging to a specific pattern of behaviour.

Prostitutes' advertisements are also persuasive literary compositions. Like 'the portrayal of a sexual relationship', this feature is not unique to prostitutes' advertisements. Persuasion can be seen to be a required feature for any contact advertisement because making contact depends upon inducing readers to become part of the portrayed relationship. Because of this, persuasion, just as much as any concrete feature, is constitutive of the scenes in which it is to be found.

The feature 'persuasion' is especially important to prostitutes' advertisements, and in locating them, because they must handle the issues of illegality and delicacy. The illegal nature of being a prostitute is a concern which requires a low-profile and non-blatant management of that

status. The issue of delicacy is a concern because of the dominant rule 'a fee' and its connection with sexual relations. The normal and expected form of a description of sexual relations is in non-client terms [e.g. marriage, romance, courtship]. The establishment of a client relationship in relation to sex removed from normal and expected situations of meaning raises the possibility of 'shock' on behalf of the reader. It must be noted however, that this shock has its place at 'the outsider' end of the contact continuum which lessens in the move towards 'the socialised member'. Persuasion functions in two senses according to the degree of socialisation. Firstly, for the new member it minimises the possibility of a shock reaction. Secondly, for all members persuasion stands as an inducement to choose one advertisement rather than another.

The central function of persuasion is that it is a means for managing the client relationship without emphasis upon the payment of a fee. As an occasion of exchange the prostitute and client formulation is informed by persuasion which at the same time subsumes that formulation under a more general and unspecific one [e.g. fantasy]. The starkness of the cash nexus is transformed into a shimmering image of willingness and submission [e.g."I'll cater for your every whim. I'm 23, highly sexed and totally uninhibited."]. Persuasive composition is a token which permits the formulation of a client relationship as an expected outcome of a reading. Such a formulation is connected to a reading in a very mundane way. Persuasive composition draws forth the tautological assertion that an advertisement is 'professionally done'. This comments upon the reflexive nature of the form of an

advertisement in revealing its originator.

Persuasion is a method for managing being a prostitute seeking clients. Because of this it occupies the position of sales-language. Constituting sales-language through persuasive composition sets prostitutes' advertisements in relief from others which portray the 'girl seeks boy' gender form. The emphasis of sales-language is objectified outside itself; it is concerned with an 'objective' social formation rather than the sexual formation which it proposes. Prostitutes' advertisements thus lack specific social and sexual determinations for contact [e.g. specifications of age, sexual relationship, social relationship], other than the most vague.

This vagueness is an essential ambiguity which is part of the message of sales-language. The location by a reader of ambiguity as a necessary requirement for the composition of an advertisement focuses attention to the reasons for that ambiguity [e.g. prostitution]. Vagueness is necessary because of the need to manage a problematic composition [being a prostitute seeking clients], and is a direct consequence of the social foundation of prostitutes' advertisements. As this foundation is to be found in the material relations of value and commodity, prostitutes ground their proposals in vague hints on the status of the male sexual partner [e.g. "kind", "generous", "considerate", "appreciative"].

For example, advertisements A and B present portrayals of the advertiser and possible replier. What connects these portrayed statuses are the specifications "treat yourself", "a little extra goody", "cater" [A], "visit me in my comfortable home", and "will bend over backwards for the

right type" [B]. These hints place the possible relationship outside normal interaction [e.g. "a little extra goody" and "visit me"]. As these terms place the contact outside everyday affairs and into the management of a professional relationship, so they also designate the type of domain from which the advertisements spring. In "treat yourself", "cater", and the juxtaposition of the sexual allusion "bend over backwards" with "the right type", advertisers are presented for use according to hinted at means.

Through essential ambiguity and vague hints, advertisers stand as commodities for use within a contractual domain. Simply, advertisers formulate themselves as commodities through pair-relating value ["treat yourself", "the right type"], with use ["every whim", "bend over backwards"]. As Lefebvre has described it, within the contractual domain of the prostitute-client relationship formulated in advertisements [A and B], "money holds sway over human beings" [H. Lefebvre, 1972]. The reflexive character of commodity relations is also pointed out by Lefebvre. He states that these formations only exist through the interrelations of people, yet they exist apart from them and modify their relations: "reifying the latter and making them abstract." [1972].

PROSTITUTES' LETTERS: The advertisements from A and B were replied to. In doing this I attempted to 'pass' as a newcomer to making contact seeking instructions on how to act [see: 'Advertisers', Chapter 2]. The reply from A, Janie, was as follows:

Thanks for writing. The only things I need to know about you really, are your tastes in sex, so that I may satisfy them fully. I am a very passionate, lustful young girl, and although I charge a fee I adore most forms of sexual pleasure [NO CP or Bondage please]. Why not phone me details soon and let me satisfy your desires.

Passionately Yours,

Janie

Rather like the reply from Janie, that from B, Sylvia, was concerned to present details on herself, state that she charged a fee, and arrange a meeting:

I am an attractive 22yr. old blonde 36. 24. 36. Very sexy and uninhibited and my fee is £15 for a Good session of up to two hours. I am free evenings and Weekends and I am very clean and discreet. Thank you very much for my letter from you.

Hope to hear from you soon.

Phone or write soon.

Love Sylvia

Both letters state that the relationship proposed in the advertisements and which is still possible, is to be regarded under the rule of payment. However the ways in which Janie and Sylvia do this are different. The kinds of context which they make observable in their accounts derives from their practices for doing so. Stating the rule of payment thus cannot be separated from 'how' this is done [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

Janie formulates her account euphemistically. She seeks to provide for the feature of 'payment' in a way that renders it of little interest; as inconsequential. This is done by

emphasising her sexual character, and seeking to present this as unconnected to the feature of 'payment'. Janie states in-so-many-words that "although" she is a prostitute, her enjoyment of sexual practices [possibly with the replier] is not connected to this.

In contrast with Janie, Sylvia presents a narrative which formulates the essential strands of the client relationship. She formulates 'who' is available, 'what' is available [being "sexy and uninhibited"], and 'how' this is available ["a Good session of up to two hours."] These three features of Sylvia's availability rest on the fundamental understanding of exchange-value as a means of carrying out sexual relations.

It is probable that the persuasive form of Janie's and Sylvia's letters stems from the request for instructions from a newcomer. For example, a reply was sent to an advertisement which sought to 'pass' as a competent member by stating that the replier was in the advertiser's area regularly and requested a meeting: "Thanks for replying. To discuss further details and arrange a meeting, phone me anytime. My number is [ ]." This number was called, and discussing "further details" consisted of being told the price, and being asked when I could attend a meeting.

THE CODE: The above features are a code for the recognition of prostitutes' advertisements. As a code they move into themselves in ever greater detail from 1] the portrayal of the 'girl seeks boy' relationship, 2] persuasive composition, 3] sales-language, 4] essential ambiguity, 5] formulations as hints of a client relationship, 6] pair-relating use with value, to 7] a possible sexual relationship as a commodity for exchange. The actual written words which the developing code structures are separated, related, and interrelated in deeper

moves which attempt to reveal the foundation [origin] of those words. The interpretation of advertisements as 'prostitute' and the code which accounts for that outcome, depends upon what Halliday in discussing the sociology of literature has called the immediate thesis [e.g. making contact], and the underlying theme [i.e. the meaning of an advertisement] [M. A. K. Halliday, 1973]. The theme [e.g. prostitution] generates the form of the thesis [e.g. the above features], through which both theme and thesis are realised.

To locate advertisements under the category 'prostitute' and construct the required code in that location for accounting purposes, requires formulating advertisements according to their commodity-for-use-and-exchange basis. This is in terms of evidence and experience. A deep assumption for the accomplishment of such a project is that the processes of reading and writing provide an objective form of life. In the process of typifying, the determining knowledge consists of ideas on definite social relations. Similarly, the accomplishment of a type requires the people and actions experienced as 'things'; it makes them definite objects. Thus constituting a code for the recognition of advertisements as belonging to prostitutes reveals the material social relations between people. A prostitute's advertisement depends for an adequate reading upon capturing the materiality of the proposed relationship [i.e. people as commodities], through the development of a codified structure which reveals the "material relations between persons and social relations between things" [K. Marx, 1976].

The relationship between readers and prostitutes is that between the products of theoretical and practical labours; interactants are material objects defined by the utilities

of use, value, and exchange. The meeting in reading is not between people but between theoretical products which reflect the social relation of the producers. This reflection comes about through the act of interpretation. Features are located, as above, by the use of a guiding rule and fore-knowledge; the knowledge is known to testify to the order being revealed. Such a 'correct' schema however, for locating the meanings of contact advertisements is not needed. An occasioned rule and guiding set of assumptions would enable the categorisation of advertisements as of 'some kind'. The suitability and relevance of that categorisation would be informed upon by the actions based on it and their consequences.

In situations of choice, interpretation uses an occasioned searching rule which produces features which are characteristic with that rule. This is not in any case of searching with a rule; a rule os either relevant to actual material or it is not. It is in the engagement between experience and prior knowledge that the occasion of interpretation is to be found as a procedure for matching rules and material. In this occasion, the rule which reasonably encompasses the experience is the rule that guides. The relational bridging between knowledge and experience, between occasioned rules and material to be interpreted, results in the resolution of the problematic as a characteristic of the rule (i.e. the accomplishment testifies to an underlying pattern). Features constituted in this way are located as a codified scheme available for use in further interpretation.

The code which enables the location and typification of advertisements is generated by the quest to 'find out' in relation to practical ends (i.e. as specified by lay or

professional interests]. This does not happen in any immediate sense. A structure of interrelated rules does not appear 'at one', but is in continuous development and disintegration [i.e. as occasioned]. Rules are variously adopted and dropped depending upon their practicality in situations [cf. D. Roy, 1970]. The task of interpretation consists of locating evidence for some general structure or idea with which to assemble advertisements into a structural order. In this assembly work, evidence simultaneously becomes the beginning of a structure with which to codify the encountered and [judged to be] relevant material. A code is thus developed for interpretation in interpretation.

The code for the recognition of prostitutes' advertisements depicted here dissects the contact domain into two different orders according to the rule of and evidence for payment. Though advertisements of a non-payment kind may never have been encountered by a reader, their possibility and patterned texture can be anticipated as a function of the structure of knowledge constructed and occasioned in past experience [i.e. knowledge of objective social formations]. Hand in hand with the construction of the code goes an awareness of its practicality as situated logic-in-use for the recognition and ordering of prostitutes' advertisements. The prostitute recognition structure in providing situated-logical expectancies generates the following list of features which advertisements of a non-payment kind can be anticipated to have:

1: Non-payment advertisements are portrayed according to reciprocal use and not for exchange.

2: Non-payment advertisements pair-relate constituent elements [e.g. physical attributes - sexual

acts], but not in material terms of value.

3: Non-payment advertisements formulate their nature in terms suggestive of a relationship other than a professional-client one.

4: Non-payment advertisements may be ambiguous, but they are not necessarily so; ambiguity is a consequence of the limited nature of the message and not a function of it.

5: Non-payment advertisements are attempts to locate specific personnel; they seek to locate rather than to sell.

6: Non-payment advertisements may be 'girl seeks boy'; other portrayed types of gender relations are certainly of a non-payment kind.

This latter implied element of the code consists of a differentiation of gender relationships according to the conventional notions about prostitution [e.g. prostitutes are female]. It is thus not expected that any other kind of relationship than 'girl seeks boy' will have to be read according to the payment rule. The six expectancies as a whole establish the counter nature of non-payment as a wholly sexual-physical matter.

A reader in possession of [some of] the prostitute recognition code can thus expect non-payment advertisements to be expressions of the need for satisfaction [or enjoyment, or pleasure, etc.], aimed towards reciprocal use. Non-payment advertisements can be expected to depend for their essential nature upon [the advertiser presenting and the reader locating] the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. Though ordering the contact domain in this way depends upon a

distinction, there is common ground between payment and non-payment forms. This is the commodity form of language; or at least the commodity expressiveness of written language. This divorces itself from the mundane world [man's practical activities] through a concentration upon a monothetic object; upon a 'thing'. In the case of non-payment advertisements this is use-value; in the case of prostitutes' advertisements it is exchange-value. This commodity feature of language is an integral feature in interpreting the contact domain. That notice of it is required to enter into making contact marks this commodity feature as, to use Cicourel's term [1973], an interpretive procedure. It is a property which allows meaning and categorisations to be assigned to events in a practically definite way.

The commodity feature of language [the reciprocity of exchange-value and use-value], interlocks with a procedure described by Cicourel. This is the normal form, where interactants assume that each other possesses similar knowledge and recipes of what constitutes normal appearances [1973]. Through the use of such a procedure as the reciprocity of exchange-value and use-value in language, meanings and definite structures are made available by and for those engaged in making contact. However the availability of such meaning and structure is largely unstated, being provided by the background expectancies awakened in orienting to an event through such a procedure. Thus, advertisements 'say more than is written'.

The feature of 'saying more than is written' can be seen from the 'results' of two 'test' advertisements, which were placed in the same issue of a contact magazine. The advertisements read:

X200: Young lady, 38-24-36, seeks kind and considerate gents for evenings of beautiful bliss. Cheshire.

X108: Attractive female graduate, 26, wishes to meet sincere and genuine males for friendship and fun. No fees.

Cheshire.

The impact which each advertisement had was different. To advertisement X200, there were fourteen replies; to advertisement X108 there were ninety five replies. The form of these replies also connected with this differential response. For example, a typical reply to advertisement X200 read:

> Dear Advertiser,
>
> I read your advert in Rendezvous and would very much like to meet you. It would be alright cash wise.

On the other hand, replies to advertisement X108 were much different:

> Dear 108,
>
> Your advertisement in Rendezvous was refreshingly different from all the others, and I should very much like to hear from you. I am interested in beauty in many forms - images, people, music, making love, conversation.
>
> Please write and tell me about yourself and if you have a telephone, perhaps we could have an initial beautiful conversation.

For readers, as the above examples demonstrate, the orientation which advertisements express through commodity

language establishes 'the market'. The establishment of the market situation comes about through the provision of the means for making contact by the producers of contact magazines. However it is only through advertisers' orientations to those means in commodity language [the language of the market], that those means continue to be re-produced. Similarly, the establishment and re-production of the market depends upon the sense of social structure employed by those who participate. Participation via commodity language leads to the construction of the situation according to a sense of social structure which shapes the forms of the possible social relations [e.g. exploitation].

CHAPTER TWO

ELABORATING THE CODE

Chapter One has accounted for the availability of the category 'prostitute' through the commodity form of language as a procedure for portraying and recognising exchange-value. It remains to describe and account for the remaining categories in the typology of contact actors, and locate the means for the portrayal and recognition of non-payment [i.e. as a defining property of contact categories other than that of 'prostitute'].

GENDER FORMS AND SEXUALITY: The non-payment area of the contact 'market' is greatly defined by gender forms and their interrelations. The most ambiguous possibility available is that which consists of the same gender make-up as prostitutes' advertisements ['girl seeks boy']. This is because it lacks the definiteness which other types of gender make-up possess. The 'girl seeks boy' formulation could well correspond to the normal form 'prostitute', whereas 'couple seeks couple' or 'girl seeks girl' awakens other ideas with which to populate the possible course of making contact in such gender relations. Payment is not one of them. The 'girl seeks boy' case is further complicated by the mixture of gender forms found in contact magazines. The normal form analytic approach has to contend with the concrete collection of a large number of advertisements from females. This can be seen in Table 1 below:

ADVERTISERS BY GENDER	EXPOSED NO 18	PATHWAY NO 77	CONSORT NO 17	TURN ON NO 6	RENDEZVOUS APRIL	TOTAL
MALE+FEMALE	109	16	8	29	141	303
BISEXUAL FEMALE	18	14	3	11	64	110
FEMALE	52	132	53	204	436	877
MALE	42	99	19	15	257	432
TOTAL	221	261	83	259	898	1722

TABLE 1: The number of advertisements contained in contact magazines, and their constitution in relation to gender form.

As Table 1 shows, there are a large number of advertisements in contact magazines which are portrayed as coming from females [i.e. 'girl seeks boy']. This is both within individual magazines [those in Table 1 range from 23.5% to 78.7%], and between them [the female category makes up 50.92% of all advertisements in Table 1]. The large number of advertisements from females can be seen to result from advertising being free when females advertise for males. The only exception amongst those magazines listed in Table 1 is "Exposed" which offers free advertising to both females and couples.

Fundamental to the process of interpreting and typifying advertisements are classificatory and relational devices. The set 'gender' is a prime classificatory device for those involved in making contact. The set is oriented to as an invariant, basic means for the ordering of advertisements. Based upon this prime classification is the relational device of 'specific sexuality' whereby gender classifications become relevant. This is because of the relational connections established between advertiser and reader by the sexual nature of the advertisement. Gender thus provides for a basic classification of contact advertisers, and the specific acts which are portrayed further differentiates them according to the sexual relevances of the reader.

The classificatory and relational connections between the set 'gender' can be seen in the tables below, which further breaks down the advertisements in the five magazines reported in Table 1 by gender and the formulated nature of the advertisements:

TABLE 2: ADVERTISERS BY GENDER - FEMALE

GENDER SOUGHT	RELATIONSHIP	EXPOSED NO 18	PATHWAY NO 77	CONSORT NO 17	TURN ON NO 6	RENDEZVOUS APRIL	TOTAL
MALE	Entertain	29	77	18	94	251	469
	Modelling	6	14	5	28	41	94
	Friendship	8	10	8	32	27	85
	Escort	2	4	6	4	23	39
	C/Punishment	1	5	5	5	22	38
	Voyeurism	2	8	5	14	16	45
	Transvestism	-	-	1	1	3	5
	Three-some	1	1	1	1	22	26
	Rubber Fetish	-	-	-	1	-	1
	AC/DC	-	1	-	2	-	3
	Oral Sex	-	2	-	3	1	6
	Massage	1	3	-	7	3	14
	Striptease	-	-	-	1	-	1
FEMALE	C/Punishment	-	-	1	-	1	2
	Bestiality	1	-	-	1	2	4
COUPLE/MALE/ FEMALE	C/Punishment	2	8	5	14	16	45
	Massage	-	2	2	1	-	5
	AC/DC	-	-	-	2	3	5
	Friendship	1	4	-	6	8	19
	Three-some	-	1	-	-	-	1
TOTAL		204	52	53	132	436	877

TABLE 3: ADVERTISERS BY GENDER - FEMALE BISEXUAL

GENDER SOUGHT	RELATIONSHIP	EXPOSED NO 18	PATHWAY NO 77	CONSORT NO 17	TURN ON NO 6	RENDEZVOUS APRIL	TOTAL
FEMALE	Female Love	-	2	-	-	6	8
	Friendship	3	-	1	-	13	17
	AC/DC	11	9	2	8	29	59
	Lesbian	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Lesbian - AC/DC	3	2	-	2	8	15
	Oral Sex - DIY	-	-	-	-	6	6
	Girlfriend	-	-	-	-	2	2
COUPLE	AC/DC - Three-some	1	-	-	-	-	1
FEMALE	Oral Sex	-	1	-	-	-	1
TOTAL		11	18	3	14	64	110

TABLE 4: ADVERTISERS BY GENDER - COUPLE

COUPLE	Swapping	59	3	4	14	82	162
	C/Punishment	-	1	-	2	1	4
	Voyeurism	-	1	-	-	1	2
FEMALE	Three-some	3	-	-	1	3	7
	AC/DC	7	1	-	-	8	16
MALE	Three-some	-	6	-	2	3	11
	AC/DC	-	-	-	-	2	2
MALE/FEMALE	Three-some	3	-	-	-	-	3
COUPLE/FEMALE	Swapping/Three-some	6	1	-	4	9	20
	AC/DC	10	-	1	3	4	18
COUPLE/MALE/ FEMALE	Swapping/Three-some	17	2	3	1	24	47
	Voyeurism	2	-	-	1	-	3
	Bestiality	-	1	-	-	2	3
COUPLE/MALE	Swapping/Three-some	2	-	-	1	2	5
TOTAL		29	109	8	16	141	303

TABLE 5: ADVERTISERS BY GENDER - MALE

GENDER SOUGHT	RELATIONSHIP	EXPOSED NO 18	PATHWAY NO 77	CONSORT NO 17	TURN ON NO 6	RENDEZVOUS APRIL	TOTAL
FEMALE	Friendship	28	50	12	11	141	242
	Modelling	4	6	-	1	7	18
	Oral Sex	5	4	1	-	10	20
	Striptease	1	-	-	-	-	1
	AC/DC	1	-	-	-	-	1
	DIY	1	-	-	-	1	2
	C/Punishment	-	13	2	1	17	33
	Rubber Fetish	-	2	-	-	3	5
	Massage	-	2	-	-	5	7
MALE	Homosexual	-	-	-	-	4	4
COUPLE	Three-some	-	-	1	-	7	8
COUPLE/FEMALE	Friendship	-	10	-	2	27	39
	C/Punishment	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Transvestism	1	3	1	-	8	13
	AC/DC	-	2	1	-	11	14
	Bestiality	-	-	-	-	1	1
MALE/FEMALE	AC/DC	-	1	-	-	1	2
	C/Punishment	-	6	1	-	14	21
TOTAL		42	99	19	15	257	432

Tables 1 and 2 show that by far the largest number of advertisements come from females. This would appear to signify that those seeking females on a non-client basis would have a greater range of choice than among other gender formations. This is not so. Free advertising and national distribution provide prostitutes with a low cost - high coverage means of obtaining clients. For example, in the issue of "Rendezvous" above, only 6.66% of female advertisers seeking males portrayed themselves on a non-payment basis [e.g. 'no fees'], while 67.65% provided such ambiguous terms as 'entertain' and 'cater'.

For a male replier seeking a female on non-payment basis this means that he is confined to the minority of advertisements which specify the inapplicability of the payment rule. All other advertisements which do not specify this are under doubt. The situation is further complicated in that not all advertisements from females are of the 'girl seeks boy' kind. They may include couples, females, or all three gender groups. This complication is further extended by the introduction of specifically sexual formulations. Some limit the reader's possible involvement to a service relationship [e.g.'modelling', 'escort'], while the feasability of others depends upon the degree of sexual involvement [e.g. 'Corporal Punishment', 'AC/DC'].

Amongst the sexual categories of Table 2, the 'entertain' and 'escort' categories account for 57.92% of the total. When the other categories which almost certainly involve payment and are of a service kind are added to these two main ones [corporal punishment for males, massage for males, modelling, and striptease], the percentage of the total rises to 74.68%. This

is compared to 9.69% of the total who seek males for 'friendship and sex'.

In Table 5, listing types of advertisement placed by males, the situation is reversed: 56.01% of male advertisers seek females for 'friendship and sex', while a further 9.02% formulate this relationship for both females and couples. Advertisers seeking female models make up 4.16% of the total, while one advertiser offers himself to females as a striptease artist ["Healthy young man, mid thirties, will strip at private parties. No fee but sorry ladies I am not impudent enough to reveal all."].

Advertisements from bisexual females centre around the formulation 'AC/DC' or variations on that theme [e.g. 'female love', 'friendship and enjoyment', 'girlfriend']. In a minority of cases, as with the other tables, the sexual formulation consists of the portrayal of explicit sexual acts [e.g. 'oral sex', 'DIY']. The term 'lesbian' is often used interchangably with 'AC/DC'. For example: "Lesbian or AC/DC female to teach joys of love to 29 year old, 34-24-36, my husband to participate if desired.". Purely lesbian advertisements are in a minority, and when encountered provide their own argot as a token of membership. The form of language formulates 'lesbian' as a more precise form of sexuality which excludes males: "Young attractive butch wanted, preferably camp, must have car.".

Among advertisements placed by couples peaks occur along the sexual parameters of swapping and troilism. For all genders these two categories make up 84.15% of all advertisements from couples. Another two categories were formulated according to bisexuality, seeking both couples with

a bisexual wife and bisexual females, or bisexual females alone. Four categories [corporal punishment, voyeurism, bestiality, and male bisexuality], made up 4.62% of the total.

ADVERTISERS: The descriptive figures in the above tables will be further illustrated by instances of actual contact. Although it would be preferable to document each sexual type of advertisement and advertiser, the nature of making contact makes this impossible. People engaged in this aspect of life are not open to formal methodological approaches; they are secretive. Also, locating the substance of an advertisement depends upon replying to an advertisement and 'passing' that off as an appropriate reply, and the advertiser choosing to 'get in touch'. Accordingly, the process of making contact is problematic.

The success rate for the research in making contact was quite low; approximately three successes for every ten advertisements answered. The strategy which was adopted in order to make contact, was an attempt to 'pass' as a newcomer to making contact who sought instructions on how to act. To do this a 'standard' letter was sent to a variety of types of contact advertisement. The letter was:

> Dear [Box number],
>
> I/We have just read your advertisement in [ ], and am/are more than interested in it. However, as this is the first time I/we have replied to an advertisement I/we are not sure what you would wish to know about me/us, or what would be expected of me/us if we meet. I am/We are [personal details relevant to advertisement - age, looks, height, marital status]. Perhaps you

could write back giving me/us more information and details on yourself and your interests.

Yours faithfully,

In replying to advertisements it became clear that there was an order of availability: 1] prostitutes and males in all sexual categories [e.g. from the major category of 'friendship and sex' to the minority categories of 'CP' and 'TV']; 2] couples; 3] bisexual females; 4] females seeking males on a non-payment basis. Members of each of these groups were contacted, as Table 6 shows:

ADVERTISERS BY GENDER	GENDER SOUGHT	RELATION	CONTACT WITH
Male	[Couple/Female] Male.	TV, CP, Bondage, Oral Sex.	Freda
Male	[Female]Couple	Domination, Bondage, Torture, Slavery.	George
Male	Female	Friendship	Mike
Male	Female	CP	Ron
Bisexual Female	Female	Female love.	Emily
Bisexual Female	Female	Mutual pleasure	Carol
Bisexual Female	Female	Oral sex.	Veronica
Couple	[Female/Male] Couple	Bit of fun. Oral sex.	Mildred and Jim
Couple	[Couple/Female] Male	Three-some.	Charles and Marjorie
Couple	[Couple/Male] Female	Stimulating experiences.	Sue and Brian
Female	Male	Would like to meet.	Joyce
Female	Male	Would like to meet.	Eve

N/B: 'Passing' letter were set according to the gender outside the brackets.

From Table 6, it would appear that the order of availability is similar for all gender categories. This is not so. The listed four male contacts have been selected to illustrate the gender relationships available [male-male, male-couple, male-female/'friendship', male-female/specific

sex act]. However, actual contact with males numbered ten. A similar approach has been adopted in the case of couples, from a contacted number of eight. The selected contacts with female bisexuals, from a number of five, show the patterned texture of a career in making contact. In the case of females seeking males without payment the two stated cases represent the sum total contacted out of a possible fifteen [excluding those advertisements portrayed in the 'entertain' or 'cater' style].

FREDA: Freda's advertisement covers the whole range of gender relationships except female bisexuals:

> Discreet T.V. would like to meet sexy couples, ladies, gents, over 30 for mutual pleasure, O, mild bondage, C.P.

The advertisement formulates both the gender and sexual class of the advertiser. The indication of transvestism does not carry any gender with it as such, but is available in a reading as stating the male gender. This is because the advertisement appeared in a section of male advertisements, and because it appears that it is an expectation that transvestites are male [e.g. "the love affair with a chemise can lead into the man wearing it" - R. Pearsall, 1971]. Brown [1971] has stated the everyday assumption that the "boy who acts like a girl is a sissy; the girl who acts like a boy is a tomboy.". Brown's portrayal of the male-female stereotypes is in a sense replicated in particular sexual argots in contact magazines. For example, "T.V." refers to the male gender, whereas "butch" [above] refers to the dominant partner in an exclusively female relationship. The everyday adage which Brown notes is thus changed in the contact world: males who dress as girls

are T.V's.; girls who act like men are butch.

Freda specifies the population of readers which he seeks to make contact with. This population have to satisfy the specification of an age limit and possess the quality of being "sexy". Having established with some qualifications the gender relations which are acceptable, Freda sets down the specific relational connections which provide and seek to search out relevancy ["O, mild bondage, C.P."].

Written language as an interconnected whole, reflects meanings between its structural parts. A stimulating demeanour [e.g. being "sexy"] has its sense in the relevance of situated particulars [e.g. oral sex, bondage, corporal punishment]. In linking himself with these situated particulars Freda transforms the normal gender group [male-female-couple] which he seeks into a specific sexual group. The boundaries of this group lie at least in an interest in the sexual acts which the advertisement lists. At most they lie in actual sexual participation with Freda.

The meaning of Freda's advertisement resides in the formulations of who placed the advertisement, those which it seeks, and what it proposes sexually. This dependant structure is based upon [and is also a case of], 'saying-in-so-many-words' what is to be done [H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks, 1970]. Freda's advertisement is grounded in "mutual pleasure" as a reference to reciprocal use-value; a kind of vice-versa, parasite-host relationship.

Freda made contact:

Thanks for your letter, but you tell me so little please write telling me more about yourself and if possible please send a photo, I am enclosing a couple of myself which I hope you will return, are you T.V. most of my friends are, I am most discreet and I live at the above address, its my own house so you don't have to be shy.

Hoping for a quick reply

Yours truly

Freda xxx

My surname is [ ] .

Together with this letter were two photographs of a man wearing a dress, high heels, wig, and make up. The letter is a negative response to the covert research request for instructions. In the context of this report the passing letter can easily be seen as a sociological quest to obtain information. However, in the context of placing an advertisement and receiving a reply, it is an unaccomplished response; it does not fulfill the normative requirements in the process of entering into a clandestine sexual relationship.

A more extreme example of this reaction was received from another advertiser, who returned the original passing letter and wrote on the back:

Not enough information supplied. Sorry cannot make arrangements.

P.S. Please enclose SAE when you answer adverts or else you will get no REPLY.

Freda's letter seeks to realign interaction within the terms stated in the advertisement. He requires more

information; the sexually non-specific research reply ["interested"] and the sexually specific advertisement are opposites, and result in the advertiser knowing 'who' the replier is but not 'what' is sexually possible. 'More' is a request for sexually specific details. Within this form of interaction knowledge has to be gained from non-vocal, long distance encounters. Nevertheless, such documentary interaction allows participants to elicit details of one another, to convey definitions of themselves, and to manipulate the images which are deemed relevant for attention. In his letter Freda does this by linking "more" with his sexually formulated self and that of his replier ["Discreet T.V.", and "are you T.V. most of my friends are"].

The possibility of a meeting between Freda and the replier is dependant upon the establishment of a situated definition of sexual interaction through serious discussions. Just as the unaccomplished response of a 'new' replier brings about the request for more information from Freda, so it also brings forth reassurances on entering into such a sexual relationship. Both in his advertisement and letter, Freda stresses his careful and secretive nature in managing a sexual affair, to the extent of providing a glimpse into the future establishment of a meeting ["its (sic) my own house so you don't have to be shy"].

In seeking information, providing information, and asserting a focus for the interaction Freda seeks to constitute a situation for making available sexual 'things' for mutual consumption. The provision of such a situation moves, as Heidegger has written, "in the manner of guaranteeing calculation and valuation." [1975]. Freda seeks to establish

and locate reliability and the comparative value associated with being used by the other, while using that other.

GEORGE: Freda's advertisement displayed a literary structure of formulations as a revealing and unfolding story. A similar simple narrative is to be found in George's advertisement:

> Male slave, 34, would like to meet ladies
> and couples for domination, bondage,
> torture, slavery. No fees, just fun.

Like Freda, George states 1] both his gender and sexual status, 2] the gender population which is sought, 3] the sexual interests he has as a means of relating to some part of the specified gender group, and 4] the 'kind' of relationship envisaged. This latter element of the structure ["No fees, just fun."], ties together the separate formulations. The coming together of advertiser and possible replier is cast in terms of 'enjoyment'. Normally the linking together of opposites [e.g. pain - enjoyment], is regarded as an oxymoron. However in the case of sado-masochism there is a connection between pain and enjoyment which is compatible, and which is a revision of commonly accepted conventions about sexual fulfillment.

However, this connection and compatibility has to be produced; it cannot be taken for granted and left unstated. While normalising the proposed sado-masochistic relationship through "fun", George links it with "no fees". The use of this term forms a positive-negative pairing with "fun", which produces emphasis upon the reason for and meaning of the advertisement. George states that he is not a trader providing a service, but seeking to meet others on a sexual basis for mutual pleasure. The term "no fees" is also double edged.

It both states that the advertiser does not provide a service for which he requires payment, and that prospective repliers should not be professional providers of sado-masochism.

Contact with George provided five thematic relevances: 1]a concern for secrecy; 2] an attempt to locate the exact sexual nature or composition of the possible relationship; 3] a concern with normalising sexual identity, or what Garfinkel has called "being able to give good reasons" [1967]; 4] a summary of sexual experience linked with 2] above, which states 'what do you want to do?', 'this is what I have done.'; 5] a brief physical description.

George's letter:

> Thank you for answering my ad in Rendezvous, I must ask you to treat anything I write here with complete discretion, we are as you can see from the address living quite close to each other so I'm sure anything we arrange must be kept to ourselves I hope you agree.
>
> I on my part will not try to contact you in anyway until you say so nor will I roam anywhere near where you live, as I yet do not know what you want of me or whether you just answered my ad just to see what would happen.
>
> I am not perverted or queer its just that C.P. and Bondage and being a slave to ladies and couples gives me a thrill, its just like someone playing football, fishing, gardening, etc they get a certain satisfaction out of it.
>
> I hope I haven't put you off its just that I like to be careful hope you understand.

I would if possible like you to give me some idea as to what you like so that we both can enjoy a mutual friendship.

I have had some experience at being a slave to a couple in Crewe, where I had to cook a meal and serve it and serve drinks, all this was done in various states of undress so that anything I did wrong was punished by recieving the cane or strap across bare buttocks.

Well thats roughly about what I like, Oh by the way Im 35yrs old tall and dark blue eyes, if I'm not suitable please destroy this letter and forget it OK.

Well thats it for now hope to hear from you soon.

Yours sincerely,

George

P.S. If by chance you do know me in any way I would appreciate if all this was kept confidential OK?

George

Much like Freda, George seeks to locate what ideas the replier [a fictional couple] proposes in sexual terms. He also captures the uncertainty of making contact and its form of 'blind' interaction ["whether you just answered my ad to see what would happen"]. Much more dramatic however are the interrelated themes of secrecy, the normality of being identified with a specific sexual interest, and the relating of experience within this interest.

George's concern with the establishment of secrecy reveals two facets of excluding knowledge from others. The secret produces what Simmel called "an immense enlargement of life", and yet brings with it "the consciousness that it can be betrayed" [1964]. George is aware of both the enlargement and the threat brought about about by making contact. George's

awareness of secrecy as an issue is related not only to the threat of detection, but also to normalising the correspondence between his self and a sexual deviation. For example, after accounting for the texture of the sexual practice ["C.P. and Bondage"], George connects being "put off" with being "careful". He would seem to be aware of the multiple nature of reality, and the necessity of guarding against the 'shock' of revealing details of a domain to an outsider.

George presents the intelligible character of his activities by grounding them in and comparing them to 'normal' activities and sensible motives [P. McHugh et al, 1974]. Though recognising the situated feature of his sexual practices ["I am not perverted or queer"], by connecting them with "football, fishing, gardening, etc.", George presents them as understandable, sensible, and rational. This normality is based in George's experience which makes observable the situation for the accomplishment of "a thrill". Likewise, this related experience is to be regarded under the already formulated rule for the normality of George's sexual activity.

George's language in providing the motives for his interests, has relevance and importance not as a description of a state of affairs but as a procedure for the reciprocal treatment of the parties involved. The establishment of a social relationship based upon use-value lies not just in surface expression, but comes from the background expectancies which language evokes and a reader ascribes, such that a context assumes its own situated normality.

Postscript: Meeting George Face-To-Face George's letter contained an address but not a telephone number. However an examination of local telephone directories provided this. This

raised the question of why it was not included in the letter, given that George hoped "to hear from you soon". Made aware of the possibility of George concealing the features of his contact activities, the telephone number was called. A woman answered. She said that George was not in, asked who it was, and was there any message. I replied with my first name, said that I had only recently"come into contact" with George, and that I wanted "a few words with him". I also said that I would call when George was at home; the woman said that he "worked shifts". Later that evening I had a caller.

There was a knock on the door. It was George. He was tall with dark greasy hair, unshaven, and looked grubby. He was wearing what looked to be work-clothes. He said: "My name's George and you 'phoned my home.". I answered that I had, to which he replied that his wife did not know who I was or "what's going on". I then told George who I was and what I was doing, and I asked him to help with the research by providing me with information on how he became involved in making contact and his experiences and impressions of it.

George said that he would have to think about it. Accordingly I provided him with certain times when he could call on me if he was interested in providing such information. If he was not, I told him to disregard the contact so far. The next morning George called again, and I asked him if he was willing to help. He replied: "But I don't exactly know what you want." I then provided him with evidence of being a sociologist belonging to a university, and of research carried out. I then again stated my particular interest in him as a source for providing contact knowledge, and further asked him

if his wife knew about his contact involvement. George said that she knew how he felt, but did not want to "know about it". He then said: "But what is it that you <u>really</u> want?" George's emphasis upon "really", it appeared to me, was an expression of his knowledge of the existence of different language-games [L. Wittgenstein, 1972]. Not only that, but rather like Garfinkel has noted [1967], interest was upon the <u>kind</u> of language-game.

George's question sought to locate the relevant basis [for him, sexual] of a speech. However, that speech was not located in a sexual interest, and produced confusion. Because my speech was not and could not be located in a sexual language-game, it was for George senseless. It breached the expectancies with which George was armed [i.e. that 'this' speech was somehow sexual], and produced a state of anomie. The production of such a condition of confusion may be settled by re-defining the social reality or by "leaving the field" [H. Garfinkel, 1963]. In answer to George's question I restated my research interest. He replied that he "wasn't sure", and that he would "have to think about it". George then left, never to be seen again.

<u>MIKE AND RON</u>: The cases of Freda and George present insights into different sexual realities. Freda is immersed in a sexual twilight world populated by people who appear what they are not. In comparison to Freda the sexual interests which George manifests in making contact have a place in a less sexually socialised world [i.e. in terms of sexual morals], judging from his report of only one case of being a slave. These degrees of sexual experience are expressed in their polarity in the gender relation of males seeking females.

The minority of advertisers in this group are highly specific as to their sexual intentions. The majority of advertisers however formulate their advertisements according to the heading of 'friendship and sex' or some variation of it. For example:

> Clean young man, 21, seeks female for sexual pleasure. No fees. Photo appreciated.

The structure of Mike's advertisement is similar to both those of Freda and George. Indeed, the basic task of composing an advertisement is briefly indexing the relevant features of an advertiser's social world and their orientations to it. Advertisement structure is not merely an uninteresting consequence of communicating a message, but demonstrates the accomplishment of a version of social structure.

Mike's advertisement is brief, without the sexual specificity demonstrated by both Freda and George. It is interesting to note that specifying "female" rather than 'females' is unusual. Male advertisements seeking females are generally cast in polygamous rather than monogamous terms. The relational connections between "clean young man" and "female" are non-payment and "sexual pleasure", thereby establishing the reciprocal texture of the advertiser's intentions. However, the use-value to be traded between advertiser and replier is left unstated; what "sexual pleasure" actually or really consists of is left open, subject to the ad hocing of commonsense, sexual knowledge by a reader. This non-specific element of the advertisement was explicated when Mike made contact:

Many thanks for your letter, sorry I haven't writtem before but I'm a long distance lorry driver and I'm not here much during the week.

Do you know I'm only 5'2" that puts most girls off, this is one of the reasons I've not been around much, I have been married once, but not for long, I have two boys, you might be wondering why so inexperienced, I only know the basic, and my ex wife didn't like it much, she was the first one so I didn't know much myself.

Yes if your still willing to meet me I wouldn't mind at all. Sorry it's a short letter.

Yours,

Mike

What is outstanding about Mike's reply is its elliptical and troubled character. Rather than being concerned with the establishment of sexual ties with the replier, Mike's letter is a case of what it talks about. As a letter about sexual inexperience it testifies to the inexperience. Not once during the letter does Mike mentiom anything about sex im explicit terms, yet the letter is based in a wholly sexual context. The reciprocity of commitment in a sexual act, particularly in making contact where sex is the initial basis for interaction, is rendered inapplicable by Mike's depictiom of his situatiom. Mutual sexual usage depends upom having something to trade. Because of his sexual inexperience Mike has nothing to trade with, and so experiences dissonance betweem his self-conception and his wish to make contact for "sexual pleasure".

The plaintive remark of "if your still willing to meet

me I wouldn't mind at all", has an echo in a note made by Eliot Aronson: "if a person conceives of himself as a 'schnook', he will expect to behave like a 'schnook'." [1972]. Because of his professed sexual inexperience, Mike is unable trade off members' sexual and contact knowledge, and thereby with it. The consequence of this is that he occasions and trades off a different set of background expectancies concerning 'personal life'. Mike demonstrates for the sociologist, the serious problem which the management of life in general and sexual life in particular presents. On the other hand, for a genuine member in making contact Mike's reported situation distinguishes itself as something other than "sexual pleasure". Because making contact depends upon some form of exchange, be it monetary or sexual, Mike's position is like that of a beggar in a market.

Mike's position can be compared to Ron's artful trading. His advertisement read:

> Male, 23, seeks ladies 18/30 interested in spanking, CP, give or take. No fees.

Ron's reply was:

> I was very pleased to get your letter in reply to my advertisement in "Rendezvous", and let me first of all put your mind at rest.
>
> I am sure that once you have experienced C.P. you will want more and more, and I can assure you now that you have nothing to fear at all.
>
> C.P. is administered on the bare bottom and either with the hand by way of spanking or with a

cane, strap, etc., but as a new comer it would only be administered lightly until you were more experienced, unless you were naughty or disobedient when you would be more severely punished.

I live in [ ] and can easily travel to meet you in [ ], as I am often there, but you don't say if you go to work or not.

I can meet you most days and evenings, and can arrange to be in quite a safe place and perhaps even at my own home after first meeting you.

I am confident that after being punished you will have a weakness at the knees, and want to be made love to, or perhaps have an orgasm during punishment, but anyway you will benefit both sexually and financially.

I should love to meet you soon, and to know more about you, such as what kind of pants do you wear [although I should no doubt find out when I spank you or cane you] - perhaps you don't wear any, and whether you are slim or plump [if that's the right word].

Can I suggest therefore that you phone me on Tuesday next [between 9.0am and 11.30am] or anytime Wednesday between 8.30am and 5.0pm so that we can make arrangements to meet.

My telephone number is [ ]. This is the number where I work, and should any one else answer the phone, please tell them that it is a 'personal' call and you will get me immidiately. Anyway darling I will try and answer the phone so you will have no

trouble, and you can reverse the charges if you wish.

So darling try and ring Tuesday if you can as I am very eager to meet you. So be good and take care.

All my love,

Ron

Ron specifies the gender and age group at which the advertisement is aimed. The sexual relation between possible repliers is established as an interest in reciprocal corporal punishment. The non-payment rule is also stated. In Ron's letter the dominant theme is the sexual practice of "C.P.". This is cross-cut by details concerning the establishment of a meeting.

Unlike other people who were contacted such as Mike, Ron provides no personal details other than those which are directly related to arranging a meeting. His quite extensive details on corporal punishment are directed towards someone inexperienced in such a practice. Interlocked with this is Ron's pervasive method of persuasion. He does not merely provide details on corporal punishment, but sketches in sexual 'highlights' and shades of fantasy. The artful enthusiasm of Ron produces an enigma. In his advertisement he specifies "no fees". In expressing his enthusiastic and committed drive to his sexual theme in the letter however, Ron states that the replier will benefit in financial terms. This enigma can be resolved by regarding it as connected to expectancies concerning sexual value. In making contact there is an either-or requirement about exchange-value and use-value. If an advertiser or replier is not a case of one, he or she is a case of the other.

When use-value, which turns on a reciprocal axis, is in

question the contact situation becomes problematic. In dealing with a new-comer, Ron has to stress the enjoyable and beneficial character of the sexual practice which is being spoken about. Because he is dealing with a new-comer he has to be artful in an attempt to persuade participation in an unexperienced sex act. Such methods attempt to establish the value of being used. The implementation of such methods is based in the knowledge of the possibility of failure; that a new-comer might view punishment as a non-sexual, deviant practice. Ron cannot rely upon the value of use. As a continuance of his persuasive methodology he raises the possibility of exchange as another alternative value for involvement. Compared with Mike, Ron is an experienced trader of his wares.

EMILY, CAROL, AND VERONICA: The case of females seeking other females enables an idea of what a career in making contact looks like to be presented. In the illustrative instances here, though there are differences between them juxtaposition and comparison results in a fairly complete conception of the changes and developments which occur over time within the course of action of making contact.

The three advertisements which will be examined are:

Emily — housewife in her 40s wishes to be loved and love another woman my place only. Husband to watch or join in all letters answered. First ad.

Carol — Attractive lady 30s wishes to meet young ladies for mutual pleasures, some experience, love O, husband if required, very good looking.

Veronica — Lancs lady aged 45, would like to get in touch with the female sex. I am blonde, blue eyed, have a lovely 40in bust, very pleasantly plump. I love O, love all types of sex fun. Very highly sexed. Experienced lady only. Quick reply, your place only.

All three advertisements formulate who they are seeking. For Emily this is in individual terms ["another woman"], whereas both Carol and Veronica use more general terms ["young ladies", "the female sex"]. Though the function of the two types of term is similar in that they will apply to a certain element of readers, they are indicators of different degrees of experience; different stages of a career. Emily's formulation of "another woman", "to be loved and love", is in terms of a first time experience. The stating of "First ad.", tells not only that the advertisement has never appeared before, but that the advertiser has never advertised before. This is a testimony to a lack of experience. The advertiser is a 'first timer'. The term "First ad." and the advertisement are icons of the advertiser. In conjunction with stating her inexperience Emily specifies that a meeting is geographically strictly limited ["my place only"]. The first time experience would appear to necessitate all possible control over the course of a meeting, if not for full sexual advantage, then for safety reasons. There are alternative cases to the specification of "my place only", where perhaps because of situated particulars [e.g. other people] advertisers stipulate "your place only".

Whereas Emily is a 'first timer', Carol is by her own formulation at an intermediate stage ["some experience"]. Unlike Emily's general sexual theme ["to be loved and love"],

Carol grounds her advertisement more specifically in sexual use ("mutual pleasure") and specifies a sexual preference ("love O"). In distinction to both Emily and Carol, Veronica indicates her experience by the type of person she seeks ("experienced ladies only"). Veronica's advertisement is more extensive than the other two. Emily's advertisement is an icon of a new member, and Carol's of an intermediate member. Veronica's is an icon of an experienced member. She presents a physical and sexual description of herself, her sexual nature ("highly sexed"), and sexual likes. Emily specifies that the meeting she wishes to arrange must take place at her home. Veronica specifies "your place only". This requirement expresses the possibility of some biographical details which make it inappropriate for the meeting place to be in Veronica's control. It is also an expression based upon the assumption of the ability to discriminate and judge between replies; of the ability to locate from documentary evidence places which are suitable.

Emily and Carol both formulate a triadic, bisexual relationship. For Emily it is a requirement ("husband to watch or join in"), while for Carol it is a possibility. Veronica does not mention any male involvement. This could be related to her specification of "your place only". For example Veronica may be married but unable to practice her sexual interests because of disapproval on the part of her husband. In this hypothetical situation Veronica's focus would be towards fulfilling the female segment of her sexual interests from within her marital situation. This imagined texture however, is only one of a possible number.

An important term in respect of the question of male

involvement in the female-female type, is Carol's "if required". It widens the possibility of possible repliers to include both those who are willing to become involved with a couple, and those whose involvement is limited strictly with females. Emily is confined to those who are prepared for some kind of a sexual relationship with her husband. Veronica however, is a single female; this is in contact terms, though in marital terms she may not be. Her population of possible repliers is wider than either Emily or Carol because of this. Veronica is the type of person Emily and Carol are seeking. As well as seeking similar repliers as Emily and Carol, Veronica is in the position to receive propositions for involvement from couples.

Though there are these differences between the three advertisements, they have a common thread running through them. All three describe reciprocal use, though the ways in which this is done are consonant with ideas on stages of experience. Emily expresses reciprocity of use through "be loved and love", while Carol states "mutual pleasures". Veronica's advertisement is more complex. The reciprocity of use is formulated through the juxtaposition of the advertiser as a physical and sexual object with the possible repliers having to meet the terms of experience and meeting place. This depicted situation is organised for and according to "sex fun".

The similarities and differences produced by comparing the three advertisements are extended in their letters:

Emily

Thank you for your letter I am Emily, I am 44 years old 5ft 2ins tall, I have not got a big bust but I must be honest with you I have not been with a woman before I hope you wont be upset because of this but I am very interested in doing it with you, I have got a 10in vibrator all-so a dildo with straps what my husband got for me, he does not mind me going with you, he is all for it I have a family but they dont know this its better that way, if you like we could have a night out then go back to our place then we can take it from their by the time you get the letter I should get my periods then we should be alright I am in all day if you want to phone me during the day my phone number is [ ] but if you phone at night theire is to many in to talk so its better to phone in the day time so please write back to me I hope you like the photo of me let me know when you want to come down I must tell you that I might be a bit shy at first but I suppose thats what sex is about so please get in touch with me as soon as you can and we can go out for a drink.

Yours

lots of love

Emily

P.S. SORRY THIS is THE only PHOTO I hAVe of me THiS IS THE BEST ONE

Carol

Thank you very much for your reply to my ad. I hope the photograph is good enough to interest you [I don't take a good photo but let's face it who does?[.

I am 31 years of age, married with two children, I go out to work [in charge of a wages office]. I am 5ft 2inch tall with blue eyes, auburn hair. I have had a little experience with women and enjoy it very much, I also had some experience in a threesome with my husband [Tom] and that was just fantastic, if you would like to meet don't be afraid of telephoning me, Tom doesn't mind if you prefer to meet me alone, we have a car so travel is no problem and if ypu can make it during the day time we can use our house or where ever is convenient for you, you will agree everything cant be explained in a letter so please get in touch as soon as you can by letter or by phone and maybe we can get together [VERY DISCRETLY] the two of us or if you prefer the three of us I don't mind which the choice is yours.

Hope to hear from you soon,

Love Carol

Veronica

I have received your lovely letter and its content carefully read well I am 45 years old blond blue eyed and I am very pleasantly plump well I love O being given to me and I also love a big clit has I love rubbing one before I use the dildo I will love your whole body lick and suck you same time has you are licking me out I am oversexed I have a lovely 40Bst hope you nipple bite and I love my bottom

played with I also love enamus and being whipped until I cry for love please send photo YOUR PLACE ONLY I shall want my travelling expenses sending an I could come next Friday after tea by Rail only I would expect you to meet me at Station please I do appreciate you writing to me I'll send you a photo if you decide to answer.

Veronica

In their letters Emily and Carol present descriptions of themselves and their personal lives.Emily describes her new membership and views this inexperience as a possible problem. The other orientations which Emily presents are towards arranging a meeting and establishing discretion and secrecy. Carol confirms her intermediate career position which was stated in her advertisement. However, there is a difference between her advertisement and letter. The main purpose of her advertisement was to seek females for sexual interaction with herself, with the possibility of the participation of her husband. In her letter, Carol reverses this situation by pointing out the benefits of a three-some and contrasting this with her involvement with women ["just fantastic", "enjoy it very much"]. Carol recognises the importance of being persuasive; the problem to be overcome in making people interested. This is shown well not only in the 'open' nature of the arrangements which she attempts to make, but in comparing the remarks made by Carol and Emily in regard to their photographs.

In her postscript, Emily apologises for her photograph and states "this is the best one". The photograph had been cut up; it was one of a group, and the other people had been cut out to reveal Emily alone at a table. Rather than being aplogetic Carol's method is to provide a means for maintaining

the possibility of interest no matter how the photograph, a holiday 'snap', is regarded. She states that she hopes the photograph is "good enough to interest you", and then casts doubt on the image catching process itself. Effectively this says that if interest is not aroused by the photograph, this is nothing to do with the person in the photograph but the photographic process itself.

Veronica's letter provides a contrast to both Emily and Carol. Her letter constructs her experience. Unlike Emily and Carol she provides no biographical details. What she does present are deeply sexual details on the practices she wishes to engage in. She also specifies the details of arranging a meeting. As well as specifying time in a homely way ["next Friday after tea"], she states that she would expect to be met. The other two elements which Veronica includes in arranging a meeting could be more problematic. The place of the meeting is emphasised above all else. This again brings with it the possible expectancy of unstated biographical details which may be problematic for Veronica. However, together with the requirement of travelling expenses, this feature of Veronica's letter could produce doubt in a reader.

It is a possibility that Veronica is engaged in fraud, small though it may be; extracting travelling expenses without any intention of attending the arranged meeting. If this were the case her plan would only succeed if she had to travel to meet her replier. This part of the letter can be read according to various possibilities; as such it is uncertain as to outcome and meaning. Another enigma is raised by contrasting the brutality of the majority of the

letter with the almost tender nature of the opening and closing remarks. Viewed in this way the letter becomes paradoxical and questionable. Are the features of tenderness and sexual brutality aimed at establishing an intimate relationship, or are they being used as part of a 'play' to 'con' the 'mark' [E. Goffman, 1972]. These questions unfortunately cannot be answered here. However, part of their significance lies directly in the fact that they are available as possibilities in populating Veronica's documentary production with meaning.

Whether Veronica is engaged in a 'con' or not, through her language she establishes the texture of the sexual nexus where the sole and primary value is the distribution of sexual action in relation to physical attributes. For Carol this reciprocity is of singular importance, given that she formulates two possible relationships: couple-female; female-female. Because she is uncertain whether the replier will engage in sexual interaction with her and her husband though favouring this [the enthusiastic "fantastic" and the disappointed "wouldn't mind"] Carol must engage in establishing reciprocity. As an individual and as part of a marriage team, Carol offers the choice of which is to be used to the sexual preferences of the replier. Use is not in doubt; the value attributed to different kinds of use is.

For Emily her own use-value is seen as a problem. She connects inexperience with "upset" in the replier. The conception of the replier being "upset" at a new member makes problematic the reciprocal nature of the proposed interaction. Emily may not be able to provide what is sexually expected of her because of her inexperience. In this way, the value

of the meeting may be diminished for the replier. The fact that the 'passing' letter stated that the replier was also inexperienced is not mentioned by Emily. This butting together of inexperience may have added to Emily's problems, placing the onus of directing the sexual focus upon her when she is unable to accomplish it. The way in which Emily proposes handling the meeting, and thereby settling the uses which each participant will have of the others, is by delegating such negotiation to another social occasion. Negotiations are left open, subject to the loosening and elevating effect of alcohol.

Emily, Carol, and Veronica in one way or another express the reciprocity of use. This expresses non-payment. It is an expression of the reproduction of use, distinct from pure exchange. In another gender form [e.g. female-male] the focus of sexuality brings with it the requirement of specifying the kind of relation [e.g. 'cater'-'no fees'] as well as using the form of language to portray this relation. The absence of the possibility of pure exchange, as in the case of females seeking females, negates such a requirement. Though there is no need to specify 'no fees' because of taken for granted conventions concerning sex [female-female prostitution does not exist], reciprocal use-value has to be stressed by Emily, Carol, and Veronica. At a general level the commodity form of language can be seen as expressing [continually reproducing] and an expression of social relations in a materialist society; it is the dominant form of language and is thus the language.

At the level of making contact a lay theorist's concerns are practical ones, unconcerned with an analysis of society or the social construction of their own actions. This would

require some kind of radical consciousness [cf. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Though commodity language and its use-value form may be virtually inescapable, for Emily, Carol, and Veronica it has the purpose of persuading at the sexual level. It is 'saying-in-so-many-words' that pleasure will result from interaction with the advertiser; that the involvement is not one-sided. Use-value language is a means of attempting to secure and satisfy interests by proposing the satisfaction of some other's interests.

MILDRED AND JIM: The advertisement placed by Mildred and Jim was written to as from a couple:

> Couple 40 and 50 wish to meet couples for a bit of fun, also threesomes. Men or women or both. We love oral so don't be shy, come and see us, everybody made welcome.

The advertisement applies to couples, males, and females "or both"; presumably individual males and females meeting Mildred and Jim at the same time. By negating the barrier of selectivity and extending an invitation to all, the advertisers convey a friendly and experienced attitude to their subject. This is a sexual meeting with couples or individuals "for a bit of fun". A meeting with a couple or having a "threesome" is not described in any detail. It is left unstated what "a bit of fun" consists of. The replier must both wait and see what the outcome of contact will be and meanwhile impute a history to the document to make provisional sense of it. This feature of locating documentary evidence is relied upon by advertisers; at a moral and sanctionable level they assume that they will and should be understood [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

The obviousness of "a bit of fun" as a situated and contexted piece of understanding, vague in particulars though it is, can be seen in the first sentence of Mildred and Jim's letter:

> you don't say whether you've swapped before but it is a simple thing to do the only thing that you have to do is not let jelousy creep into your lives and be very broadminded, the only thing I can tell you is that our names are Jim who is 50 - 5ft 9in broad quite considerate and love making love also love doing oral sex with any ladies but also I do not like hurting anyone otherwise I am just a ordinary man my wifes name is Mildred 40 5ft 1in loves any kind of sex as long as there is no whipping or violence we love making friends we have been in the swapping game 5yrs find that it is a bit of fun and find that it has helped our marriage but as I said be open minded and no jelousy and you will find that you can enjoy trying out new things and different people there is no two people alike so if you would like to ring us we would be pleased to hear from you our phone number is [ ] and we will talk to you.
>
> Hoping to hear from you soon
>
> Mildred and Jim

It is taken as obvious, as far as a reply from a couple is concerned, that the advertisement was about swapping partners. Mildred and Jim indicate that they are very experienced at the "swapping game", and furnish instructions upon how it is to be successfully carried out. This refers not only to different sexual preferences and their sexual

negotiation ["there is no two people alike...we will talk to you"], but to the finer emotional requirements for constructing the boundaries of sexual contact within marriage. These instructions are designed to enable a new couple to enter into previously unexperienced sexual relationships. However the dimensions of the sexual realm of Mildred and Jim's world are unknown. Their advertisement indicates that these dimensions are at least in intention quite extensive judged by the gender population which they formulate.

An interesting insight was gained into the life of Mildred and Jim when a 'female seeking males' advertisement was answered:

> Young lady wishes to meet gents also
> husbands approval for 3-somes. No
> inhibitions looking for a good time.
> Gents or ladies.

The advertisement states that a "young lady" wants to meet males for an unspecified reason, and that males and females can engage in a three-some with her husband. Rather than being the simple situation which the category 'girl seeks boy' evokes, the advertisement is full of puzzles.

The letter from this "young lady" was as follows:

> Please bring me a nice gift not chocalates
> my number is [ ].
>
> Mildred

From the signature and telephone number it was found that the two Mildreds were one and the same person. The differences between the two letters and forms of formulated gender relation are enormous. In place of instructions on handling emotions are the specification of a gift and the provision of a telephone number.

When the telephone number supplied by the "young lady" was rung, a woman answered; it was Mildred. She was told that a contact advertisement had been answered, and that a reply had been received from her. "Oh yes," she said, "and there was a thing on the bottom that said about a gift.". This was confirmed and Mildred asked: "What do you think?". I stated that this would be alright, and asked what kind of a gift she required. "Oh anything really, but not chocolates.". When asked what she liked she replied: "You get fat on that.". I again asked what she would like and she said that I could pay something towards the telephone bill "if you like". I agreed. Mildred then asked when I would like to visit her, to which I inquired when would be "best". She said that she did not "have anything before Sunday". I suggested Thursday, to which Mildred was heard to say: "What about next Thursday, Jimmy?". A man's voice was faintly heard, and then Mildred said that Thursday would be fine. She instructed me to telephone on the Thursday morning to check that everything was alright, and to receive directions on how to reach her house. The conversation then ended.

It is a puzzle whether Mildred is to be regarded as a prostitute. She certainly extracts some form of payment from single men. Whether this occurs when the male replier suggests including her husband in the situation is unknown, as is the situation concerning single girls. On the other hand, it is clear that Mildred does not charge 'a fee' or carry out her interests on a professional basis. Having made contact with Mildred and Jim together and Mildred alone, the two facets of their contact lives which were revealed suggest the following organisation of contact activities.

For Mildred and Jim contact with couples is on a mutual, 'fun' basis. Similarly for single females, because of their short supply-in demand status, a welcome would be extended under the terms of 'mutual pleasure'. Both these types of involvement involve Mildred and Jim. That which involves Mildred alone however correlates with the largest group of reader-repliers; males. Because the supply of males is greater than either couples or single females, the demand for and bargaining power of this group is low. Consequently Mildred, who in contact terms is in short supply, can ask for a gift in order to share her favours. The probable sense of this is to finance the activities of getting in contact with those groups in short supply. The gifts from males pay for advertisements, correspondence and telephone costs. Mildred pushes the bounds of use-value through reciprocal sexual satisfaction and into instrumental use.

CHARLES AND MARJORIE: What happens in sexual acts is a cause for concern for the participants both in terms of what they want to happen, and what they do not. In the process of making contact this concern assumes further importance because biographical details are at a minimum [even the surname or address might not be known], and yet intimate details have to be discussed. The extent of this discussion is limited, confined to an 'enough for now' rule rather than a complete exposition of all the relevant details. An important and related strand in this concern for what is going to happen when contact is made is the safety of the participants' interests against unwanted sexual practices.

Charles and Marjorie propose a "threesome". The gender formation which their advertisement specifies, females-male, males-female, makes a bisexual event possible. However, the

interests of Charles and Marjorie do not extend that far:

> Housewife, 33, wishes to meet gents or ladies for threesomes with husband, strictly heterosexual, also couples to swop. Phone number for quick reply.

The sexual interests which a couple, female, or male have in any meeting with Charles and Marjorie are to be directed towards the opposite sex. Apart from this sexual qualification and the sense of enthusiasm imparted by "quick reply", the advertisement is succinct in marking out the people to whom it applies and stating who placed it. Like Emily, and to a lesser extent Carol, Marjorie's literary style describes an individual before introducing the other marriage partner. This form, at least in Marjorie's case, may be related to persuasion and the inhibition which people may have in entering into sexual discussions and relations with strangers.

In formulating herself first, Marjorie forces her husband into the shade; she appears as the central figure in the advertisement. Any contact, whether by female or male, will be with her; it is her advertisement. Such a portrayed appearance may be less inhibiting to repliers; negotiations take on the gender structure male-female and female-female rather than the more inhibiting male-male and female-male. This focus upon Marjorie's style was gathered after coming into contact with her, first being noticed in the conversational arrangements through which she attempted to embed a stranger in her marriage and home life.

Where the advertisement conveyed that Marjorie was the advertiser, or at least the central figure, her letter continued this:

many thanks for your reply to my advert No 965I. I would be pleased if you could give me a ring anytime between I2 o'clock or 5 o'clock - 6.30 if these times are no good anytime after I0.30 at night, it doesn't matter how late.

Yours im anticipation

Marjorie

Though the letter comes from a couple as the advertisement makes clear, it is written as if from an individual. Whether or not this strategy is the result of contacting an inexperienced member in an attempt to socialise him into the contact world is unclear. However the similarity between the letter and the advertisement im creating a textured scenario suggests that Charles and Marjorie employ specific methods to establish a "minor world" with its own conventions, and suspend the "serious" world as im a game (H. Garfinkel, I967).

Telephoning Marjorie revealed further her and her husband's ability to conduct someone im a 'strange' situation. This artfulness requires the suspension of everyday norms of conduct (such as 'sexual conversations do not take place between strangers'), which are replaced by devices for the management of the practical enterprise of making contact. Because this and arranging a meeting have a strictly limited temporal span, the use of these devices is temporary. The protracted nature of making contact (the time between placing an advertisement, receiving replies, and arranging a meeting), requires that such management devices are om call.

When the telephone number which Marjorie gave was called a man answered. His voice was hardly audible due to crackling om the telephone line. I said that I would call back because of this, but he said: "No, don't. I'll get Marjorie.". When

Marjorie came to the telephone I told her that I had answered her advertisement, and had received a reply. I also said that because of hardly being able to hear her I would telephone back. Marjorie said that she would "take it upstairs".

On calling back, Marjorie elected to tell me "something about us". She said that Charles and herself had been doing "it" for three years and found it helpful and beneficial to their marriage. Details on children, residence, employement, and interests were also stated. Marjorie then asked if I wanted to visit her, said that I could stay the following weekend, and that "Charles will pick you up at the station". When I said that this was possible but that I would have to confirm it later, Marjorie stressed the importance of making arrangements and keeping them: "If you can't come someone else can". Having arranged this provisional meeting, Marjorie asked: "Do you want to speak to Charles?".

Charles began by saying: "It's alright, I'm not queer.". He then asked about sport and interests, stressing non-sexual matters as important in a meeting: "You've got to have something to talk about."; "Some of the lads have been great for Marjorie, but we couldn't get on. Nothing to talk about.". The relationship between their sexual activities and marriage was characterised by Charles as "spice to the marriage", and open to them both; females for him, males for her. He then asked whether I was likely to be meeting them, told me something about the area where they lived, and then gave the telephone to Marjorie again.

Marjorie asked if everything was alright. She then told about the way in which the central sexual element of the meeting might be handled. It was stressed that any sexual

involvement depended upon "if you like what you see". There was to be no obligation, and if sexual involvement was decided against "we have a spare room so you can sleep there". Here, truthfulness about feelings was stressed: "One lad who came up from Bristol left to get some petrol and didn't come back. He did put pen to paper later though.". If sexual involvement was decided upon, what generally happened Marjorie said ["What most of the lads do."], was for her and the male to go to bed together and then to be joined by Charles later. The place of these events within the home and marriage, and the relevance of keeping them from the children was emphasised: "The first consideration is the kids.". The outside partner in the "threesome" was to act like and be accepted as "a friend". Marjorie confirmed that I would inform them later about whether I was to meet them that weekend, and the conversation ended.

The telephone conversation with Marjorie and Charles revealed further their ability to conduct someone into a 'strange' situation. This artfulness requires the substitution of contact methods [e.g. the 'opening' of the conversation by Marjorie, the 'get to know you' by Charles, and the final 'is everything alright' by Marjorie], for everyday norms. Because making contact and arranging a meeting breach these norms, contact devices are required to maintain everyday obligations and to manage and accomplish a sexual liason.

Postscript: Eighteen months after the above data was collected I again contacted Marjorie; Charles was "out". I told her that I had been in touch with her previously, and that I was a sociologist carrying out research. When asked to provide information on their contact career and experiences

she said that I would have to talk to Charles. However she said that "one thing I will tell you something about is jealously". They had "swapped" twice, but Marjorie had not wanted to and did it "because of Charles". Marjorie said that she became very jealous, and that it was bad for their marriage. As to making contact in general, she said that it would have to stop because their eldest child was fifteen and "might put two and two together". Marjorie said that she would tell Charles I had telephoned and if he was willing to talk to me he would call. No call was received.

SUE AND BRIAN: Sue and Brian do not seek either couples or males, but bisexual females. In this respect they are similar to Carol. A difference is that the advertisement which they placed is portrayed as coming from a couple:

> Happily married couple 32/35, attractive and discreet seek AC/DC females for stimulating experiences.

Sue and Brian point out the amicability of their marriage, their good looks, and their care in handling contact relations. Like many advertisements, Sue and Brian's does not specify what sexual contact will consist of other than ideas which are conveyed by relating female bisexuality with "stimulating experiences".

Whereas Sue and Brian's advertisement is different from Carol's, their letter is similar:

> We are V432, I am Sue and my old man is Brian. Thank you for answering our ad. We would both be very pleased to meet you.
>
> You ask what would be expected of you, well, that rather depends on you. If you could come down and

meet us you could see for yourself if you fancied either one of us or both of us. We should watch a few films and as I said if you fancied both of us, all well and good. My husband enjoys watching two girls and also joining in at the end.

We have had a couple of threesomes before and I have also had a couple of experiences on my own with girls. We don't set out specifically to have threesomes we just take things as they come.

We have a 4 bedroomed house so if you would rather be with just one of us or if for some reason you didn't fancy us we sould still put you up for the night in a room of your own.

If you would like to telephone us on an evening at [ ], and any questions that you have could be answered.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Regards,

Sue and Brian

The letter revolves around the theme of participation and decisions on sexual involvement. Carol's letter followed a similar course, but the emphasis there was upon the inclusion or exclusion of her husband. Sue and Brian recognise the negotiable character of participation for both of them, and the possibility of no participation at all. Making a decision about entering into a relationship is the prime problematic to be settled. If the decision is negative then the third party would be "put up for the night". A positive decision however, is less well described by Sue. She does emphasise the preferance for a threesome, but is

vague about what that would include.

The unspoken nature of sexual interaction is referenced by Sue after describing the sexual events which she and Brian have experienced. Negotiations on whether the relationship is to be constituted as a three-some or only between Sue or Brian and the contacted female, appear relatively unstated: sexual understanding without words. In relation to Carol it was suggested that the topic and resource of use-value was used as a persuasive practice. Carol's letter, and Sue and Brian's in particular, demonstrates that sexual use is a negotiated process according to relatively unspoken and probably unspeakable tenets. The contact with Charles and Marjorie indicated the levels of concern and awareness for managing a meeting. However, those concerns are very much external to the central sexual theme which Charles and Marjorie, like the others, left 'open'. Presumably what would take place after a replier had "gone up" with Marjorie, to be joined by Charles later, would be accomplished through some form of verbalisation; it may be easier to whisper 'likes' and 'dislikes' during a sexual act than to write them down on paper or state them over the telephone. But since none of the contacted advertisers was met as a 'genuine' replier, it is unknown what discussions are carried out prior to sexual engagement, or during it.

JOYCE AND EVE: So far in presenting this report, a career perspective has been invoked ad hoc. It has been made use of when it appeared helpful, and has been unstated as a background to my remarks. The idea of a career, far from belonging to industrial or occupational sociology, seems embedded in everyday conceptions. For example, it is implicit in expectancies on ageing [I. Illich, 1977], leisure activities

such as card playing [L. A. Zurcher Jr., 1973], and the management of and opinions upon political involvement [W. F. Whyte, 1969]. In such areas the career perspective is not an explicit topic, but is an implicit resource for practically viewing activities.

This occurs in making contact. Participants view themselves and others according to biographical particulars which, though incomplete, impart a sense of history to their involvement and limit the horizons of their future participation.

It has already been noted that non-payment advertisements from females seeking males are the most difficult to locate. This difficulty is complicated by the idea of a career of contact involvement. Once a likely non-payment advertisement has been located it seems that all there is to do is to reply in the hope that the advertiser chooses to 'get in touch'. Yet doubt is produced by the mere fact of locating a possible non-payment advertisement. For a person, particularly a woman, to be in a position to place a contact advertisement and to carry out what is proposed in that advertisement shows that the person must have a biographical history sympathetic with that decision and proposal. The advertiser, by the very act of advertising, is placed outside typical interaction. The normal and conventional pathways towards obtaining sexual partners are in such cases either unsuitable or inapplicable. Thus, the location of a possible non-payment, 'girl seeks boy' advertisement is problematic by what it leaves unsaid. Because of ideas on the developments and changes which must have occurred in a female's life-history to engage in making sexual contact, doubt exists as to the social context in which an advertisement is grounded. Pieces of probable biography are set in relief by existent knowledge, while what is known,

used and interpreted according to what can reasonably be assumed to have previously happened [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

In the two cases of 'girl seeks boy' advertisements to be presented here, both when made contact with displayed signs of a problematic biography. In regard to the effects which such problems can have on the sexual side of life, contact magazines provide a focus which is wholly relevant. The conventions of courtship, romance, or seduction are suspended and communication concentrates on sexual matters and purposes.

The first female contacted was Joyce. Her advertisement read:

> Attractive well built lady 35, nymp,
> would like to meet gents 28-60 at their
> home. Will travel. Send S.A.E.

Joyce's advertisement could have come from a prostitute, given that there is no indication of non-payment. However, there is no token of prostitution either; no hint at a client relationship. Instead there is an insight into non-payment and a problematic biography provided by "at their home. Will travel.". Joyce is not concerned to 'entertain' the people she seeks in her 'comfortable home', but rather the opposite. As evidence for the inapplicability of the prostitute code, this feature makes it likely that Joyce does not require payment. It also raises the question as to why Joyce specifies "their home" without saying something about not being able to provide a meeting place of her own. From this the expectation can be built up that though Joyce may not be a prostitute, she is in possession of problems which have made this particular form of making contact relevant both in terms of motivation and interpretation.

Though the awareness of the possibility of a problematic biography may be no more than a lurking doubt to a reader, this doubt may dispel the 'hoped for' expectancies which more properly belong to the realms of fiction and fantasy. Such expectancies are generated and sustained by the world of fantasy fiction which 'girlie' and obscene magazines produce and picture in their photographs. For example, the magazine "New Direction" has a feature titled "Contact Made" which describes experiences of people who have engaged in making contact. One such article describes a meeting between an older female advertiser and a male replier: "I was bowled over when I saw her. She'd dark hair cascading onto her shoulders. Her body was so well proportioned she could have been ten years younger. I couldn't think why she was bothering with me.". Or again: "I noticed she was wearing stockings. The bottom of her dress kept riding up and she rubbed her legs against mine. The dress had a very low cleavage. She kept leaning against me and I saw right down into her bra. The brown of her nipples was showing!".

Such articles elevate the sexual experiences they describe from the temporal, spatial, and problematic groundings which they have in everyday life. Fantasy produces sex as the mere satisfaction of lust; the ideal of use-value. This to a lesser extent can be seen in contact advertisements. Yet this level of discourse crumbles into making arrangements over the time and place of a meeting; wrangles over time, place, intentions, and fears.

For example, in terms of fantasy, Joyce formulates her self as being sexually insatiable; she states that she is a nymphomaniac ["nymp"]. This formulation directs attention to Joyce as a sexual object, and as a user of others as sexual

objects. Yet it need not be the case that Joyce's description is accurate. It is enough that she conveys her sexual availability and need. In this sense, formulations of fantasy are devices of persuasion and enthusiasm. Joyce's letter read:

> I am 35 years old 5ft 4in, Black long hair Brown eyes, 44 Bust 38 waist 48 hip.
>
> as I said in my adv. nymp.
>
> I would like to visit you if possible when you like I am not working at the moment so can travel any time. Let me know how old you are? and if I could visit you for a weekend.
>
> Write soon
>
> Mrs. [ ]
>
> P.S. My first name is Joyce and my husband has left me for good for another women.
>
> Joyce

The first and most striking impression about Joyce's letter is its fragmented and inarticulate construction. It also confirms that the advertisement's formulation of "nymp" rather than 'nymph' was not a misprint. Aside from thoughts which the formation of the letter provokes about the person who wrote it, information is provided on four levels. Joyce states her physical attributes, her sexual disposition, what she would like to do, as well as making an inquiry about the replier's age. These features are an expansion of those contained in the advertisement. Yet Joyce does not provide any reasons for the importance she places on the replier providing the meeting place. The reasons for that are unknown.

What is new and illuminating in Joyce's letter is the postscript. After signing the letter with the formal title "Mrs.", Joyce attempts to become more intimate by stating her

christian name. The fact that her initial signature indicates her married status raises the question of the involvement or whereabouts of her husband. Consequently she reveals that she is estranged. Far from being a living fantasy, Joyce is in the grips of reality and social existence. Her husband has left her and she is unemployed. Rather than being involved in face-to-face interaction with a man in the name of friendship, courtship, or seduction, she is willing to sexually submit to a perfect stranger. Not only that; her desperation is so acute that she is enthusiastic about that possibility.

Whereas Joyce's problematic situation was revealed by self-reporting, Eve's documented situation is more uncertain. Yet her reasoning depends upon reasonable expectations concerning problem as a method to gloss what she plans to do. Her advertisement read:

> Sexy young lady would like to meet
> well endowed men, loves giving and
> receiving O. No fees but likes
> outings, open to suggestions,
> husband approves.

As well as engaging in the usual contact practices of formulating her self, who she wants to meet, and what she wants to do, Eve states her non-prostitute status. She also transforms the purely sexual nexus of use into a social occasion and inviting propositions in relation to that occasion. Eve further reveals that she is married. How is this reported situation to be understood? Eve formulates a sexual relationship, yet tempers use with sociability. Is she an exception to the dominance of exchange and use? The existence of a marital partner complicates the situation. Even though "husband approves", to what extent can any friendship develop

and in what forms? These questions were answered by Eve in her **letter:**

> Thank you for answering our advert. From your reply you sound the exact type of person that we would like to meet, and you also sound very sincere.
>
> I can't add much more about myself that I put in the advert only to explain a little about my husband and I. Up until a couple of years ago we had a perfectly happy sex life, when my husband had an illness, since which he hasn't been able to take a very active role in our relationship, so with his consent and our mutual pleasure I have taken lovers, but now we are looking for a more permanent friendship with one person, who I would like really to care for.
>
> The one problem at the moment is that we have to meet away from home as children are involved, when we do meet the right person, and are sure then they will have to gradually except him as my husbands friend.
>
> The address on this letter is of a very good friend, as I don't want to get involved until I feel safe about who I meet, I hope you understand.
>
> I will leave it up to you to arrange a meeting. I can furnish a phone number at short notice if you wish when I hear from you.
>
> Yours
>
> Eve

Eve presents a problematic situation which she and her husband are attempting to resolve. Though the problem is

sexual, she wants to resolve it by forming a stable relationship. Like Charles and Marjorie, Eve describes her concern for managing the establishment of this relationship which begins from sexual premises. She tells of her concern to locate the "right person", and to integrate that person into her family as an acceptable part of it. Because of this concern initial and introductory meetings are to be held outside the matrimonial home. The similar reason of not getting "involved until I feel safe about who I meet", is given for Eve keeping her address secret. Any meeting with Eve would consist of her appearing incognito, and no doubt unless the meeting was with the "right person" she would disappear into her concealed background.

Eve engages in justifying and giving 'good reasons' for her actions. She also presents a definite description of a situation. To accomplish some part of that description she engages like all advertisers, in the practice of glossing. Glossing consists of relying upon the knowledge that the distinctness of a situated description lies not in the past which it purports to describe, but in its consequences. Eve glosses her address. The address presented in the letter does not belong to a "friend", but is Eve's. It is also probable that the furnishing of "a phone number at short notice" would result in Eve's own telephone number. Her address was checked by consulting local telephone directories; the telephone operator said that her telephone number had been changed and made ex-directory.

That Eve glosses this part of her letter raises the question about the story and the 'good reasons' which she has presented. Eve could be protecting herself from unwanted intrusion, or be engaged in deceitful sexual use. Whatever

Eve's intentions, her description and the situation which this makes observable conform to her glossing practices. Here, essential features of the situation are masked or made false provision for in a planful way. This is crucial if the description is to be a description of a situation which Eve wishes to make observable, rather than some other situation. Engaging in providing false details and hiding others enables the interaction to be controlled and guided towards Eve's practical ends. Whether Eve's situation is as problematic as she describes, or is a mere mock up, is uncertain. Her practical ends however are not. Like Joyce who presents a somewhat tragic account of her personal life, Eve is basically concerned to establish a relationship which is grounded in mutual sexual activity.

THE ADVERTISERS REVIEWED: Joyce and Eve's advertisements illustrate the methods employed for constructing and establishing sexual use. Each advertisement illustrated, expresses different concerns and emphases in relation to this guiding topic. Freda and George showed how constituting use depends upon providing mutual sexual information as a basis for judgement and assessment, and engaging in a process of discussion which develops an understanding against which sexual activities have 'good sense'.

Mike and Ron showed the differences which sexual use and interest can have. Though Mike was involved in making contact in order to be in a position to use someone sexually and be used, in his description he provided elements of his social existence which set in relief the value element of use. As a contrast, Ron concentrated upon creating in an artful manner the high value of his particular sexual interest. The bisexual females displayed various degrees of membership and experience

in their particular sexual interests. Yet all stressed sexual use as a need and an attraction.

The depth and extent of becoming involved in making contact was seen in the case of Mildred and Jim who had evolved a mutually ramifying system of measured use-value according to demand. Charles and Marjorie focused most clearly upon the management of persons and domestic affairs in securing sexual use. Both they and Sue and Brian demonstrated the largely unspoken area in making contact, which is the point of the contact itself: sexual use.

IN CONCLUSION: The prostitute recognition code has consequences for its opposite, non-payment. These consequences can be seen in actual cases of non-payment advertisements and in contact with the advertisers. In contrast with prostitutes' advertisements, non-payment advertisers emphasise reciprocal use, relate specific attributes of possible repliers to that use, formulate the possible relationship in terms of quality, and specifically set out to contact gender populations who are given accredited membership because of sexual interests. The effect of becoming familiar with the procedures and processes of making contact is that the contact domain can be marked out quite speficàlly and definitely. By locating and adopting the interpretive dichotomy of payment/non-payment an account of advertisements and advertisers can be provided, such as the typology in Chapter One.

Any account of making contact however, has its sense in the code which provides for it, or some version of a code which is invoked by a reader of such an account. Above I have attempted to document the code which provides for an understandable reading of the area of experience which the typology of contact actors glosses.

The central point in using a code or body of rules to make a domain observable is that the rules are representations of the socially ordered ways of the domain. This means that the user of a code has to know the order which the encountered activity conforms to, prior to coming into touch with that activity. Through experience, once a reader can get an idea of the constitution of such an activity as making contact then the coding of the material can be extended.

In making contact such an idea would consist of the main structures of payment/non-payment, the classifications of gender, and the relations of sexual type. This code is intended as a plausible model of how those who experience contact advertisements make sense of them. As an example of cracking a code it is not merely descriptive about the area of contact, but in fact exhibits it [cf. L. Weider, 1974]. This is in the same way that the materials that have been used to illustrate contact themselves exhibit that domain. This method of 'exhibiting-in-the-telling' applies both to the productions of sociologists and those of people engaged in making contact.

CHAPTER THREE

USING THE CODE

> The real is not entirely rational, nor is the rational entirely real.
> [A. Camus, 1975]

> Differences between our 'practical theorist' and 'academic theorist' may all but disappear when both describe everyday activities. The observer-researcher must rely upon interpretive procedures when subsuming 'recognised' behavioural displays under concepts derived from his scientific vocabulary.
> [A. Cicourel, 1973]

In the previous two chapters, a version of the world of making contact has been presented. That world has been described in its various constituting forms. The code for the apprehension of such forms and thereby that world has been suggested. An important question remains. What is the status of this code? This question might at first be seen as inquiring into the rational structure of social action, but perhaps it is more accurate to regard it as seeking an examination of the structure of rationality itself.

From this perspective rationality ceases to be a measure of practical actions [cf. S. Lukes, 1973], and becomes its product. At the same time rationality as a unified concept crumbles into various contexted and often competing versions of 'what Anyone should know' [cf. D. Zimmerman and M. Pollner, 1970]. In respect of making contact, I shall show below how

members can use a situated code in order to fabricate a rationality [i.e. to invoke and rely upon 'what Anyone should know' in order to further their own practical ends].

THE RESEARCHER AND HIS RESEARCH: The exposition of the code by which members who make contact sustain versions of what they are doing brings with it a need for an examination of the place of the researcher and the process by which he comes to terms with actions and produces his 'professional' account. From Durkheim's "all preconceptions must be eradicated" [1964] through to the much different "ethnomethodological indifference" of Garfinkel and Sacks [1970], sociologists have sought to 'bracket' their beliefs. But as Merleau-Ponty recognised, the lesson of bracketing is the impossibility of it being done in any complete sense [H. Spiegelberg, 1965].

The relation between the researcher and his research is not one of indifference, nor should it be glossed over by saying that it is outside examination. The linguistic relation between the sociologist and his subject needs examination. It is this relation which enables the professional researcher to interpret the area of study and present findings upon it. It is suggested that the means for understanding and accounting for actions are similar for those making contact and those doing sociology, though the latter formalises these essential linguistic links. Later in this chapter a description of the similarity between sociology and everyday reasoning in recognising and locating features for interest will be presented. This latter concern grounds members' practices and the code which they produce and through which they are expressed, in artful language.

Though sociologists and those involved in making contact share the level of practical reasoning, they address different concerns and seek to answer different sets of questions. Because of these different involvements, different domains of discourse are constituted. Without the recognition of the shared character of practical reasoning and the problematic of translating and formalising members' utterances and activities, sociologists must inevitably transform and distort the areas which they study. Where this recognition does occur it will result in an interest in how both lay and professional members manage their different interests.

INDEXICALITY: In his approach to the study of sociological methods Harold Garfinkel focuses upon one of the problematic and constituent phenomena of doing sociology. This is the indexicality of expressions and actions. Bar-Hillel in 1954 wrote that the majority of utterances could only be understood when who or what they referenced and the context and time of production was known.

The import of this for Garfinkel is that both lay and professional sociological method, in coming to terms with practical actions, has as its problematic the substitution of 'objective', context-free for occasional, context-bound expressions. This substitution is only possible through a scheme of proceedings which for all practical purposes allows a particular demonstration of accounting for an action to stand as adequate. This 'adequacy' is according to socially sanctioned ways of accounting.

In studying practical action it is taken for granted that the inquirer 'knows' the scenes of operation under investigation. This is in order that the adopted way of

proceeding can be seen to account recognisably for the encountered features of scenes. In conjunction with this it is assumed by people that accounts are constituent features of the scenes which they present [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. These embodying assumptions of accounting are extended in everyday life by the sanctionable properties of indexical expressions. Garfinkel reports that people refuse to let each other know clearly what they are talking about. Instead they view the indexicality of language [occasionality, vagueness, retrospective-prospective sense, waiting until later to see what was meant], as presenting a background of taken for granted features against which accounts can be produced and seen as recognisable and adequate. These properties of indexicality are a sanctioned backcloth which enables people to claim that they know what they are talking about and that they should be understood [i.e. 'what Anyone should know'].

These remarks on indexicality and the embodying character of accounts provides a sketch of the assumptions and expectancies which contact readers, advertisers, and other practical theorists are armed with. Such background features are engaged with particular knowledge of the contact domain which they help to generate and constitute. The centrality of these features of accounting has been introduced here because as resources for making scenes observable they also permit non-existent scenes to 'come alive'. They are available as management devices for the fabrication of rationality for all practical purposes.

In order to illustrate people's reliance on the properties of indexicality, a description of a series of 'experiments' which were carried out will be given. The purpose of these exercises was to discover how people would locate types of

advertisement. People were presented with advertisements [in a public house], and asked what they were about and who they were from. After a list of answers had been compiled, the respondents were told what the advertisements were 'in fact' about. These explanations were deliberately different from the respondents' answers.

This was done in an attempt to see how strongly and in what way people would defend or change their judgements. The compiled lists of answers were made up of such terms as 'kinky', 'a pro', 'a nympho', and 'a lesi'. In respect of sexual factors the compiled lists were accurate. However they did not differentiate strongly between an advertisement which required no payment, but which did not state this, and prostitutes' advertisements; answers portrayed all female's advertisements that sought males as 'pros'. When respondents were told that all their answers were wrong, they reacted with blankness. To produce a further reaction, people had to be questioned. Again there was little reaction, consisting of such as: "Well it doesn't say that.". When it became clear that this was the end of the 'experiments' people were disappointed, saying "is that all?", and "I thought there was more to it".

The function of these 'experiments' was initially seen as enabling an examination of everyday sexual knowledge. They were used to distil out and separate everyday from contact specific knowledge. It was thus possible to see how everyday members typified advertisements according to broad sexual categories rather than the fine and specific ones used in the contact domain. The device of providing explanations contrary to the responsents' own answers was a failure, if it is viewed as a means of adding to the description of the contact domain. However the 'failure' itself threw some light on practical

reasoning.

Im the question and aswer situatiom I was not an interviewer. I was someone who was well or little knowm with a right to be im that situation. The features of "Is that all?" and "more to it" indicate what was happening im the covert interview situation. People do not go about questioning what something is whem there is no need to. That I did this was taken as a display of 'something going on' that could not immediately be seem. It was a case of waiting untilb later to see what was meant. Whem it was found that the point of the questions and answers lay im themselves and mot im some to-be-revealed purpose, people were disappointed.

This was clarified by one man who, whem I began to tell him the 'answers' said: "He's going to put it together now.". Whem told of the purpose of the exercise he said: "Oh is that all? I could have done that (correctly typified advertisements).". He then said that he thought I was performing some trick. This has two consequences. The blankness or vagueness which was experienced cannot be called, as it might, 'confusiom at being wrong'. It was rather am indicatiom of a reliance upom the retrospective-prospective quality of language; that what 'was' meant will become clear 'later'. Secondly this wait-and-see factor is related to the indexicality of expressions, where there is knowledge that the provisiom of different contexts results im the display of different rational properties. For example, people know that 'a trick' consists of presenting and establishing an 'objective' descriptiom, of eliciting reactions to that descriptiom, and them changing the 'objectivity'. Am instance of this is a partially folded letter which can be read as concerning sexual matters. But when it is unfolded it

becomes quite innocent. For dealing with verbal and behavioural displays people rely upon the properties of indexicality. Though they might be experienced as problematic in that they permit no final clarity, these properties are resources for the management of practical affairs and understanding what others are doing.

DECODING ADVERTISEMENTS: In what follows we will return to the previous chapters. Advertisements will be presented and examined in the light of remarks made there and the standardised code which was produced. In this sense the advertisements will be looked at as representing in some degree the main parameters of contact judgement. The code acts as a collection of rules for allocating advertisements to specific, pre-constituted socio-sexual types. Harvey Sacks has called such a procedure a membership categorisation device [1974]. As a means for ascribing membership to a certain type the contact code categorises features of individual advertisements. These features, individually and as a whole, amount to 'belonging' to a specific sector of social reality; they are taken as 'showing' the grounds from which an advertisement springs.

In this way the application of a code rule is as a transformation rule. By remedially approaching indexicality through incarnate language these rules developmentally change advertisements from mere strings of words into understandable reports. These transformations depend upon two things. Firstly rules of 'what things look like' and 'what things go together'. Secondly the selection of individual features of advertisements as conforming to these rules. In a reading the contact code selectively organises the materials

presented in advertisements in order to locate them in some position in the unit 'contact advertisement-actor'. An idea of what this process might look like, at least on paper, is presented below. Because of the dominance in interpretaion of the payment rule, for comparison the process of the transformation of an advertisement into 'payment' is included.

Firstly the advertisements:

A: Young, beautiful, blonde housewife would like to meet couples or female/male singles for pleasant evenings together. Has husbands active approval. Please include photograph, all returned.

B: Attractive, passive TV wishes to meet any frustrated males for fun in the privacy of own home. Bondage, loves O and accepts A.

C: Girl student, 22, bisexual, seeks similar attractive girl-friend for a sincere lasting love relationship. All letters answered. Photos appreciated.

X: Petite, sensuous, brunette, 43-25-37, loves receiving 'O' and having her body massaged and admired. I welcome all generous mature gentlemen over 30 please to my home where we can relax. SAE for phone no.

These advertisements can be ordered and organised according to four reading rules: 1] each advertisement states an advertiser; 2] each advertiser states the repliers sought; 3] each advertiser states a specific sexual purpose; 4] each advertiser states the general character of the future encounter. Such rules are the response to the indexical texture of the advertisements and seek to answer the basic questions of 'who?', 'what for?', and 'why?'. The establishment of such bases invokes general and contexted, specific knowledge which fills out this remedial approach to indexicality. The four advertisements with which we are concerned here, when 'worked up' and 'filled out' so as to provide for a definite category, look like this:

A: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Non-payment, 'wife-swapping/threesome' relationship.

B: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Non-payment, male/transvestite relationship.

C: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Non-payment, female bisexual/homosexual relationship.

X: 1 + 2 x 3 x 4 = Payment, male/female heterosexual relationship.

The reading rules organise each advertisement into four main and relevant parts: who the advertiser is; those sought; what this is for; and why. The typicality of each advertisement comes from the juxtaposition of 'what for?' and 'why?'. The ascription of type, the form of the possible relationship, and the location in structural reality of the advertiser and possible repliers comes through the judgemental interaction of the materials located by reading rules 3 and 4. For the reader these rules are the tools for doing 'recognising

a description' and also the means ascribed to the advertiser for 'doing a description' [i.e. if 'what for' and 'why' can be found then a description has been located - cf. H. Sacks, 1974].

The problematic posed by 'recognising a description' is the repair of indexicality for the practical purposes of a reading. This is linked with ad hocing in various background knowledge. The attempted repair of indexicality in advertisements brings with it the notice that some activities are tied to particular categories [e.g. the activity 'dressing up in women's clothes' belongs, for a male, to the category 'TV'], whereas others are not [e.g. oral sex]. In the case of advertisements A, B, and C, though some activities will certainly be tied into the types "housewife", "TV", and "girl bisexual" the formulated sexual features ["pleasant evenings", "Bondage, loves O and accepts A", and "love relationship"] are not.

The case with advertisement X, from a prostitute, is different. The norm which connects advertiser and replier with the sexual feature is presented by the character relation ["I welcome all generous mature gentlemen"]. This relation informs that the activity is category bound, by 'hinting' that it is subject to the category requirement of payment. The location of a proposed activity as category bound has consequences for other formulations in an advertisement. In reading an advertisement according to the category 'payment', the advertiser and possible repliers become certain types of people; 'a prostitute' and 'clients'. The relationship becomes one of 'exchange'. Where an activity cannot be found to be category bound, some wider set of relations must hold. The formulated

character relation in the advertisements A, B, and C are in terms of mutual sexual use, as are the sexual features. Thus, though there are differences of sexual type between these three advertisements, most obviously sexual, they constitute members of the unit 'mutual sexual use' because of the presence of non-payment indicators.

Typification does not come about only through seeking answers to the 'why?' question. The gender of advertiser, repliers, and the sexual features make the possibility of an activity being category bound more relevant in the case of some advertisements than others. An advertisement which formulates a female seeking males for sex can be searched for indicators of category bound status. Other formulations such as a couple seeking all gender groups, a transvestite seeking males, and a bisexual female seeking "a girl friend" make category bound relevance and search less likely.

The typification of advertisements A, B, and C is an application of the contact code. Its central element of use is the notion that some sexual activities are bound to the category 'prostitute' by the norm of payment; that the occupier of such a category is female; and that this category bound status is formulated in contact advertisements. Where a formulated sexual activity cannot be found to be category bound it thereby belongs to the unit of 'mutual sexual use' which can be assembled according to sexual similarities and differences, rather like Wittgenstein's family of resemblances [1972]. The foremost token in organising this unit is evidence of use-value.

THE LETTERS: The letter from B was a response to the 'passing' letters described above. The reply to C sought to

'pass' as a competent member; stating contact experience and asking for details of the advertiser's biography and situation. A's letter is the only response to a series of ten 'ambiguous' letters. These stated that the advertisement had been seen, requested a meeting, and gave 'a department of sociology' address rather than a private one. A had scribbled through her letter and substituted the epithet "Sorry I only model". Her letter read:

> Thank you for your letter in reply to my ad, although it does not seem to be written for my services as a photographic model, which is what the ad was for. If you do want to meet me as a model please write back and we can fix an appointment one evening. I will only see any one by appointment.
>
> The other possibility is that this is an exercise in sociology, if this is the case do not bother to reply.
>
> If your reply is genuine and written in answer to the terms of the ad please send further details, and a photograph as requested.

The immediate thing of notice is that there is no obvious matching between the advertisement, letter, and typification. The formulation "pleasant evenings together" and the typification "non-payment, wife-swapping/threesomes" turns out to be 'evenings of photographic modelling'. The juxtaposition of advertisement and letter produces such a discrepancy that it could be suggested that they are not from the same person. However, A returned the 'passing' letter with her reply written on the back of it. On this was the box number of the above advertisement.

A's letter presents a description of a situation to a possible "genuine" male replier. Though this description is affected by the confusing 'passing' reply, it is possible that some sort of arrangement like this would normally be proposed by A to a single male rather in the style of Mildred above. Also like Mildred, a change in gender in the replier may elicit a different response and description [further replies were sent to A in different styles and formulating different gender forms, but there was no response]. It is also possible that A's use of "model" is a cover for prostitution.

A also reacts to the 'department of sociology' address, seeing a possible intention in the letter of "an exercise in sociology". This is contrasted with being "genuine" and making contact "in terms of the ad". It is obvious that A experiences the same difficulties with the 'passing' letter that her reply presents. This confusion can be seen to be occasioned by certain features of the reply which she received: 1] no substantive expression of sexual interest in her advertisement; 2] the address; 3] the request for a meeting before the intentions of both possible interactants had been made clear. The consequence of these features is a breach of contact expectancies of saying 'who', 'what for', and 'why'.

For A the specification of 'who' and 'what for' was problematic because it was not contexted in a 'why' interest. Though the properties of indexical talk are sanctionable, a lack of concern for indexicality itself is a breach of everyday forms of action. Such a lack of concern in the 'passing' letter results in it being atypical, causally indeterminate, and specifically senseless for A [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. All

that A can do is to review the available possibilities for the letter. A's reply, her renunciation of it, and the substitution of "Sorry I only model" is an indication of a lack of trust [cf. H. Garfinkel, 1963. J. Henslin, 1968]. Because the reply which she received breached contact expectancies, A was unable to act towards the proposed activity [a meeting] in a way which would produce that event as in accord with the basic rules expected in normative orders of such events. This was because she could not be sure what 'kind' of activity was being proposed.

A's reaction to the 'passing' letter illustrates three kinds of approach to confusion, and is similar to those adopted by players of disrupted games. A firstly attempts to normalise the possibilities which the letter presents and specifies which possibility is appropriate. Secondly and in relation to the possibility she endorses, she attempts further investigation. The final element in A's reaction is to completely revoke the interaction [i.e. what has been established or suggested]. She withdraws her account, coming to the understanding that her basis for making contact and the replier's are different. The "Sorry I only model" statement means that there is no practical purpose, A has decided, to be served in any further discourse between herself and the replier because they are attending to different orders of events. As such, A decides to leave the field of play.

B's reply was not as confusing as A's. However it was no less surprising:

Many thanks dear, for your nice letter. I'm sorry for the delay, but I've had a lot of letters to answer, but also I've been away too. I hope you liked the photo of me in the magazine. The hair is my own, and not a wig, also my eye brows are plucked by a beautician friend of mine, but I've learned make-up my self.

I try to give a nice service to any one who visits me, and while I don't wish to seem like a whore I think I'm worth a fee of £10. After all, it would probably cost a lot more to visit a call-girl, and then probably be thrown out after ½ hour, but if you visit me time doesn't matter, any evening would suit me, but I would expect you to keep an appointment, as its not nice to be let down is it! Any type of sex pleases me, and I don't mind mild C.P. but not too severe! I don't have any bondage items yet, but I do intend getting some, but one could always use rope, I like being tied up, then I've got to please, yes!

I'm sorry I haven't a full length photo to send you, but while I'm not too slim, I think I have a fair figure when I wear my tight-laced corset, my legs are very good, better than some real girls! I hope I don't sound very vain, dear, but I'm sure you will enjoy visiting me. It's funny really, but I don't think of myself as queer, I like female company, but I've never had sex with one, but I do enjoy the attentions of a nice male.

Anyway dear, if you think I sound interesting

enough, please let me know, then we can arrange a date, it would have to be about 7.30pm, as I said any evening as I have to get changed etc.

I hope to hear from you soon.

Love

'Mavis'

Whereas A's letter was varied and confused, Mavis's is quite explicit. Like A's letter however, it undermines the previous typification. Although the available relationship does conform to "transvestite/male homosexual relationship", the prediction of non-payment is refuted. The dominant and guiding idea that prostitutes are exclusively female is invaded. The above reading of Mavis's advertisement took "fun" and used it as an indicator of mutual sexual use. However Mavis's letter makes it clear that the most relevant part of the advertisement was "frustrated males". This term references not merely a gender population but one which in some way or another is unsuccessful sexually [i.e. the basic cause of being "frustrated"]. Added to this, a reply received by Mavis from a male informs him that the replier is in such a position that he is either desperate enough to engage in a sexual relationship with another male, or that he is so sexually disposed. It also informs Mavis that the replier is likely to be unable to gain access to such sexual activities. So by merely receiving a reply Mavis is in touch with someone who is likely to pay for sexual services. In this way the gloss "frustrated males" states 'males who are either desperate enough or so sexually disposed to pay another man for sexual services'.

There is no knowledge or indication of how successful

Mavis is in establishing a clientele. Because he charges a fee for his services, he must face the problem that "frustrated males" can pay for a "real girl" rather than an illusion of one. Like female prostitutes Mavis has to engage in practices of persuasion. This is occasioned not only because the replier purports to be inexperienced, but also because of Mavis's inter-sexed position; a male seeking to charge for what is commonly accepted as a female's services. As well as establishing and managing a service relationship, Mavis has to handle his particular form of inter-sexuality. With the female side of his character belongs the stigma of payment; with the underlying male side of his character belongs the stigma of homosexuality. Mavis presents and is faced by norms and expectancies resulting from the enmeshing of two different stereotypes. He approaches these problems by emphasising the value of his "nice service" for exchange and by attempting to consolidate the illusion of female gender by the adoption of female mannerisms. Both these forms of practice are designed to accomplish sounding "interesting enough". Mavis is in competition with prostitutes not as a man, but as another prostitute giving a better service for less money.

Like the letters from A and B, the one from C is most surprising:

> I wouldn't have written to you if you hadn't written 'you can't be too careful can you and I want to be sure of your sincerity'. I feel awful about this, <u>really</u> terrible. I want to apologise to you, but I don't think I deserve to be forgiven. All I deserve really is for you to throw this letter away at once. I would hope that we might become friends despite it all, but

such a deception as this does not seem the best basis for friendship. As it happens, please believe me that deception is contrary to my nature: I am sincere and couldn't contemplate pretending that I'm not.

So why did I place the ad?

A few months ago I went through a period of total despair, which I'm not yet out of. I need love desperately. I've never had a girlfriend. I've always been female identified as well as attracted to females. At various periods of my loneliness [i.e. inability to externalise my love of femininity in the normal way] has made me want to dress up as a girl. My ad was a stupid mistake, prompted by the feeling that a bisexual girl might be the only sort of girl who could accept me. I want to be cured and never dress up again, but I'm afraid. I hate those clothes now. I placed that ad because girls can advertise free, because I felt most of the ads were false anyway, and because I was out of my head with hopeless depression. I regretted doing so immediately afterwards. I have no wish to be a girl, to fool gay women for the sake of boosting my ego. I'm sorry, truely am, that I deceived you.

Often I fall into very deep depressions, but I know exactly what is wrong with me: loneliness. I need a girl-friend so badly. Being over-sensitive to the female point of view I've never had the confidence to believe any girl might be remotely interested in me. I have little hope of ever finding a girl-friend, though there is no particular tangible cause for my permanent rejection and solitude, it is the way I

have always been forced to live, so however much I may long for someone to share my life with, it is difficult for me to imagine how it might be, like a crazy dream come true.

Please write back, if only that we might become friends.

Yours very sincerely,

Martin

It is not immediately clear what the writer of the letter is aplogising so profusely for apart from stating that it is some kind of deception. It is only through sections of the letter and the signature that the gender of the writer is revealed as contrary to that formulated in the advertisement. The typification "female bisexual/homosexual relationship" was a false one. However Martin made the same false assessment of the reply received by him. This attempted to 'pass' as a bisexual female who was competent in both the contact situation and that form of sexuality. This was expressed by enthusiasm for the advertisement ["really excited by your advert"], references to contact experience ["I have made other friends through answering ads"], and an esoteric element which justified a brief letter. In order to do this the letter referred to the dangers of "being found out" by "telling too much" and stated that "you can't be too careful can you, and I want to be sure of your sincerity".

Martin's account can be regarded as a strategy for the practical accomplishment of locating someone in particular; ofmaking contact "for a more lasting relationship". The organisation of such a strategy is in terms of the expression and demonstration of a story that is situated. For its teller

the story is a practical task as an attempted repair of the indexicality of situated conduct. It is made in relation to a biographically determined plan. This consists of typical knowledge and expectancies. The possibility of such a plan is viewed in relation to scenes of action which are seen as specific, partly unalterable, and obvious [A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, 1974]. Martin's interest in the 'passing' letter can, in this way, be seen as plan-determined. This practical interest prescribes a level of adequacy for an outcome which ranges from "a more lasting relationship" to "if only that we might become friends".

The operational structure of Martin's plan is a 'deceptive' one. Because of this not only does he have to offer information and details relevant to making contact, but also reasons for telling the story as reasonable action. The deception becomes part of the story which is set against a background of situated events which produce that deception. Thus, someone I showed Martin's advertisement and letter to commented that it was "tragic" but perfectly "understandable" in view of his situation.

Three reasons are given by Martin for the adoption of the strategy of deception. Firstly because financially it cost little; because of situational problems, such as "needing love desperately"; and lastly because of doubt about advertisements being genuine. Martin does not explicate the third reason any further, but it is the basis for the other reasons. It is also interesting in that his comment applies to his advertisement as well as "most" other advertisements. Because he regards contact advertisements as "false anyway", he must review the possibilities for locating and meeting

someone who conforms with his ideas of the type of person who could help produce "a more lasting relationship". One type of possibility is the placing of an advertisement. Formulating this advertisement in terms of a bisexual female comes from two considerations. Firstly it is attractive financially, because no advertising costs are incurred. Secondly it is relevant because of what Martin sees as his personal problems: "My ad was prompted by the feeling that a bisexual girl might be the only sort of girl who could accept me".

Martin could have advertised as a male seeking a bisexual female, but this would have involved the cost of advertising. It would also probably not have been as successful as the formulation of a female bisexual advertisement. This is because of the limited supply of such sexual actors, and the emphasis which this sexual form has upon the female gender and the exclusion of the male gender. As a male advertiser Martin would also only have a limited opportunity to explain his reasons for seeking a bisexual female. In his letter on the other hand, Martin's related reasons present an explanation for his actions in terms of the available means and his desired ends. The ends which he seeks are biographically determined [e.g. "I've never even got as close as kissing a girl"]. His biography involves remnants of other substitute solutions such as transvestism. Martin does not argue that his transvestism is understandable or natural. He does not attempt to justify it. Instead he condemns it: "I want to be cured and never dress up again".

The other elements of his problem, loneliness and depression, are treated differently. They are seen as understandable conditions which can be solved: "I know exactly

what is wrong with me: loneliness. I need a girl-friend badly". The problems are topics which are subjects for discussion and resources to argue with in the direction specified by the plan. In this way Martin seeks to accomplish his plan through establishing his strategy as 'reasonable' for the adequate solving of his problems.

'WE ARE ALL PUPPETEERS AND HOMONCULI': This report on contact magazines has produced a structure of typifications, instances of that structure, and suggested the code through which that structure was produced. As a sociological account it adopted practical rules for the social standardisation of understandings in order that it appear as a 'normal' report [A. Cicourel, 1973]. A consequence of this is that the texture and effects of the actions of those making contact conform to standardised expectancies. However, the cases of Mavis, Martin, and the unknown A could have been left unexamined and this report would then have claimed for itself some authority in describing what occurs in the world of making contact.

Cases contrary to sociological standardisation reveal the fallacy of formal categorisation, and when experienced prompt a revision of that structure. In everyday terms this revision consists of 'what' was really meant when the advertisement was first read and selected. The appropriate modifications, which may take on an anecdotal quality, can then be made to the original typification. Such a narrative of experience gains its sense by being set against the norms which are expected and assumed to apply in making contact. Though the judgement made by the use of this code is revealed as inappropriate, the code survives more or less intact as a recipe for interpreting advertisements. Advertisements which fabricate one sense of

understanding only to reveal another, whether intentionally or not, do not invalidate the code. Because of the 'wait and see' quality of actions it is assumed that appearances may be deceptive. That deception is an accomplishment of inappropriate social and linguistic practices which rely upon code expectancies and assumptions. Thus the code itself is not at fault, but the users of it.

The revision prompted by contrary cases for sociology can be pursued in two way. Firstly and perhaps more generally, the creation of another structure or category in a theory or description in order to encompass deviant cases. Further or new types may have to be included, typologies extended, and more description or cases studies included. To some extent this has been carried out above, where advertisements A, B, and C were examined in the light of what the letters revealed. Perhaps this is a pervasive pheneomenon in doing sociology: occasions of contact with other interactants requires a revision of previous description, theory, or thought. Secondly, contrary cases can be a beginning for a deeper sociological question, and that is how they are made possible. A discussion of how people's actions 'outwit' sociological predictions or descriptions forges a link with already encompassed cases [i.e. those which appear to conform to the sociologist's account]. If the means whereby a prediction was 'hoodwinked' can be located, it also locates a constituent ground in the already standardised understandings of the people studied and in the production of the sociologist's report.

The contrary cases of Mavis, Martin, and A serve to show the reciprocal typification which commonsense reasoning accomplishes. It is not only sociologists who make use of the

process of typification in producing accounts, but also commonsense members. As one aspect or form of reasoning the normative description of those involved in making contact transformed living people into judgemental dopes or puppets [A. Schutz, 1964. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. This is by investing them with attributes, needs, and characteristics which are required by the particular relevance system which the sociological problem prescribes. The underlying effect of this is that the people involved in making contact are supposed to act 'as if' prior agreement existed over topical or routine matters, rather than agreement and understanding being worked out temporally in engaged practice. Just as the sociologist tacitly uses the concept of the judgemental dope in order to accomplish his studies, so do everyday members in seeking to secure their practical ends and in judging the outcome of actions. Armed with different relevance systems advertisers and repliers in making contact attempt to predict actions of those whom they seek to interact with. In doing this they expect others to act in accord with their judgements. However, as they are dealing with real people and real outcomes, unlike the sociologist who more often than not is dealing with theoretical outcomes, experience teaches that such judgements are only approximations which may work.

TYPIFYING: Organising and assembling people and actions into standardised orders is commonly termed typifying. This process occurs somewhere between being able to produce fairly abstract types of social actor and the codes or structures of rules which support such categorisation. A most important questions remains. What does this process consist of? Between the act of meeting something and being able to account for it as 'one of a kind', governed by rules, there appears

to be an unseen process at work. It is rather like watching a magician produce cards from 'nowhere'. This must be done in some understandable way, but how?

In looking at the production of types and their practical relation with codes, a model of practical reasoning will be presented. It is suggested that the actual practice of sociological and mundane reasoning may be underpinned in such a way. And that it is by using something like this model that the sociologist and the everyday member 'magically' produce their artful accounts. By way of introducing this possible way of constructing types and codes some remarks by Alfred Schutz on the process of typification will be discussed. These remarks are to apply both to sociology and everyday life, but not to the formal methodological statements which sociologists present about their ideal type use [e.g. J.W.N. Watkins, 1973]. The process of typification to be discussed here is seen as enabling such sociological discourse.

Schutz dichotomises the concept of "ideal type of human behaviour" [1972]. The two elements in this dichotomy are the ideal type of another expressing himself in a certain manner ["the personal ideal type"], and the ideal type of the expressive process itself ["course of action type"]. The personal ideal type is constructed from the objective context of meaning of the course of action type. An objective context of meaning is made up of separate events which are collected into a synthesis which becomes an "object" within consciousness [1972].

The construction of a personal ideal type concerns the issues and elements involved in performing a personal action. Understanding is derived from the course of action type which

has been laid down by experience and produced by means of a synthesis of recognition (A. Schutz, I972). Experienced behaviour is interpreted in relation to objective accounts of meaning; the sedimented course of action type. The purpose of ideal typical understanding is the deduction of the in-order-to and because motives of behaviour as social action. This is by the elucidation of the characteristic and constant features and goals of actions. Through this process a picture of the person who typically performs a typical act can be formed. This is the personal ideal type.

Schutz reasoned that because the personal ideal type was dependent upon the course of action type it was always determined by the interpreter's point of view: "It is a function of the very question it seeks to answer. It is dependent upon the objective context of meaning, which it merely translates into subjective terms and then personifies" (I972). This personification is an attempt to capture the certainty of actions. What the outcome of a predicted action will be however, remains problematic because of the occasioned nature of the ideal typical construct, the situated nature of action itself, and the complexity of interactants' mutual typifications of one another according to differing practical aims.

The course of action type, the sedimented body of experienced events, is engaged with factors of commonsense socialisation. The main elements in such a socialisation of knowledge have a relation with a course of action type as aspects of it and as parameters for its use. Parameters are formed from ideas which constitute an event and the problems associated with it, and further define the conditions of

'complete' or 'adequate' description [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Commonsense socialisation has three main components. The first is structural, where people assume that if places were changed with another, the world would be experienced in much the same perspective. Secondly it is assumed that knowledge is culturally derived and organised. The third component is the limited nature of accumulated experience in its relation to the social distribution of knowledge and the experiences of others [A. Schutz, 1964].

The ideal type and the expressive process are transformed by these elements of commonsense socialisation. From being a mere collection of limited experiences the course of action type is constituted and expanded into a series of expectations. Though these are concerned with specific topics [e.g. why advertisements are placed], they are made viable by and based upon expectancies derived from commonsense socialisation. The ascription of object categories is made possible because candidates for a category express some particular cultural form through language which can be seen as appropriate for a personal ideal type which it occasions. The adequacy of this ascription though based squarely upon evidence of approximation between a perceived event and accumulated experience, is also located in the expectation that knowledge is always incomplete. Any change which renders an ascription inappropriate [e.g. Mavis, Martin, or A] will not be met with a great deal of shock. This feature enables the selection of a particular category to be sanctioned as appropriate 'on the evidence'. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, it is expected that categorisation when carried out will be approximate to the 'real' event; that actions

can be understood as others experience them.

Labelling theory has taken up the topic of the ascription of typifications. It sees social events as "a consequence of the application (by others) of rules" (H. Becker, 1963). But as Pollner (1974) has indicated there has been confusion between commonsense and sociological models. Commonsense models have been used as a means for analysis rather than regarded as an integral characteristic for the construction of situations by members and sociologists. In this way, rather than explaining social phenomena sociologists' explanations stand as similar and competing accounts to those of everyday members themselves. This is because both forms of explanation rely upon some commonsense model as "an autobiographical conception of itself" (M. Pollner, 1974).

Though both sociologists and everyday members construct their settings, an integral feature of such work is the conception that settings are independent of that constituting work and can be objectively apprehended. Though labelling theory espouses the maxim that a certain type of behaviour is behaviour that people so label, it neglects how it can itself present descriptions and explanations which reside outside this maxim. In other words, it neglects to examine the social practice of typification while tacitly relying upon that practice. This is because it belongs to a particular form of life. To be involved in sociology is to take part in the normative constraints of some particular method, derived from some formal structures which are seen as constituting 'professional inquiry'. Such veridical methodology reinterprets an area of study in language other than that which belongs to and constitutes that area for those who are immersed in it. Within everyday forms of life a

particular methodology is not dominant, and the tenets of scientific practice are inapplicable.

Schutz has written that the structure of relevances held by social scientists depends both upon the formulation of the scientific problems and the corpus of knowledge which constitutes that discipline. The social scientist takes for granted that he can define his data independently of any non-scientific constituting work. However the only way in which an observer can grasp subjective meaning structures is to proceed in a way similar to the everyday member while being guided by a different system of relevances (A. Schutz, 1973).

Elsewhere Schutz has written that scientific work "constitutes the archetype for rational interpretation and rational action" (1953). A problem is raised for sociology if the ideal of rationality is not a feature of everyday life. This problematic is occasioned because of the "complete nature of the knowledge required for an actor to behave rationally". To seek the repair which this problematic raises, sociologists must interpret their chosen subject matter in practice (like everyday members) and then reinterpret it according to their formal methodological or scientific rationalities (A. Schutz, 1953. H. Garfinkel, 1967).

These reinterpretations are carried out according to a language which does not have its grounds in the context which it attempts to speak about. For sociological language the concerns of science exist independently of particular, contexted action. However such concerns are constitutive of the contexts which they make observable (cf. J. Heap, 1974). The relation between sociologists, their course of action

types, the documentary signification of those types, and the understanding of sociological reports depends upon and consists of both sociological methods and the use of everyday social practices.

The connection between the course of action type and the construction of the personal ideal type has, in this description of making contact, been termed a code. In Schutz's work the criticism can be made that he leaps between concepts without grounding his reasonings in anything other than hypothetical and imagined situations, and consequently is involved in nothing more than a special kind of story telling [B. Hindess, 1972]. In a sense this is certainly true, but the form of questioning in which he engages conforms with his programme of examining the constituting function in relation to meaning [1972]. Though the relation between meaning and the construction of social reality is a core matter, the interest here is more direct and specific. This is the specific and pragamatic connections in the constitution of social phenomena. Code has been used in this respect as a heurism for locating these connections and to present the relevant knowledge to account for particular judgements. These connections however can be made more specific as actual social practices.

A MODEL OF PRACTICAL REASONING: Schutz argued that the modern view of functionalism in sociology is not derived from the biological concept [1964. cf. A. Ryan, 1970]. Function rather refers to the "socially distributed constructs of patterns of typical motives, goals, attitudes, personalities, which are supposed to be invariant" [1964]. These typical elements are used in functional analysis to interpret and

represent 'the social system'. The way in which functionalists constitute items for analysis is comparable to locating and understanding the contact order. From this view the procedural process of doing functionalism, of locating items for analysis and regarding them as accounts and reports on 'the social system', is taken as a model for the reading of contact advertisements. Though there are gross differences between being a functionalist and a reader of contact advertisements, it is suggested that whatever the focal point of attention [e.g. 'the social system' or 'females for sex'], the ways in which phenomena are encountered [i.e. judgementally produced] are basically similar.

Merton has presented a paradigm for functional analysis in sociology. His first element concerns the "item[s] to which functions are imputed " [1971]. In order to locate an item upon which to work it is necessary to decide which characteristics ["the kinds of data"] of those available are to be focused on. Merton states that if existing functional analyses are examined for their "kinds of data", it will be found that description "involves a report of <u>who</u> is variously involved in the pattern of behaviour. And the description of the participants [and onlookers] is in <u>structural terms</u>, that is, in terms of locating these people in their inter-connected social statuses" [1971]. In discussing the items to which functions are to be imputed, Merton offers procedural maxims for locating and describing these items.

<u>Maxim 1</u>: Describe items according to typical knowledge of "inter-connected social statuses". This provides clues as to the nature [function] of the particular item in question and its relation to 'the social system'. Here description

consists of locating and producing clues which formulate the total nature of the context in which they are found. In this way Maxim 1 begins with pre-existent knowledge which, it is assumed, makes available an item for description. For example, in reading contact advertisements [describing them according to typical knowledge] it is assumed that they consist of the statuses 'advertiser' and specified 'replier'. These two statuses as distinct descriptions are connected and qualified as sexual. The maxim thus leads to a redescription of advertisements, where it is through interpretation of the encountered materials as indicators of 'structural reality' that advertisements are located within 'structural reality.

Merton's first maxim results in finding out the kind of item being dealt with. In functionalist terms it is then possible evaluate the described item and to regard the validations of occasioned and typical knowledge as contributing to the upkeep of the theoretical superstructure of society. For making contact, 'finding out' is related to sexual predilections and preferences of a reader as a basis for choice. To both enterprises the materials which accomplish Maxim 1 are activated as worthy of attention by practical matters and constituted through interpretation. The accomplishment of this mode of description as a pre-analysis and pre-choice condition depends upon resolving experienced events with pre-existent knowledge occasioned by those events in terms of the dominant practical interests.

Maxim 2: Indicate the alternatives which Maxim 1 excludes. The first maxim involves and implies the second one. By invoking the mode of alternative comparison, this enables further enlightenment of "the structural context" of the item

and the validation of Maxim 1. The second maxim is both integrated into and a method for justifying Maxim 1. In the process of formulating, the events to be interpreted evoke a range of possible but limited outcomes. As in making contact the context is sexual, such outcomes involve both categories of sexual act and actor. The engagement between these categories and the problematic event to be interpreted involves both positive [Maxim 1] and negative alignments of characteristics, where the location of 'a clue' excludes certain categories.

Conceptions of alternatives help to produce an item, where the focus is concentrated upon the specific linkages as of a probable kind. As well as helping to produce a decision upon an event, Maxim 2 also consists of accounting for the accomplished description in terms of 'good reasons' [i.e. what an alternative action entails and why it does not 'fit' the action in question].

Maxim 3: Describe the regularities of items. These may not be recognised by participants, but nevertheless these "unwitting regularities" provide further clues to the typical position of the items [R. Merton, 1971]. The distinction between unwitting and known regularities [fairly constant features] belongs to the basic process of formulating the adopted programme. The importance of this distinction lies in its place in accomplishing the pragamatic interests from which the programme originally springs [e.g. doing functional analysis or making contact]. It does not matter whether awakened features 'reallyare' generally shared. What is important is that they can be seen to occur in that form.

A feature's importance however is lost as soon as the general aim of the activity is no longer secured. This provisional character of judgements is perhaps more commonplace in everyday courses of action than professional studies because 'real' outcomes have to be dealt with or secured rather than theoretical ones.

In finding out that an advertisement conforms to the category 'prostitute' it is not necessary that the significant features which enable that location should be recognised by a possible replier. What is necessary is that any judgement should self-fulfill itself. When this does not occur the resulting outcome causes the reinterpretation of the original evidence in order to normalise the surprising outcome. Making decisions and judgements in everyday life has a provisional nature. Those involved rely upon waiting to see both what an outcome will be and what the situation consisted of when an interpretation was made.

Maxim 4: Distinguish between the reasons for an item and the typical mode ["objective category of behaviour"] in its relation to 'the social system' [R. Merton, 1971]. Individual motivations do not prove problematic or fragment the typical patterns of interpretation, but may prove useful in abutting that pattern. This maxim allows for the individuality of particular configurations of meaning in order to ensure the applicability of the adopted typical mode. Individual instances breath life into typical abstractions. However to the extent that these instances confound abstractions as adopted pragmatic means, they can be "discounted" as singular ["psychological" motives], rather than collective ["social" motives]. Thus, though individual actions may not conform to the typical mode, by distilling out singular and collective

elements both the difference and unity of experience can be accommodated. This provides for the accomplishment of a programme through finding out, while recognising and minimising the varied nature of the instances which constitute such a programme of action. For example the differences between "cater", "right type", and "just fun" as contextual events may be manifest. The modes 'payment' and 'non-payment' have to come to terms with them as forms of typical expression. Contexted differences are recognised through the typical mode and unified as collective documents for it. A "present" and "a fee" may be very different things, but reviewed through the mode of 'payment' they can be constituted as a unity.

Maxim 5: Describe the meanings of items for members. Merton glosses this maxim in two sentences, stating that its accomplishment suggests "appropriate lines of functional analysis". Similarly for the reader of advertisements, the attainment of this maxim suggests appropriate lines of contact choice. However in being stated, the maxim presupposes the accomplishment of description, the achievement of finding out, and the understanding of meaning.

Merton's gloss passes over the highly problematic nature of this maxim; it does not directly address 'how' the ascription or location of meaning comes about. A fundamental characteristic in this process is the form of language through which making sense or inquiry proceeds. The linguistic connections between sociologist and data, between reader and advertiser are taken for granted grounds for the accomplishment of actions. This unrecognised ground as Gadamer has written, fails "to see in the object the counterpart of itself and hence understand both" [1976]. It is perhaps because of this that

Merton glosses the relationship between sociology and the members studied [e.g. "as will become evident"]. He does not recognise that the accomplishment of Maxim 5 comes about through at least the other maxims which he details. The maxims are not so much rules for locating and describing social phenomena, but are practices which are dominantly linguistic for constituting phenomena. Events and experiences are intelligible according to their accounting-reporting character, yet are found to be so through the work of interpretation whereby they are constituted.

IN CONCLUSION: Regarding Merton's suggestions on how to locate items for functional analysis as a model of practical reasoning, we are led to a basic programme for accounting for occurrences and events. This programme is remarkably similar to that which the above chapters on making contact have imputed to contact actors, and which I found myself using in reporting the contact domain. And on reflection, it is the programme which I instituted in initially experiencing contact magazines and contact actors. In this way the practical programme gives rise to a relevant code [i.e. the code produced by a functionalist and a contact actor would be different] for interpretation and establishing a corpus of knowledge.

As a means for accounting-reporting, the practical programme consists of: 1] accounting for an occurrence by establishing its significance in relation to other events and experiences; 2] accounting for an occurrence by showing 'how' it can be adequately recognised and described through presenting opposite and alternative forms; 3] accounting how occurrences 'fit in' with pre-existent knowledge as expected formations or outcomes; 4] accounting for the uniqueness of an occurrence in

relation to what 'was' known; 5] accounting for an occurrence by saying what 'was' meant by use of the accounting devices 1 - 4.

The devices of establishing relevance, comparison, unity, and difference in the accounting-reporting of meaning produces an occurrence or event as understandable. They permit the production of codes for the routine recognition of phenomena for 'what they are' through accounts, and the construction of more formal structures of types of activity and actor. This form of practical reasoning however, also permits those codes and structures to be confounded. It makes possible the presentation of 'reasonable' accounts and reports which are only later discovered as mock-ups and fabrications. There are other occasions of language-use which distort actions and utterances, one of which will be examined below.

SECTION II

Practices - The Part Played By Competence In The Conversational Patterns Of Pre-School Children

Section I has demonstrated the ways in which a typology of contact actors can be established, developed, and changed by events which were not as they appeared. These fabrications of a rationality may at times confine the professional, sociological theorist to becoming a judgemental dope. To take benefit of Harold Garfinkel's writings (1967), the sociologist becomes the man in the everyday member's society "who produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with pre-established and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides.". Section II follows this notion of the replication of the social structures of society in relation to pre-school children, and seeks to evaluate the part played by practical activities and theoretical considerations.

As theory casts doubt upon the competence of everyday inquiries, and subjects itself to the danger of becoming a judgemental dope, adults view the activities of children in a similar manner. To 'be' a professional theorist involves the use of the conception of the type 'everyday member'; to 'be' an adult involves the use of the conception of the type 'child'. These conceptual types provide for 'ways of seeing'. Events, people, and places are regarded with reference to them and thus 'appear' that way. However without an awareness of this very constituting process itself, this important function is lost to sight; it is not only a social world which is given to me by others, but a means for creating that world with others. Without this insight the practical nature of the world for the theorist and child's world for the adult appear 'just so'; as natural facts. An awareness of the intersubjectivity of our

realities results in being able to locate the shared features of situations, embodied in language, which give rise to a differentiated and structured 'social system'. This phenomenological perspective views the existence of theory and practice, adults and children, as situated accomplishments of people in interaction rather than brute facts.

While researching into contact magazines and becoming aware of the existence of a whole range of knowledge and methods which I tapped into without being aware of it in interpreting 'present' events, I stumbled onto another area which was familiar to me yet which appeared on reflection to consist of a largely unrecognised social organisation. My daughter was attending a day-nursery to which I took her each morning. On some occasions while there I observed meal-time activities where adults would question children's responses to their inquiries. It appeared as a normal adult activity to question the utterances and actions of children. I found myself becoming aware of the times when I did it.

Yet this questioning and doubting process raised what seemed to be a fundamental question: if children could not understand what was said to them to the extent that adult questioning insisted, would not adult-child interaction consist of chaos? On the other hand, if children were more competent than adults took for granted, what features were present to account for this situation? Section II addresses these questions, seeking their resolution in a discussion of both historical features and situated practices. It is an assumption of the Section that an examination of the adult-child relation is analogous to the theme embraced in each section: the relation between theory and practice.

CHAPTER FOUR

LANGUAGE-USE AMONG PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN

CHILDREN AND COMPETENCE

> When I was a child I spake as a child,
> I understood as a child, I thought as a
> child: but when I became a man I put away
> childish things.
> [I Corinthians 13:11.]

This chapter and the one which follows it will seek to build upon the practical report and theoretical discussion of the above chapters. Their subject is language-use among pre-school children. This will be based in an examination of a day-nursery and the interaction which takes place there between staff and pre-school children [Chapter Five]. This chapter will examine the relation between children and the concept of competence, which is crucial in any interaction between adults and children.

It will be argued throughout that the child is not totally subservient to 'physical development' and the simultaneous process of 'socialisation' for making sense of his surroundings and producing socially perceptive remarks about them. Though children are certainly under constraints [e.g. being unable to walk, not knowing the phrase 'socially perceptive'], it is suggested that the concept of 'the child' is socially produced. Moreover, this production distorts the actions and utterances which it seeks to approach and label. The unique event of being a person occupies only a marginal interest in the language of object production.

A RESEARCH NOTE: There is certainly an irony in calling into question the use of the word 'child' and the taken for granted practices and knowledge which accompany it. This is because while casting doubt upon its use, 'child' is used in just this ordinary way here. Beginning with this irony however makes topical the ways in which children are treated. Attention is drawn not only to descriptions of interaction which occur between adults and children and the predominant subjects around which they are organised, but also to the reflexive nature of acting socially which constitutes interaction and those subjects. The focus of study falls upon the reflexivity of members' constructs. This has importance not only for the substantive topic of inquiry, but also for doing research and producing sociological reports.

Courses in sociology more often than not contain a programme entitled 'research methods' [cf. D.L. Phillips, 1973]. The emphasis here is upon the statistical approach to social phenomena. The recognition of a phenomenon for examination and study by statistical method, and how the sociologist interacts with those from whom he has to compile his data, are topics which are only dealt with in terms of the programme itself [e.g. significance, error, rejection]. Non-statistical methods, generally combined under the title 'participant observation' are sadly neglected.

It appears that though statistical methods need to be taught, descriptive methods require little examination. The reason for this is the assumption that such descriptions can 'somehow' be done without much reflection upon the underlying process. Further, this assumption would also seem to be connected to the belief that non-statistical methods are

'less' scientific or 'less' precise than statistical methods. This is because they cannot produce the conclusions of statistical inquiry such as verification and prediction, though the 'true' status of these concepts and their relation to the contexts about which they claim to have authority would seem to be in doubt [cf. A. Cicourel, 1964. On participant observation cf. D. Silverman, 1972, S. Bruyn, 1966].

The emphasis upon professional expertise which can somehow be done is not confined to courses in sociology. It may well be that it pervades most areas of life; a neglect of the common environment in favour of expert knowledge from professionals. For the 'would-be' sociologist interested in how people proceed in their daily lives rather than tables of statistics, the production of a report [seen as 'inside knowledge'], presents peculiar problems. The topic for study can easily be selected; indeed it often seems to present itself. But having decided upon the subject how does the sociologist proceed? Does he keep research diaries? Use tape-recorders and video equipment? Or just sit, watch, and listen? Whichever approach is used, a more basic question is what is to be observed?

The answer appears to be easy: action that is informed upon by participants' speech. However in virtually any situation the richness and complexity which these phenomena present overwhelms the observer. The research method which is invoked at this point is that of selection; filtering out the elements which are essential to the domain in question in relation to the researcher's system of relevances. Such a system controls the construction of a descriptive picture of 'what it is like' to be part of a particular kind of action. This filtering process remains for the operating sociologist

unexplicated; it is uninteresting. The sociologist emerges with a product which details the characteristic features of the area which has been studied. Yet the bedrock of social life [speech and action] which constituted the world under study and enabled the production of the sociological report, is left in the shadows. Others have made this point, stressing the need for the contexts and grounds of sociological explanation to be examined [cf. T.P. Wilson, 1970. D.L. Phillips, 1971. M. Phillipson, 1972].

Before entering the nursery as 'a researcher' in order to collect 'data', I had decided to focus upon the filtering process. Reflecting upon adult talk about children as objects [e.g. talking about a child in his presence as if he were not there], it appeared that there were separate and discrepant linguistic areas: adults' talk in relation to children; childrens' talk in relation to adults; childrens' talk in relation to themselves. Normal sociological practice would filter social reality from among these areas of everyday talk without giving them recognition as the producers of everyday scenes. From this basis I decided to concentrate upon specific instances of talk in order to examine the fragmentary character of speech, and the social mechanics by which 'complete' or 'satisfactory' accounts and outcomes of action are produced. By the adoption of this particular research method I sought to display not only 'inside knowledge' of the daily routine of a day-nursery, but also the speech practices whereby that knowledge was constituted. This interest is a sociological one; for those involved in these speech practices the reflexivity of their accounts is treated with a "passing matter of fact" [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

COMPETENCE: As a preamble to an examination of actual events within the nursery [Chapter Five], I want to address and make explicit an assumption which is central to the formulation of this chapter. This is the status afforded to the idea of competence. More particularly this is in relation to: children and their demonstrations of competence; everyday ideas on competence; and the resulting negation of the possibility of children's competence when it is exhibited in commonsense situations. In order to do this competence will be examined in both practical and theoretical terms.

A Practical Examination of Competence: This makes problematic a child's claim to knowledge. It poses the problem: what constituent factors are there which warrant an utterance as understandable? As an occasion to approach this problem I 'heard' my daughter, Vicki, reading a book. The book was concerned with three participants: Peter, Jane, and Pat the dog. The section which was being read concerned Peter and Jane "paddling in the water". This was how Vicki accounted for the pictured activity; the book referred to "having fun" and "liking water". Each description in the book [e.g. "Here is Peter."] was placed opposite a picture; the written text making reference to the pictorial representation. These written descriptions are not definitive; they do not rule out other interpretations of the pictorial form.

One must agree with Wittgenstein that a picture is a model of social reality, and that it is also a fact. But when he contends that the elements of a picture are related in a determinate way, and that this indicates that "things" are related in the same way, he overlooks the situation of interpretation. For the early Wittgenstein, pictorial form mirrored and corresponded to reality, "like a measure" [1971].

It was only later that Wittgenstein adopted the view that understanding depended upon the situation of use of a particular grammar [1972].

In hearing Vicki read, my procedure was to ask questions concerning the pictures in the book. By being insistent upon a sense of definiteness the conversation developed into an examination of the reasons for regarding a representation in a certain way rather than another. The conversation:

1:

A: What are they doing in that picture?

B: Erm, playing in the water.

A: What's Pat doing?

B: Watching.

A: What's he watching?

B: The...Peter and Jane in the water.

A: What are Peter and Jane doing?

B: Paddling.

A: Paddling. And what's Peter doing?

B: Playing with a ball in the water.

A: How do you know it's a ball?

B: 'Cause I do, 'cause it's round.

A: Well, the sun's round.

B: No. But look. That. [Points to 'ball'.]

A: 'Look that' what?

B: Round, red thing.

A: How do you know it isn't an apple?

B: 'Cause it isn't an apple.

A: Why not?

B: 'Cause it isn't.

A: Why?

B: 'Cause it isn't.

A: Well apples are red and apples are round.

B: Yer.

A: He might have been eating an apple and dropped it.

2:

B: Yes.

A: Is he? [Vicki nods her head.] He is?

B: I think so,

A: Well you said he was playing with a ball.

B: Yer.

A: Well, what's he doing? Playing with a ball or eating an apple?

B: Playing with a ball.

A: Why?

B: 'Cause I know he is.

A: Tell me how you can tell? How do you know?

B: 'Cause some balls are red.

A: But apples are red.

B: I know, but little balls could be all red.

A: Well apples are all red.

B: Oh, can't we get on with it?

A: O.K., but can you tell me how you know that that's a ball and not an apple?

B: 'Cause there's not apple trees. [Begins reading another page.]

A: What is it? [Points to picture.]

B: Apple.

A: How do you know.

B: 'Cause...I don't know if it is an apple or not.

A: Is it an apple or is it a ball?

B: A ball.

A: How do you know?

3: B: 'Cause Pat's ball is red.

A: How do you know Pat's ball is red?

B: 'Cause I do 'cause I seem it in another book.

A: Let's see if we can find this ball again. (Turns over pages.)

B: It is a ball. You're wrong and I was right.

A: How do you know?

B: Look. (Points to picture.) Pat's going to catch it.

The conversation has been separated into three different parts; I) the beginning of the questioning procedure and the emergence of the topic 'a ball'; 2) the comparative questioning of 'ball' and 'apple'; 3) the resolution of the topic 'ball or apple?'. In an essential sense this conversational structure is different to those found in the mundane world. It belongs to a special order where turn taking of questions and answers is expected: having a reading test at school; being questioned by the police; having an interview for a job. In relation to children, adults use the question and answer procedure in order to maintain both practical and theoretical dominance. This procedure both directs actions and demonstrates and maintains the grounds of that direction (parent-adult authority).

Carl Werthman has written in a paper on juvenile delinquency that once young people question the grounds of the organisation of actions (which thereby demands an account of such organisation), they face a choice as to their orientation to that order. For Werthman it is in such decisions that the essence of delinquency lies (1971). Before such a point is reached however, the adult's questioning procedure continues in a fairly orderly way. Perhaps the only difference between the above data and 'natural' adult-child conversations is the

emphasis placed upon a claim to a piece of knowledge in relation to the activity being carried out (reading words). This disjunction between the overt purpose of the activity and the disruptive effect which the questioning has upon this, can be seen in Vicki's reaction of "Oh, can't we get on with it?".

Part I: The first part of the conversation concerns questions upon the activities which are represented by the pictures in the book. Descriptions of such activities have to have an element of correctness about them, but this is in relation to a background of assumptions concerning cultural knowledge. Once the major categories of actors and activities have been appropriately selected and agreed upon in interaction the notion of the correctness of descriptions is specified by the background assumptions and not 'independent' facts.

Harvey Sacks has said that children acquire social categories in interaction with other members of society. These categories identify and select particular people or groups as of a particular kind; they produce an orderly sense of social structure and appear as part of 'the natural order'; as "natural groupings of categories". Such groupings are termed by Sacks "membership categorization devices", which consist of categories and rules of application to actual situations. Sacks has noted the difference between devices which are adequate for the classification of any set of people and those which are not. For example, all people can be classified by the device 'sex' and its categories 'male' and 'female', but not all people can be classified by the device 'occupation' (1974, 1972).

The description of the picture by Vicki rests upon the

use of such general and multiplex devices in tackling the problem of categorisation. General devices help to establish and maintain an orderly cultural background. Because of their generality [i.e. their specific application to everyone], usage can be judged as either correct or incorrect, though this can be problematic [cf. H. Garfinkel's discussion of the transvestite Agnes's management os sexual status, 1967]. For example, the use of the device 'sex' and the category 'boy' underlies the recognition of Peter.

A memory for past interaction further maintains and occasions a particular corpus of knowledge. In the above conversation the participants are approached in terms of "they" and personal names. These individuals are remembered from the past, and their factual texture comes from the attention directed towards them under the maxim 'regard them in that way'. This, as an ongoing process, constructs an orderly body of knowledge. It is not stable however. If participants wish to forget or reconstruct knowledge then they can [cf. D. Zimmerman and M. Pollner, 1970]. The 'correct' recognition of a person or activity depends upon being able to direct attention towards the social nuances and emphases being used by participants in interaction.

Against this background of obvious, occasioned knowledge, multiplex devices form the foreground of description. They formulate the particular mode of expression with which the interaction is to be regarded, detailing in specifics persons and activities. In the conversation, the device 'playing' was selected by Vicki in order to convey the sense of the occasion portrayed in the picture. In her rendition this device at least contains the categories 'paddling' and 'playing with a

ball in water'. Also allied to the device 'playing' is the category 'watching'. This is integrated into the sense of the picture as seen by Vicki: Pat the dog is watching Jane paddle and Peter play with a ball.

Part 2: The second segment of the conversation is concerned with the criteria for the recognition of 'ball' and the suitability of the application of another criterion. Vicki begins by stating a criterion for identifying a ball: "'cause it's round". In response to repeated questioning she affirms the obvious character of the object ball: "No. But look. That"; "Round, red thing". Her conviction of the suitability of the interpretation 'ball' is then apparently swayed by the comparison of the object in the picture to an apple. In response to the question of whether Peter has been eating an apple she says: "I think so". Further questioning on the status of the object in the picture centres around its use; either for play or to be eaten.

No further criteria are introduced to distinguish between an article for play and an article of food. Rather Vicki stands by her original interpretation of 'ball'. Her answers to the questions treat the pictures situation qua situation, rather than an occasion for a demonstration of analysis. She is inductive, supporting the selection of 'ball' for the object in the picture by the possibility that other balls in the world share similar features. This reasoning contrasts with the questioning, which uses abstract features [shape, colour], in order to examine the particular object.

In an examination of the approaches to insanity, Coulter has suggested that differences in interpretation are the result of different judgemental procedures; that the attainment of

some concensus in interpretation results from the adoption of similar styles of judgement, depending upon context [J. Coulter, 1973]. The disparate gap in communication which the use of different sets of procedures brings can clearly be seen in Vicki's exasperated answer to a comparison of the roundness of both a ball and the sun: "No. But look. That". In accounting for a pictured scene of activity, Vicki makes sense of the observed objects and reports upon them as an interrelated structure of meaning. Because of this, introducing the subject of the sun is a total non-sequitur. It has no place in the structure of Peter, Jane, Pat, play, paddling, and ball. The sun cannot be played with or held in the hand. It is more or less beyond words: "No. But look. That".

The second section has two different, though in terms of the conversation similar, parts. The first is the agreement by Vicki that the object in question may indeed be an apple. The second, the forthright "Oh, can't we get on with it?". One is acquiescence; the other exasperation. However, both appear similar as procedures for reformulating the interaction in terms of its original purpose; to drop the pointless topic of 'ball' and resume 'a parent hearing his daughter read'.

Part 3: The final section of the conversation continues the 'apple-ball' topic. In response to these questions Vicki introduces two new features for justifying her selection. The first is relating 'apple' to "apple trees", implying that the adoption of apple for the pictured object would be unfounded. This is followed by another change of mind by Vicki, and the selection of 'apple'. However she is unable or unwilling to relocate the pictured activities and interactants in terms of 'apple' and reverts back to 'ball'. The second new feature

is the remembering of prior knowledge about the interactants and the object in question: "'Cause I do, 'cause I seen it in another book"; "'Cause Pat's ball's red".

Vicki demonstrates that the object in question has an owner, which is based upon a claim to prior knowledge. By locating Pat as the owner of the red object Vicki further clarifies her case. Just as 'mother' and 'baby' "go together" [H. Sacks, 1974], so do 'dog' and 'ball'. Connecting 'dog' and 'apple' does not seem natural. The conclusion to the conversation is related to this 'going together' of categories. A picture showing Peter's arm extended, a red object in the 'sky', and Pat below it resulted in Vicki saying: "It is a ball. You're wrong and I was right". The categories 'throwing' and 'catching' go together with 'dog' and 'ball' under the device 'play'. It is interesting to note Vicki's awareness of the temporal span of the conversation, and the uncertainty of judgements: "You're wrong and I was right". This is what Garfinkel has called waiting until later to see what was meant [1967]. She contrasts the 'present' with the 'past'. Though throughout the series of questions and answers Vicki's judgements were uncertain and possibly unfounded in relation to the nature of the interaction, the instances of 'throwing' and 'catching' validates them.

The examination of the question and answer session with Vicki reveals what it is for an utterance to be understandable; to be competent. Wittgenstein said [1972] that a game does not only have rules but also a point. In the context in which she found herself, Vicki had to locate the point of the language-game in 'reading with daddy'; it was obviously not 'reading correctly'. The point of the language-game involved

adequately describing the meaning of a pictured situation, upon which turned the status of objects. These two tasks are fused together; the accomplishment of one depends upon the recognition of the other. The conversation shows that to be understandable and competent depends upon the negotiable and emergent character of interaction. It depends upon the use of procedures for the selection and elaboration of selected devices and their categories; a background assumption of culturally specific knowledge; the invocation of prior knowledge; the imputation of motive as a reason for a state of affairs [cf. P. McHugh et al, 1974]; and finally, upon the claim to be a bona-fide member of a situation with a right to the assumption of adequate knowledge [e.g. "I was right"].

A Theoretical Examination of Competence: In the course of everyday affairs 'knowing what one is talking about' is a sanctioned property of discourse. Within conversational settings such competence is an assumption whereby discourse is maintained as orderly and ongoing. As soon as this assumption is called into question, conversational settings break down [cf. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. There are other occasions when elements of competence are withdrawn from participants in a conversation in an orderly fashion. For example, the mutual establishment of locations by conversational participants shifts from an occasioned 'commonsense geography' towards 'giving instructions' or 'inside knowledge' when a stranger is involved in conversation [cf. E.A. Schegloff, 1972].

The stranger concentrates upon the competent knowledge assumed to be held by others, whether it be to gain instruction for reaching a location or, like the sociologist, cultural knowledge of a group. Alfred Schutz constructs his conception

of a stranger as: "an adult individual of our times and civilization who tries to be permanently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches" [1971]. Though Schutz specifically excludes people with only transitory contact with a group, for the present purposes his definition of a stranger will be sufficient.

In order to be recognised as a stranger, and be accepted or tolerated at that level, depends upon a formulation of an expected lack of knowledge [e.g. coming from another city]. The asking of a question in this case provides the dual features of topic [the subject of the question] and resource [how to formulate an answer in terms of 'who' the questioner is]. Schegloff notes for example, that asking for a certain place may elicit a question concerning knowledge of the area. Depending upon the answer is a choice of routes and the place references contained in the selected route [1972]. That remarks formulate more than they appear to do enables strangers and others to gloss their surroundings and experiences when in interaction, even if only for the sake of conversation [cf. "Rose's Gloss", H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks, 1970].

The stranger provides a good example for a demonstration of a lack of competence which does not evoke sanctions or derision. Being a bona-fide stranger however is a contingent matter, depending largely upon the obviousness of what is strange and how this is portrayed. For example, a man with brain damage has provided an account of seeking directions: "When someone passed by, I asked him how to get to Kazanovka. But he just smirked and walked on, since the settlement was right there - you could see it through the hedges. I still couldn't believe it and asked another person. 'Look for

yourself', he said,'it's right here!'" [A.R. Luria, 1975].

Seeking directions depends for its accomplishment not just upon demonstrating a manifest lack of knowledge. Though the above account relates the difficulties experienced by a brain-damaged person, it also displays the appraisals which people make of utterances. In the above example if the questioner had asked 'is this?' rather than "how to get to", the responses may have been different. Such a part of speech as 'is this?', reveals that the questioner has recognised the possibility that the immediate surroundings may have relevance for him. The questioner requires instructions on how to regard his surroundings in relation to his system of relevances and not how to recognise them as in the above example. Failure to exhibit situated understandings and problems [e.g. 'I'm lost', 'I don't know the area'] as a condition for being understood places the assumption of interactional competence and further conversational interaction in doubt.

When in the position of a stranger a person must demonstrate not only that he lacks the requisite cultural knowledge, but also that he has the social skills to use knowledge. A bona-fide stranger's dilemma is the search and retrieval of appropriate knowledge. For a none bona-fide stranger however [i.e. one who is unable to carry out everyday affairs without interference], because by definition the means are in doubt the dilemma is one of recognition and thereby identity. Those who are seen as incompetent are thereby produced as lying outside the specific, socially constructed world. Because of this production process, in interaction there ceases to be 'a world in common' [cf. P.L. Berger, 1971].

In this situation one or more of four validity claims have

come into question. Conversely, where competence is an assumption this accomplishment recognises these claims as a background resource. The claims involved are: understandability; the truth of statements; the sincerity of a speaker; and the appropriate placing of a speech. In general it appears that interactants do not dwell upon these features of competence. They are unstated claims which speakers mutually expect they can perform and satisfy. As both a resource for framing an entry into and sustaining a position in a collective world they form a model of pure communicative action [T.A. McCarthy, 1976]. There is however, little fit between the ideal nature of this model and actual situations of talk. The ideal model of communication cannot be totally fulfilled. Yet people let this pass. On some occasions however, elements of this model do become an issue. This can be demonstrated by another situation: prison.

On a broad level people committed to prison are branded as morally incompetent, because they have not abided by the legal rules of the society. At the more particular level of language in interaction between prisoners and warders - and no doubt within both these groups - there are different forms of verbal address, exchange, and appeals to rules as exhibiting a particular social order [cf. L. Weider, 1974]. In looking at talk among and between such institutionally differentiated groups, the idea of universal understanding [i.e. a model of pure communicative action] becomes problematic. Some forms of life [e.g. being a prisoner] presuppose other forms which are seen as antagonistic and which are reacted to in a like manner. Because of this interaction between the two cannot trade off a mutual assumption of competence. Relations between anatagonistic forms of life characterises "not the language

used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as practice." [M. Foucault, 1977]. In this situation the assumptions of the universal naming ability of language and the face value of environments are negated. Instead, attention is paid to language as means of constructing and producing appearances.

On a mundane everyday level discourse as practice has inherent in it the model of pure communicative action as a unifying element. The institutional recognition of moral incompetence however results in doubt being thrown on at least two of the components of this model: truth and sincerity. This doubt concerning the competence of remarks is reciprocated between both warders and prisoners. Weider for example relates that an element of the convict code is "*do not trust staff*". Staff also used a version of the code in order to connect prisoners' actions to a possible goal: "By seeing the potential code relevance of the act as an attack on staff, the staff member identified 'the' specific meaning of the act." [1974].

In a similar way, prisoners relate to warders' utterances and actions, forming and transforming them into an array of objects understandable in terms of the discursive relations imposed by the difference of formations. Jimmy Boyle, a prisoner, has described the kind of attention and interpretation which is paid to warders' actions: "Larry and I had the Inverness trial to attend, so we spoke *in whispers to each* other about it. We had someone to watch out for the screws while we searched our cells for listening devices. We would come up with *endless permutations* as to what the game was. A screw would mention something completely innocent, and we would pounce on it later when alone, dissect it and interpret

it in all sorts of different ways." [1977].

Boyle describes the somewhat secret life of prisoners in respect of the attention which they pay to the organisation of a prison, the intentions of those within the authority structure as a vocabulary of motives [cf. C. Wright Mills, 1971], and the background of understandings which are brought into play in order to constitute interpretation. The provisional nature of interpretation is recognised by Boyle. This also demonstrates the type of communication engaged in between warders and prisoners, and the assumptions which are used.

Central to Boyle's description is a scepticism of what warders said. The reciprocal doubting of truth and sincerity of utterances which can be seen to occur between warders and prisoners results in a form of pseudo or distorted communication [cf. J. Habermas, 1976]. Though for Habermas, distorted communication produces misunderstandings which are not recognised as such by the participants, in Boyle's case it would seem that he fully recognises the form of language-game in which he was engaged. That because of organisational constraints [i.e. the very form of language-game], he was not trusted and could not trust his keepers as well [cf. S. Cohen and L. Taylor, 1972].

Because of the lack of situational or cultural knowledge the stranger is seen to be incompetent. The prisoner is one who has not abided by the legal rules of society, and who because of this becomes involved in a form of distorted communication where words and actions are doubted. Amongst none of these theorised groups is the assumption of competence doubted per se; in interaction competence is always a facet of

a stock of knowledge. For the stranger it is assumed that if he had 'inside knowledge' he would be able to use it competently. For the prisoner, that he could be competent [truthful and sincere] if he wanted to be. However when that universal group of people located by age and known as children is addressed, this is not the case.

Throughout early life the adult power and authority structure removes from young people the semblance of competence. Unlike the stranger who openly elects to portray his lack of competence in knowledge as a condition of membership, or the prisoner who has competence wrenched from him, the child is taken to have no competence. Rather than being an assumption as it is in the majority of situations, for children the demonstration of competence is a condition of admittance to a different language community, and consequently to different forms of action. Without this demonstration [e.g. acting one's age] and rite de passage, conditioned to a great degree by the appearance of 'age', the young person remains in an inferior position vis a vis adults.

The word 'child' has a history. It can be found that in medieval society our generally postulated difference between the child and the adult did not exist. As soon as the child could live without constant care then he belonged to adult society. Whereas in medieval times the definition of the word 'child' was loose and wide ranging, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries childhood was marked out by a specialisation in dress and a change of attitude towards children. Rather than being part of adult society the child was set apart. Because of his innocence he was a source of interest and amusement to adults. At this time teachers and

moralists emphasised another view of childhood which dismissed adults' amusement as indulgence. They stressed discipline and rationality. The innocence of childhood had to be protected, particularly by the Church, against being spoiled and corrupted by adults. Childhood was an extended period of time brought about by subordination and bound up with ideas of dependence. Childhood ceased with independence. Among less dependant classes an awareness of age as a stable, measuring principle sprang up, developing into the stages 'child' and 'youth' [P. Aries, 1973].

The moral and rational ideals of subordination to adults, the Church, and the family developed and persisted into the nineteenth century. These ideals were rooted in the middle classes and played out in the development of education [e.g. the development of the public school system]. For the working classes the necessity to work, the hours and conditions of work, and the dominance of industrialisation meant that 'the home' and 'the family' were only fragmentary concepts [cf. R. Fletcher, 1967]. The development of education at this period was related to these two classes, where working class children were expected to be educated and working at around ten years old. H. G. Wells referred to this as educating the working classes "for employment on lower class lines, and with specially trained inferior teachers" [D.V. Glass, 1959].

The gap between childhood and adulthood was occupied by 'youth' in the seventeenth century. Between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries there develped the conception of 'adolescence'. This grew on two levels. Firstly on a social level where the period of attaining maturity became a dominant theme. Childhood was shortened and transformed by war, fashion,

education, marriage, and economic and political power. The emergence of these various factors resulted in the social construction of a fairly homogenous group of young people who possessed a consciousness which was alternative to the existing social order [cf. T. Roszak, 1968]. Central to the genesis of such a sense of social structure, though largely covert within it, is the second level of growth for the conception of adolescence. This knowledge concerned sex and anatomy.

For medicine and commonsense, sexual maturity in its relation to age is an important factor for defining 'normal' and 'pathological' development. Knowledge of the onset of sexual maturity [e.g. menstruation] and the problems associated with it [e.g. venereal disease] are widespread if sometimes obscure. Today knowledge about adolescence is far more specific than it was in the nineteenth century. Discharges from the genitals were variously thought to be brought about by ice-cream, bad weather, marshy regions, footwarmers, and too much coffee. Menstruation was thought to be begun because young women developed more rapidly than young men and produced more blood. The lining of the uterus was postulated as the weakest part of the vascular system, and under pressure from the over-production of blood was thought to rupture. Bleeding occurred until equilibrium was restored to the vascular system.

This explanation of menstruation was offered in 1878, over forty years after the discovery of the ovum and thirty years after the postulation that menstruation depended upon ovulation [R. Pearsall, 1969]. Twentieth century medicine is more certain and specific, defining puberty as the period when the gonads grow quickly, sex hormones lead to the development of secondary sex characteristics, and mature

gametes [egg or sperm cells] are released for the first time [D.F. Horrobin, 1972]. The development of such specific knowledge, disseminated throughout everyday life, has meant that adolescence need not be speculated about. It can now be recognised [e.g. the growth of facial hair, the growth of breasts], and even be confirmed by medical examination.

IN CONCLUSION: Looking at the historical indexicality of 'objective' phenomena shows that they are essentially related to specific usage in social institutions. The meaning of the world 'child' depended upon the specific historical situation in which it was located. As this applies for usage past, it also applies for usage present. Where sociologists, historians, and others examine developments and changes in phenomena [essentially indexical in character], they employ and trade off a sense of social structure which enables them to overcome the indexicality of their task and accomplish a satisfactory account for all practical purposes. Accounts are methodically organised and assembled in this way, which specifies what adequate knowledge 'in this case' consists of [cf. A. Blum, 1970].

It is just this procedural process in the production of knowledge, in relation to the treatment of children today, with which the next chapter will be concerned. One important element in occasioning a corpus of knowledge about children has been noted by David MacKay. He suggests that from both a commonsense and a professional sociological position, to be adult is to be complete: mature, rational, competent, social, and autonomous. To be a child however is to be incomplete: immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial, and acultural. MacKay locates within this commonsense viewpoint a paradox. As general terms [i.e. portraying a theorised social structure]

'adult' and 'child' imply different, essential stages; different ontological orders of being. The consequence of this general view is that adults and children are fundamentally different in respect of communicative ability. Because of the gross difference in the two orders, adults and children cannot talk to and understand one another. Yet it is manifest both in sociological writings about children and in adult-child interaction at an everyday level that adults and children can understand one another [R.W. MacKay, 1974, 1973]. The implication of connecting children with incompetence by adults, is that there is an area of silence between the two. Yet the accomplishment of the very feature which raises this implication depends upon the ability for children and adults to interact. It is this topic which will now be examined.

CHAPTER FIVE

LANGUAGE-USE AMONG PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN

NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE OUTLOOKS

> I would like to show that a discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language, the intrication of a lexicon and an experience; I would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice. These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects. 'Words and things' is the entirely serious title of a problem; it is the ironic title of a work that modifies its own form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day, a quite different task. A task that consists of not - of no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs [signifying elements referring to contents of representations] but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.
>
> [M. Foucault, 1977]

This chapter examines the relations between adults and children, and between children themselves, in a day-nursery. It seeks to show how in actual occasions of interaction, the

conception of the incompetence of 'the child' is used and maintained. This means that in the engagement between theoretical resources and actual behaviours, 'the child' is produced as incompetent [i.e. made observable].

THE NURSERY: The day-nursery which forms the subject of this chapter was not selected at random. In fact it entered into my daily routine, as my daughter attended it. Permission to enter the nursery as more than a routine visitor was granted by the Social Services Department of the County Council. This permission was conditional upon not revealing the whereabouts of the nursery or the real names of the children. Gathering the data took place after my daughter had left the nursery, yet the majority of the children knew me as 'Vicki's daddy'. There were twenty children aged between two and five years old ["big ones"], in the nursery at the time the research was carried out, and five young children ["little ones" or "babies"]. The nursery had an "official" capacity of thirty, but the remaining places were held in reserve in order to handle any urgent cases presented by the Social Services Department.

The staff in the nursery at this time were: the matron, who was in charge; her deputy, the sister; four nursery officers [known to the children as "aunties"], who were the main ones to look after the children; one part-time nursery officer; two part-time cleaners; and a cook. The nursery was open from eight o'clock in the morning until half past five in the afternoon. The main group of staff [matron, sister, and nursery officers], was organised into two working groups. Each group alternated weekly between being "on earlies" or "lates"; working either from eight o'clock in the morning

until four o'clock in the afternoon, or from half past nine in the morning until half past five in the afternoon.

The nursery consisted of a single storey building fenced in on all sides. The outside area was divided into two different sections by fences; one for public access, consisted of pathways and gardens; the other was a lawned play area for the children. Internally the nursery was organised with a view to containing the children, while providing space for the administration of their needs and the comfort of the staff. The areas which the children were not generally allowed access consisted of the matron's office, the kitchen, the staff room, and toilet.

For the children there were two play rooms, one for each of the two groups of children. The signal for a child's passage from being a "little one" to a "big one" was loosely based upon age, depending upon the abilities and demands displayed by the child. When a child had reached the age of two, and could use the toilet and feed his or herself, then they would move into the "big ones". This move is not only related to a child's age, but is a measure of the care and insulation which the formal nursery setting afforded to children of only a few months old. As a child became more demanding of his nursery environment he was regarded as a danger to the other, younger children. Accordingly the "big ones" room offered slides, climbing frames, and a little play house. Another factor contributing to the benchmark [cf. J.A. Roth, 1973] of the move to the "big ones", was the children leaving the nursery to attend school. The judgement of whether a child was a "big one" or not had attendant upon it the number of children who had reached this higher level of

development. In this way, a child's actions would be viewed not merely according to behavioural displays but through the filter of organisational priorities and constraints.

Places in the nursery were in short supply, parents having to put their child's name on a waiting list. This position was made more acute by the Social Services Department using the nursery as a partial remedy for people's problems. Though access to files and documents in the nursery office was denied me, from talk amongst members of staff classifications of entrants to the nursery based upon 'problems' could be gauged. Though in everyday use as features of speech these classifications lacked a rigidity in that they might be used differently or in combination on separate occasions, they specified a particular form of social organisation: that which was officially problematic as specified by social work files. Staff referred to "unmarried mothers", "one parent family", "children who cannot mix", "criminal family", "child batterers", "neglected children", "depressed mother", and the ubiquitous catch-all "problem home".

References such as these, made in relation to specific people, were used as somehow covert indicators of a wider but unspoken system of interconnected events. In this way staff did not go into the intimate details of people's lives and biographies [at least while I was there], but relied upon mutual understandings as a structure to support the particular topic of their conversation [e.g. a particular child]. It appeared that though certain children might present problems of behaviour [e.g. biting other children], being 'problematic' was a formalised construct which depended upon official

involvement of the social work agency.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE NURSERY: The nursery day begins at eight o'clock in the morning and ends at five thirty in the afternoon. At various periods between these times children may enter or leave the nursery. They may be brought later than the opening time because it is part of their daily routine or because of some outside reason [e.g. a visit to the doctor]. They may leave the nursery earlier than the closing time for similar reasons. Between entry and exit they are confined to the nursery grounds subject to a formally organised day.

As the nursery is a place of work, time is organised according to the tasks which have to be completed; this organisation is ideally towards the realisation of future states of affairs as a measure of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the nursery [cf. A. Etzioni, 1964]. From the point of view of such formal organisation, "time is [now] currency; it is not passed but spent" [E.P. Thompson, 1970].

The daily timetable for the nursery was as follows:

8.00.a.m.: Children enter the nursery and have breakfast in the "little ones'" room.

8.30.a.m.: The "big ones" move to their room and play; the "little ones" play.

11.00.a.m.: The "big ones" watch television.

11.30.a.m.: All children have a wash ["big ones" wash themselves], and have dinner.

12.15.p.m.: Play.

12.30.p.m.: One member of staff [one from each room] has dinner; the other two supervise the children.

1.15.p.m.: The staff alternate for dinner.

3.00.p.m.: All children have a wash and have tea.

3.30.p.m.: Play.

5.30.p.m.: Nursery closes.

According to the nursery staff there was no set policy by the Social Services Department upon how the time in the nursery was to be organised. Yet they noted the generalisation that all the nurseries of which they had experience were organised in a much similar manner. This was accorded the status of tradition: the matron and sister implemented the regime they had experienced. The relationship between the type of organisation and implementation was located in a network of experience of other organisers: "We [matrons and sisters] more or less all know one another".

The formal organisation of the day can be contrasted to and depends upon the informal social organisation which takes place. Timetables, such as that found in the nursery, are not the sole determinants of action [on the informal use of time in an organisation cf. D.F. Roy, 1960]. As a "common set of cultural symbols" [T. Parsons and E.A. Shils, 1971], the way in which the nursery timetable is organised as a system of activities is the same thing as the way in which its organisational charcteristics are produced and maintained [H. Garfinkel, 1963]. The formal nursery timetable is both a product of interactive behaviour and a condition for the management of a day in the nursery for both staff and children.

The accomplishment for all practical purposes of the nursery timetable depends upon supervisors and children acting together in a concerted way. As such this interaction can be described. In another sense however, it is self-descriptive.

In carrying out activities, conversations arise which comment upon and construct the sense of the activity which is being engaged in. What this means is that the formal, objective, determinate timetable emerges in various socially constructed forms which may be deemed adequate for the purposes of the daily routine. But these forms are not included in a formal statement or description of nursery activities. The actual task structure can be provided by viewing actions as essentially satisfying the rules which is specifies [D. Zimmerman, 1970].

PATTERNS OF CONVERSATIONAL INTERACTION: The accomplishment of the nursery task structure does not entail an examination of the practices whereby 'the job' or 'nursery conversation' gets done; or focus upon more general issues or implications which 'the job' and 'nursery conversation' carry with them. Because of the self-revelatory character of the informal organisation of activities upon which formal organisation depends, the description of the organistion of the nursery will concentrate upon the patterns of conversational interaction. The two predominant patterns are those of 'supervision' and [from a formal, organisational, adult point of view] 'play'. Each of those breaks into various forms [e.g. supervising meal times, washing times, play talk, talk with supervisors].

In order to illustrate these patterns, a conversation will be presented. It is a sequence which occurred when the nursery had opened in the morning. Children were coming into the nursery for the first time that day; others were already there. All had the opportunity of having breakfast. This was an informal occasion; if the children wanted toast and tea they could sit around a table. If not they could play in the nursery or outside on the lawn. Although from the point of

view of the timetable this occasion is an orderly one [e.g. "enter the nursery and have breakfast"], the data reveals two conterminous forms of interaction taking place: the administration of breakfast [supervision] and children's breakfast talk [play].

The conversation:

1 Aunty 1: Would you like some toast Lisa?

2 Lisa: [Nods head] Yes.

3 Aunty 1: Keith. [Shouted outside], would you like some toast?

4 Keith: [Comes in and nods head]

5 Aunty 1: Come on then.

6 Mandy: Juliet's come in.

7 Aunty 1: Juliet, do you want some [3 secs.] toast? [Juliet shakes her head] Do you want some toast? Sudi? [Sudi nods her head] Sit down then. [3 secs.] Do you want some milk as well Sudi? [Sudi nods her head - 6 secs.] Do you want some Juliet? [Juliet nods her head] I thought you would. Do you want some milk? [Juliet nods her head] Hello Andrew.

8 Andrew: Hello.

9 Aunty 1: Would you like some breakfast?

10 Andrew: Naa.

11 Aunty 1: Would you like some toast?

12 Andrew: No thank you.

13 Aunty 1: Alright then.

14 Levon: [Comes in from outside] Aunty 1.

15 Aunty 1: What love?

16 Levon: David won't let me have me gun.

17 Aunty 1: You and David are at er...//this morning.

18 Levon: He won't let me have it [ ] goin' to take it home.

19 Aunty 1: [Walks outside] David why won't you give Levon his gun? [4 secs.] Is it Levon's?

[Untranscribable talk - 45 secs. Aunty 1 comes into the nursery followed by David and Levon.]

21 Levon: He give it me back.

22 David: I 'ad a go now.

[Aunty 1 does not answer, and begins wiping tables.]

23 Aunty 1: Do you want another piece of toast Lisa?

24 Lisa: Yes please.

25 Aunty 1: Would you like a piece of toast Andrew? [Andrew nods his head and sits at the table]

[Untranscribable talk - 35 secs.]

26: Sudi: You have to stay there don't ya?

27 Mandy: [ ]

28 Andrew: Pardon?

29 Mandy: [ ]

30 Andrew: I thought you said Aunty...Aunty 2.

[Untranscribable talk - 15 secs. Levon begins 'shooting' the children at the table with his gun. Laughter.]

31 Andrew: He can't, he can't fire, with being his mouth full with his toast. [Laughter - 7 secs.] He can fire now.

[Untranscribable talk - 20 secs.]

32 Andrew: Who maked that silly noise?

33 Mandy: Me.

34 Sudi: Not me.

35 Andrew: Is it Mandy?

36 Mandy: Yer.

37 Sudi: Not. Levon.

[Untranscribable talk - 37 secs. Rachel begins to cry.]

38 Sudi: Give it her back.

39 Andrew: Who done it?

40 Mandy: Levon.

41 Levon: No.

42 Mandy: Oh yes.

43 Levon: Oh no, you.

44 Mandy: No. You. Oh no.

45 Levon: Oh yes, you.

[4 secs.]

46 Sudi: Levon made Rachel cry.

47 Aunty 1: Why? [3 secs.] What's he done?

48 Sudi: He's pullin' a purse off her.

49 Aunty 1: Levon, go outside. I don't want to see you. If it's not you or it's David. Go on out.

50 Levon: [ ]

51 Aunty 1: Well don't come near us. Go away.

52 Levon: No.

53 Aunty 1: Yes. Yes. Everybody you've looked at you've argued with. [Levon remains in the room. Aunty 1 resumes cleaning.]

Pattern 1 - Supervisors and Children: In the above conversation this pattern can be seen in sections 1 - 13. In examining this part of the conversation attention will be paid to the motives which are displayed. Max Weber saw motive as a context of meaning which appears to either participants or observers as a meaningful ground for an action. This was amplified by Alfred Schutz who discussed the "in-order-to"

motive as a series of projected expectations concerning the status of an action [1972]. As a means to orderly organise and select the possibilities of social action, motive is an emergent property of talk [cf. P. McHugh et al, 1974]. Because attention is directed towards it by the participants in a conversation as the ground for understanding what is happening, it is not an incidental feature.

In the breakfast-time conversation Aunty 1 asks a series of questions, all concerned with whether the children present want breakfast. From the point of view of an observer the reasoning behind such questions would be to locate exactly who wanted breakfast as a condition for the distribution of toast and milk. The questions are also indicators of organisational time; part of the ongoing organisational day. They are not 'personal' questions. They do not 'belong' to the actual speaker, but are part of the nursery vocabulary for dealing with and ordering the day. It can be suggested that this, or at least some part of it, is what forms the background to hearing Aunty 1's questions. What of the answers? Firstly they complement the questions; they enable the accomplishment in some respect of the projected course of action to which the questions are directed. The answers like the questions, inform listeners about the motives of the speaker; what he or she intends doing. In this respect, different possible courses of action meet. Though in everyday life a person is in many respects free to contemplate a course of action without question, for children in the nursery this is not so.

The questions which Aunty 1 asks of Lisa and Keith are answered in the affirmative. They are not questioned any

further. However when Andrew states that he does not want any breakfast, Aunty 1 reformulates the question and asks him again; he is also asked later in the conversation [section 25]. The questioning of Juliet is taken further. Firstly she is questioned twice as to whether she wants toast, and twice indicates in the negative. After 'successfully' dealing with Sudi, Aunty 1 returns to Juliet with an emphasised question. At this third time of asking Juliet indicates that she does want some toast. Aunty 1 then displays her reasoning behind the questioning of Juliet: "I thought you would.". It indicates that although Aunty 1 had seen Juliet decline toast, this was not the 'real' state of affairs; that although Juliet refused toast she really did want it. The questioning and refusal to grant to children's utterances a display of motive at face value by adults can also be seen in the following example, where motive is directed.

Colin came into the nursery holding a packet of sweets:

Aunty 1: What do you want me to do? Um?

Colin: Open them.

Aunty 1: Open them, huh, huh. Do you want me to give the children some, or do you want me to put them in the sweety tin?

Colin: No.

Aunty 1: 'No' what? Do you want to put some in the sweety tin? [Aunty 1 opens Colin's sweets and hands them round to the children; gives the rest back to Colin.]

Colin's answers clearly state his intention to engage in 'eating sweets' rather than comply with the organisational choices of action; sharing or contributing to the communal

"sweety tin". Colin's choice of action is inappropriate because it does not fit in with the organisational motives of the nursery supervisor. For the children in the nursery, eating sweets is a pleasant activity. Where some of the children have sweets and others do not, this leads [at least in the eyes of the staff] to disruptions in the normal routine. Rather than being engaged in 'normal' activity [e.g. play], the children would argue or collect around the child with sweets 'being friendly' in order to share them. The immediate sharing of sweets under the orderly supervision of staff, or contributing to the communal "sweety tin" are the nursery staff's solutions to the problems of inappropriate nursery activity. In this case, these solutions are also related to wider mores concerning what is preferable; it is 'good' to be 'kind' and 'share'; it is 'bad' to be 'mean'.

This can be seen in a further extract from the conversation between Aunty 1 and Colin:

> [Colin enters the nursery holding a packet of sweets.]
>
> Aunty 1: Colin.
>
> Colin: I'm not sharing these are ur?
>
> Aunty 1: Aren't you sharing them? [ ] Go on. Don't be mean. Nobody'll give you any of their sweeties. [Takes sweets out of Colin's hand.]

Aunty 1 contrasts Colin's evident intentions with the social impact which this would have in his communal world. Such moral issues engage with the nursery rules; to comply with the rules is to be 'good'; to evade them is 'bad'. The nursery solutions to the possible problems brought about by the free possession of sweets [and more generally by the possibility of the free choice of action by children], appear

as perfectly plausible selections. However as Schutz emphasised, the child does not begin his life in a vacuum. Rules and ways of acting are given to him as pre-existent properties of a 'natural' world. The nursery rules concerning sweets were in existence before Colin attended the nursery and will continue long after he leaves it.

The existence of nursery rules and the approximate invocation and satisfaction of them by supervisors, organises a communal response against the rule-breaker. The individual whose action is selected as an example of rule-breaking is verbally and visibly singled out from all those around him. Although in other situations an individual may be encouraged to implement a particular motive for his and others' actions [e.g. rights to property, the relations of exploitation - cf. L. Althusser, 1972], when he enters the nursery he has to comply with the nursery guides for action. He has only a contingent choice in the course of action which he will follow. The selective and contingent aspect of applying available rules and producing a rule-breaker needs to be emphasised.

For example, in what might be termed 'manners' or 'etiquette' rules are not absolute. In the breakfast-time conversation one example of 'letting pass' a possible occasion for applying a rule has been shown. When Andrew was asked if he wanted breakfast he replied "Naa". At another time however, such a response may be selected as a case for enforcing rules applicable to 'doing manners'. This is shown by the data below:

[Aunty 1 is giving out further helpings of dinner.]

Aunty 1: Do you want some?

Jon: [Nods head]

Aunty 1: Well?...Well?

Jon: Thank you.

Aunty 1: You don't say thank you before you've been given anything do you, you silly boy?

Jon's nod of the head and evidently inappropriate response gained him a public rebuke. Yet it appears as if there were two different language-games in operation, and thus two different readings of what was occurring. The first is that of the supervisor's. Her questions "Well?...Well?" were designed to elicit a response from Jon in order to verbally complete his silent affirmation. Aunty 1 saw the response which she received as inappropriate, belonging to a different course of action than they were engaged in at that moment. This produced Jon as 'going out of sequence' in conversation and consequently "silly". What Aunty 1 was probably seeking was the reply 'yes please'. In contrast to this language-game what Jon was engaged in was 'doing the work to get another helping of dinner'. With this motive as the ground to his responses they can be seen as 'appropriate selection'; his nod communicates his wish for "some more", and "Thank you" makes reference to 'doing manners'. From this point of view, to the question of "Do you want some more?", Jon answered 'Yes. Thank you'. It also seems as if he located Aunty 1's questions of "Well?" as prompts for a display of manners, in that he responded with "Thank you". What he did not realise was that at that brief moment the question of 'more dinner' had been suspended. That he had to retrace the sequences of the conversation and 'fill in' his inappropriate response in

relation to the motive of 'doing manners'.

So far in examining the supervisor-child pattern it has been the adult who has instituted interpretive and corrective action towards the children. There are other times when the children themselves appeal to the nursery staff [as representatives of the organisational nursery structure] to become arbiters in their world; in their finite province of meaning [A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, 1974]. Such an appeal is indicative for the staff of a disruption in the organised day of the nursery; it is a shift in respect of the expectancies of the staff concerning what should happen. These appeals represent to the staff a disruption in the self-organising processes of the children. Two instances of this are contained in the breakfast-time conversation [sections 14 - 22 and 46 - 53].

The first disruption is brought to Aunty 1's attention by Levon. The accounted problem revolves around David having Levon's gun and refusing to give it back to him. Aunty 1 resolves this problem by ordering David to give the toy back. Prior to this she questions the ownership of the gun. Levon's account of the situation is not believed as a description of a state of affairs, but as an indication of trouble. Having settled this trouble by being satisfied of the ownership of the toy and ordering its return, Aunty 1 re-enters the nursery. Levon tells Aunty 1 of the settlement of the disruption and David accounts for the event as a misunderstanding. His "I 'ad a go now" attempts to locate the disruption as a mistaken 'normal' event; that he had borrowed the toy and was merely using it. Aunty 1 does not respond to either of these utterances which are both directed at her. Levon and David

are snubbed. The effect of the silence is to say: 'You are not not worth responding to-treating as person' [P. McHugh *et al*, 1974].

The second disruption builds upon the first because it follows it in time and also features Levon. Rachel begins to cry at the breakfast table and Sudi tells Aunty 1 of this. Upon hearing from Sudi that Levon was "pullin' a purse off her", Aunty 1 orders Levon outside. The intention of her previous snub is verbalised and extended when she states: "I don't want to see you". Though David has nothing to do with this particular disruption, the history of trouble is mentioned by Aunty 1: "If it's not you or it's David". The community of children and staff is also invoked when she again tells Levon to go away. Levon both refuses to go outside or be spatially separated from the other children within the nursery. Aunty 1 contents herself with the comment which locates Levon as an inappropriate or 'abnormal' person ["Everybody you've looked at you've argued with."]. This removes any credence or justification from Levon's activities. It is to say that his activities are disruptive because he is a disruptive person, providing the ground for Aunty 1's references to informal exclusion from a community [cf. E. Lemert, 1973].

These disruptions appear as relatively natural features of occasions in which children figure, and which the staff member settles in a routine way [i.e. 'more or less' consistent with the ways in which other adults settle such disputes]. From a sociological point of view - and in many respects from the point of view of the child - these occasions illustrate the ambiguous meeting of different finite provinces

of meaning. In discussing these subuniverses of knowledge, Schutz and Luckmann describe them as cognitive styles. In a finite province of meaning are contained experiences which are assembled as meaning-compatible. Because it is of a particular style, sedimented experience is mutually harmonious [A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, 1974]. The effect of belonging to a particular community which has a shared and existent [i.e. intersubjective] history, is to place upon events a certain accent; a particular mode of being. Though inconsistencies in this always particular and always occasioned history can be found, this does not remove from reality the community's way of regarding it. As long as inconsistency only has a partially asserted meaning it is unproblematic. When it becomes a topic of interest however, the background assumptions which enable the production of a particular accent or sense of social structure can become problematic.

It is tempting to regard disruptions in the nursery of the organised day and the children's community in just this way: as a breakdown of the normal ways of acting. Such an approach would regard the disruptions as caused by incomplete socialisation of shared norms, where adults are faced with the task of reorienting the child towards these norms. There is another account possible however. Disruptions are not breakdowns of everyday life which result in an inability to act. They are a part of social actions which requires methodical negotiation. In other words, they are a part of might be termed 'normal, natural troubles'. Disruptions are produced by the problem of accomplishing actions, and are thereby resources with which members of a community further the experienced meanings of their finite province of meaning.

Disruptions occasion a sense of a shared history for the 'present' purposes of achieving a solution and instituting practices which are seen as achieving this end.

In reporting to Aunty 1, Levon and Sudi were instituting action by using their knowledge of the normative aspect of the organised nursery day. This is not to endorse that regime, but to use it as a solution to their troubles [e.g. to begin a new game, to carry on a conversation]. In this way the children produce disruptions as reportable phenomena for the staff as solutions to the circumstances in which they find themselves. What for the staff is a disruption [i.e. circumstances which require change], is not for the children. Likewise, circumstances which the children may want changing are not focused upon by the staff unless reported upon as a trouble. The staff do not have an interest in children's activities apart from their meaning in relation to organisational relevances. By instituting action by the nursery staff, the practice of reporting troubles both reinforces the finite province of meaning held by the staff and that held by the children. The two however do not become entwined. Though both the staff member and the child are attending to the 'same' event the way in which they address it is different. Their motives for engaging in such actions as they do are different, and the outcomes are seen as belonging to different moral orders.

In examining the supervisor-child pattern, the existent structure of rules and authority which limits the choices of action available to children has been demonstrated. This limiting factor occurs because the authority of supervisors lies in the belief "in the everyday routine as an inviolable

norm of conduct" [M. Weber, 1970]. Children are seen as having to comply with the nursery rules and commands or be judged as outside the community.

Berger and Kellner discuss marriage as "a nomos-building instrumentality": "a social arrangement that creates for the individual the sort of order in which he can experience his life as making sense" [P.L. Berger and H. Kellner, 1971]. If the supervisory role in the nursery is viewed as having to provide a similar arrangement for the children, then a very condition for its accomplishment is the production of alternative cases. Otherwise the arrangement and the supervisory role would be seen as unnecessary. The role of supervisor by its very practices for making sense, produces contrary instances. In doing this the method is a selective and contingent one which demonstrates: motive cannot be asigned to an action; or its assignment puts the action in question. In terms of this programme, the child who carries out such an action [i.e. mere behaviour] is seen to be anomic, and because of the social effects of judgements and related actions the child may begin to feel anomic.

Looking at motive in the nursery leads to the conclusion that on a broad level the nursery is oriented to adapting individual motives to the organisational motives. Conceived as rules of conduct the nursery organisation is directed towards intended results. Stated as informal rules these intended results might be: 'accomplish orderly meal times'; 'ensure that children eat enough'; and 'solve any disruptions'. Staff in the nursery methodically assemble and accomplish such rules and the concept of organisation which they occasion by selectively demonstrating for all practical purposes ' a change of mind' in the children, or providing the conditions

for this 'change of mind' [e.g. exclusion from the group]. The rules in use [the organisational sense of social structure] are constructed on each particular occasion by judgements from the staff that a change of the motivational plan of a particular child has been accomplished; if not in fact then in practice. The examination of disruptions occasioned by children however suggests that they may not be as plastic as the ideal of remedial supervision either suggests or allows. It is to this subject and interaction exclusively between children that we now turn.

Pattern 2 - Children: As a performative unity, this pattern of conversational interaction has two typical forms: that which takes place before adults; and that which occurs without the presence of adults. The breakfast-time conversation contains an example of the former, and an example of the latter will be given below.

The breakfast-time conversation [section 26 - 45] is discretely organised around four topics produced by the researcher's dilemma of 'untranscribable talk'. What this dilemma does is to present a series of apparently incomplete and fragmented utterances. Treated in this way they become fairly trivial instances of data, gaining this definition through the conceptual relation with the aims of the research. For example, in terms of describing interaction in the nursery the breakfast-time talk appears to have little to offer. The children's conversation is jumbled, fragmentary, unclear, and incomplete; it appears to offer no insights into what they actually do. The consequence of such a constructive approach to data as this is to let pass such conversational instances because they are deemed unimportant. Yet such instances of conversation as the breakfast-time talk do display the

features with which children construct their world.

In order to regard children's utterances in this way it is necessary to treat what they say amongst themselves as 'natural conversation', and not to transform it into data. In this way the tape-recorder in the breakfast-time scene becomes a metaphorical hearer. Though the tape-recorder could not see what was happening, the form which it documented of what was said is a fairly accurate facsimile of what others heard. Though certainly there would be a difference in what was heard among the children at the breakfast table because of location, interest, and the clarity and volume of speech, the quality of the conversation would have been apprehended in much the same form as that reproduced by the tape-recorder. In this way the transcript ceases to be an incomplete report of what was said. It can become to be regarded as a piece of naturally occurring conversation. The conversation is unclear, fragmentary, jumbled, and incomplete because that is what conversations are like, not because of a fault in data collection. The problem for all hearers to the conversation and for a sociological analysis of it is how it is to be regarded [i.e. how can talk be heard as making reference to something and in what way?]. Though for sociological analysis this problem is of theoretical interest, for those involved in the conversation it is a practical interest.

The first part of the conversation is begun by Sudi [section 26 - 30]. She selects Mandy as a possible conversationalist and makes reference to a taken for granted nursery rule: that the children remain in their seats at meal times. Mandy's reply is indistinct. This applies not only for the facility of the tape-recorder, but for Andrew as well.

Whether Sudi heard what Mandy said is unknown for Andrew uses the cultural symbol of "pardon" to formulate the question 'what did you say?'. The appropriateness of this formulation depends upon an awareness of a social grammar for claiming certain forms of recognition and reference. The question 'what did you say?' is made sensible by a background which can be recognised as providing the conditions for an inadequate receipt of an utterance [cf. "Snubs" in P. McHugh et al, 1974]. In answer to Andrew's question it appears that Mandy either repeats or reformulates her previous statement. What this does for Andrew and others present who can hear is to clarify Mandy's utterance; it transforms it from what Andrew "thought" was said to what 'was' actually said. Having found out the exact content of Mandy's utterance, Andrew presents his reason for questioning her. He states that he thought she spoke about Aunty 2, when in fact she was speaking about someone or something else.

The occasionality of these expressions and their incompleteness does present difficulties for description. A similar difficulty is faced by hearers in actual situations. Andrew's response is to institute a practice for clarification which engages the one who spoke in a concerted attempt to establish what was actually said. Though the incomplete data does not reveal why this practice was instituted [e.g. it could have been because Andrew misheard, or because Mandy did say Aunty 2, or 'something else'], it does permit an examination of the ways in which 'topics get done' and 'data gets produced'.

In the second part of the conversation [section 31], Andrew is the sole speaker, though not the sole participant. Levon pretends to shoot the children at the breakfast table,

which Andrew describes and comments upon. The action of shooting is accompanied by 'gun-like' noises. Andrew describes Levon's behaviour by juxtaposing two models of being; breakfast-time behaviour and playing. In doing this two different sets of assumptions for the adequate accomplishment of the separate modes are invoked. Andrew occasions the typical actions of 'play' and 'meal-times', which as separate entities are characterised by different forms of intention. In play, the children join together to suspend - or at least to attempt to delay - pragmatic interests in particular topics. Instead they reconstruct typical actions found in wider society. This depends upon knowledge of the ways in which actions or scenes are ordinarily assembled in normal situations. Meal-times however are of a different order. They belong to the mundane world of everyday actions, ruled by practical interests.

Andrew connects the suspended world of play with the mundane, serious world of meal-time activities. Levon cannot fire his gun because he is eating; having finished eating "he can fire now". What this juxtapositioning of different orders of reality does is to throw into relief the incompatibility of some situated actions. In the name of comedy Andrew treats the topics as resources for displaying the socially constructed nature of the children's world. Though the matter of Levon being unable to fire his gun because he had toast in his mouth was treated as an occasion for fun and laughter, to be heard in that way depended upon focusing upon the ways in which social situations are ordinarily assembled.

To hear Andrew's remarks as situated humour depends upon focusing upon the social construction of different realities.

This is also present in the third breakfast-time topic. Here it is treated not as an occasion for review but for play. Knowing about the social construction of scenes enables the suspension of the serious impact of a particular topic's features. In other words, a topic can be manipulated merely for the sake of that experience. Andrew was again featured in this exchange. Sitting opposite Andrew was Mandy who banged her cup down on the table. In saying "Who maked that silly noise?", Andrew looked straight at Mandy. In answer to the question, Mandy answered "me". It would be conventional to assume that Andrew's use of the word "noise" corresponded to the forceful meeting of the cup and the table. This is not so. It is certainly true that the event of Mandy striking the table with her cup provided the opportunity for Andrew's remark, but he was not interested in that event as such.

This can be seen in his use of the word "silly" which established a "rule of irrelevance" ["Fun in Games" in E. Goffman, 1972]. A taken for granted corollary of meal-times is 'meal-time' noise; it is an expectable attribute of such activity. To regard such a noise as out of the ordinary - when in fact it was ordinary - serves to occasion a different way of regarding it; it is an invitation to others to join in the construction of some other kind of event. Andrew initiated the nature of that event as a search for a person who had 'done' something; a common topic in supervising children both in the nursery and elsewhere. In response to Andrew's question Mandy states that it was she who made the noise. Sudi states that it was not her. As the interest is in the topic 'who did it?' as a resource for playing and not for factual establishment Andrew extends the interaction. He recognises that Mandy has

said that it was she who made the noise ["Is it Mandy?"], but offers this for further action. Monday again states that she made the noise, while Sudi places the 'blame' on Levon who has had nothing to do with the particular event.

Throughout the course of this conversation the matter with which the children were dealing was treated in a lighthearted way. It was evident who had made the noise, but this was not important. Attention was not directed to 'serious blame' but to detecting and apportioning 'blame' as an exercise interesting in its own right. To carry out such an enterprise as this involves producing talk as unfounded; as not referring to specific and particular objects. The recognition of such a production as grounded in some other order than the mundane world hinges upon regarding an 'ordinary' event or object as 'extraordinary'. What happens after this form of production and recognition have occurred is a contingent matter; it depends upon the intentions and creative abilities of those involved and in the first instance, upon a willingness to participate. Some of the strands which contribute to and enable the accomplishment of play have been described here. In situations of use however, their recognition is not such an extended matter. The observer and potential participant often uses the "maximally appropriate unit of interpersonal observation" to recognise the situation around him. That is, "no more than a glance" [D. Sudnow, 1972].

The final topic in the children's breakfast-time conversation is similar to the last one; 'finding out' the person who has 'done' something. Sudi begins the public interest in the interaction between Levon and Rachel when she tells Levon to "Give it her back". Prior to this Rachel has begun to cry when Levon was "pullin' a purse off her".

Andrew asks "Who done it?", and is told by Mandy that it is Levon. Levon responded by denying that it is he who is to 'blame'; this attribution of 'blame' and denial between Mandy and Levon is twice repeated. Sudi then reports what Levon has done to Aunty 1.

Unlike finding out who made the "silly noise", Rachel's crying and locating who "done it" is a serious matter. There are related reasons for this. Crying is a condition which publicly indicates that something is wrong. Because of this the phenomenon of crying can be causally treated at its source. Where one person has caused another to cry, the 'blame' which accrues to him indicates a crossing of normative boundaries. For the children it is a matter of some relevance to know quite clearly who caused a child to cry because the factual settlement of 'blame' may be the first step in the allocation of some form of punishment. As a practical procedure for accounting for an event's observable features, 'doing blaming' is a claim to know what happened. If such a claim is disputed it challenges a person's right to know what he is talking about.

For Levon, being 'blamed' for making Rachel cry was a serious matter since it may have led to punishment; hence his denial. The relevance of Levon's denials for Mandy were that they challenged her account of who was to 'blame'. If believed they would have possibly resulted in Mandy being regarded as 'unreliable', and have lent credence to Levon's counter claim that it was Mandy who was responsible for making Rachel cry. These features of the children's social world are both the conditions and products of a breakdown in communication. Because of the unspoken concensus about Levon's 'blame' and

Levon's entrenched denials, the only way in which the matter could be settled was by letting someone else decide 'what happened'. Because an adult member of staff is the ultimate arbiter in disputes, Sudi reported the matter to Aunty 1.

Because the focal point of attention in the conversation is doubt about reporting and describing 'what happened', the issue of who made Rachel cry is an instance of 'a normal, natural trouble' [for a discussion of 'normal, natural troubles in relation to documentary records cf. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. It is produced as a trouble because those involved operate with senses of 'the right way of doing things'. These senses however are discrepant with the practical relevances occasioned by particular purposes and routines amongst the children themselves. Mandy's sense of 'doing things the right way' is based upon a definition of normal circumstances; she focuses upon 'what happened' as a concrete event and its meaning in the system of the children's and the nursery's rules and obligations. For Levon however, 'doing things the right way' was not bound up with 'what happened', but what in present circumstances 'will or might happen'. From within this position a denial is not another description of 'what happened', but a procedure for remaining within the children's realm of activities and outside the nursery's enforcement of rules.

The above discussion demonstrates some of the children's interactive abilities. This is not a claim for particular individuals, but for the social group who: 1] focus upon the social construction of the world; 2] establish and maintain conversational patterns and sequences; 3] manipulate the socially constructed nature of the world according to their own purposes; 4] recognise and locate actions and utterances

as belonging to particular social orders and solve the problems they present according to situational circumstances. These features of the children's talk reference particular forms and ways of acting. In the instance dealt with here the children are performing in front of an adult supervisor, who may become part of the interaction at any time. What occurs when supervision is a minimal consideration? This situation will now be examined.

Utterances made by the children in the nursery make sense; they are not idiotic, extreme, or without reference. To illustrate the competence of children's conversational practices a precise example will be examined below. It is suggested that it is some such interactional ability which enables both children and adults to make sense of their surroundings, but which adults distort through pragmatic motives and institutionalised power and authority.

The organisational time of day and the presence of adult supervisors defines for the children what is happening (e.g. dinner time). Breaks in this organisation and supervision are exclusively covered by the term 'play'. The situation to be examined here occurred outside, in and around the sand-pit. Simon, Colin, and Jon were playing when Andrew approached carrying a toy helicopter:

Simon: Hey Andrew, you be the police covering up with his feet. And you don't know what he's got behind his back, eh?

Andrew: What?

Simon: You erm, be the police covering his feet up. With that spade, and you don't know what he's got behind his, or what he's holding there.

Eh? Come on. Do it Andrew, like that. [7 secs. - Simon covers his feet up with sand.] Alright then I've done it then Andrew. You be the police covering me up. Eh? Eh? Shall we?

Colin: He...he...he isn't talking to ya.

Simon: Andrew. [5 secs.] Jon will you be the police//?

Jon: Yeh.

The utterance to be examined here is that made by Colin: "he isn't talking to ya". It is a product of the conversational interaction which precedes it and has consequences and implications for further interaction. Colin inserts his remark into the 'potential' conversation between Andrew and Simon as a description of 'what is going on'. As such its status is as an intendedly true description. As Sacks has written: "the fact of its utterance in doing some action can [then] serve for us as a means of seeing its status as intendedly true. And the way it's dealt with can then be further evidence with regard to others' understanding of it." [H. Sacks, "Everyone Has To Lie", unpublished paper].

Colin's description was not taken by others present to be 'silly' or misguided. In fact Simon reformulated his selection procedure for engaging in play after what appears as 'testing out' Colin's description. This was by shouting out the name of the person he had selected for play, to which he received no reaction. Colin's formulation of "not talking" was adequate for the practical concerns of those involved. The outcome of Colin's utterance was to bring to public awareness the incompatible intentions of the two possible co-participants in play.

As an outcome "not talking" was successful. But how was such a production possible? This is an important question for

the outcome of an intendedly true statement can be seen in some part to depend upon the selections which are made from a number of possibilities. To inquire sociologically into these possibilities is to show how description can be accounted for "in terms of the use of conventional cultural procedures and presuppositions"; to present the "unavoidable procedures and presuppositions informing the utterances and interpretations which members can make" [J. Coulter, 1973]. To present the procedures and assumptions available to describe the interaction between Simon and Andrew which were occasioned by that interaction, two strands of possibility will be examined: 1] the nature of, and the possibilities presented by, Simon's invitation to play; 2] the possible descriptions available where an utterance which selects the next speaker in a conversation is not replied to.

The nature and possibilities of play: It has been stated above that the crucial feature of play is the suspenstion of everyday interests. Instead some 'other' set of rules is brought into use to guide the intended activity. This may be very specific [e.g. chess] such that actions are regarded as rational strategies, or more or less loose and open to amplification and change by those involved. It is with the formation of the latter kind of rules with which we are concerned here.

Simon invites Andrew to join with him in play by supplying two of the controlling rules for beginning their game. It is suggested that Andrew 'becomes' a typical actor, and should control the actions of this actor in relation to an agreed upon extent of knowledge. The enactment of these rules is left vague by Simon, except in regard to the immediate action to be

performed. Simon asks Andrew to treat him as a participant in the game, where as a function of the typical policeman's role, Andrew has control over him.

The adoption of these suggested rules would transform the situation in which the players found themselves, but it would only be for the duration of play. Playing does not radically change the surroundings, or result in the adoption of a new perspective on reality. In order to overcome the immediate environment [i.e. regard in a different way], and to enact their intentions, those who would perform this type of game have to adopt procedures for 'pretending'. These procedures are based upon 'common knowledge' and constitute for those involved the structural appearance of reality for the length of time which they engage them. Without the use of procedures for pretending, both in action and in language, play looses its sense of possibility and thereby its whole nature as a suspension of reality for 'now'. Simon's utterances are an attempt to engage in the procedure of pretending and to persuade Andrew to join him.

The possible descriptions of a lack of verbalisation: The first time Simon spoke to Andrew he answered "What?". After the second time, he never answered at all. This situation offers various descriptions of what is happening to account for the lack of verbalisation on Andrew's part: 1] not hearing; 2] not listening; 3] not talking. According to the rules of conversational practice [cf. H. Sacks, "Aspect of Sequential Organisation of Conversation", draft manuscript, and I974. H. Sacks and E. Schegloff, I974. E. Schegloff, 1973], Simon twice selected the next speaker and signaled the occasion for the transition of speakers. Any one of the above

three possibilities is appropriate to describe the failure to comply with these conversational rules.

As McHugh et al [1974] have discussed, returning a greeting or some other utterance is dependant upon the condition that the person whom it is addressed to can complete such a programme. For example, unless it is known that a deaf or dumb person cannot reciprocate an utterance directed towards them, then they will be regarded as 'odd' or 'strange'. Normally it is a common and prevailing assumption that people can return an utterance. Where a greeting or question is directed at someone and the sequence of speaker change does not occur, then the lack of verbalisation means that either: there are conditions present which cause an utterance not to be received; or the person to whom the utterance is directed does not "acknowledge a public relation" [P. McHugh et al, 1974].

The second condition for the lack of speaker change itself is formed by two types which are distinguished by a fundamental criterion: intention. When spoken to, if a person's attention is directed towards something else, his failure to acknowledge the speaker is a product of his interest. He is not listening. Where a person intentionally ignores the conversational practices which select him as the next speaker then he performs a snub: "a refusal of recognition" [R. Turner, 1971]. In this case, as Colin observed, the person concerned is not talking. Where conditions are present which result in an utterance not being received, the person is not hearing. In all three types of description for a lack of verbalisation the location of intention is crucial in order to recognise the silence for 'what it is' and to judge what action should be taken. Because Andrew took up Simon's signal for transition

and became the speaker, it was demonstrated that the conditions for impairing the reception of Simon's communication were not present. Not hearing could therefore only be a partial factor. It could only account for a lack of information.

Andrew asked Simon to repeat what he had said. Having done this and provided four signals for speaker change, Simon received no answer from Andrew. Prior to this, Andrew's answer of "What?" could have been accounted for by the description of not listening; he was playing in the sand-pit and because his interest was occupied, may not have received Simon's message. However because Andrew had once heard Simon's signal for speaker change, had requested that Simon repeat his message, and had been provided with this and still not responded, his lack of verbalisation could only be a refusal to recognise Simon's existence at that place and time. As the features which mitigate against an intentional silence are not present, Andrew is not talking to Simon. It is against this background of procedures for speaker change, the initiation of play and pretending, and the presuppositions which make an answer possible, that Colin's observation can be read. The consequence of it was for Simon to try a last time to make contact with Andrew by shouting his name. When this did not have any effect he recruited Jon to the game.

An Assessment of the Children's Utterances: When examined the children's patterns of conversational interaction within the nusery are not strikingly childish. They certainly contain references to activites which are typically regarded as belonging to children, but the conversational practices themselves are not naive. Their practices had to cope with knowledge of the existence of possible sanctions against them

when their actions were viewed from a different perspective [i.e. an adult one]. In this way, though the children were constructing their social world, they had to be aware and accommodate wider normative boundaries. In the face of adult supervision and amongst themselves, the children in the nursery found it possible to manage their affairs and produce the features of an orderly and maintained social world.

OBJECTIVITY, TIME, MEANING, AND NORMATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE OUTLOOKS: A description of the patterns of conversational interaction found in the nursery and as a consequence of this a description of its social organisation, has been presented. It remains to consider the wider and more general implications which this situation has for similar situations and also for sociology. This is not to offer policies for concrete change, but to attempt to re-assess and re-view some of the constituting features of the social world which generally remain hidden. It is to look to the conditions of reality in which adults and children act and view them as products of that action in order to make them visible. Following W.I. Thomas' famous phrase: it is to assume that people define situations for themselves as real, and to look to the 'real consequences' as social products in order to judge the ongoing status which these consequences [as conditions] present to members of situations. This will be done by examining: objectivity; time; meaning and assumptions; and two alternative methods for defining situations and their consequences for children. It is suggested that these features can be found in the nursery as already described, and are important factors in shaping the events which are found there.

The Objective View of Children: In response to the idea

that the concept of 'the child' is socially produced, adults would no doubt object that treating children as physically, intellectually, and socially inferior is a consequence of the existence of such facts; that such treatment is in accord with the state of the natural world or the order of things. Taking facts for granted in this way, prominent both in everyday life and the methodology of social science (cf. P. McHugh, 1970. D. Walsh, 1972 and 1977), posits a correspondence between what is said and the 'real' world. There is seen to be a relation between what is said and the independent objects which make up reality, which can be evaluated as true or false. By adopting this approach, certain areas of action which are central to the fact producing process itself are disregarded. An awareness of these failings, which will be discussed here in terms of interaction between adults and children, would result in the radical transformation or abandonment of the view of positive realism.

By assuming knowledge of 'how things are' and measuring children's actions according to the principle of incompetence, adults fail to comprehend that interaction with children is only possible through mutual praxis. The publicly voiced 'private' states (cf. L. Wittgenstein, 1972. C. Jenks, 1977) of the child go largely if not totally unacclaimed. The world of the child is treated as private so long as the actions of the child do not impinge upon the practical organisation of adult life. When this does happen, adults seek to eradicate the troublesome state. Yet this does not consist of an understanding of the child's actions, for such repair stems from the disorganisation of adult programmes and norms brought about by the child's expressiveness.

This approach towards children by adults has been sociologically regarded as a feature of children's actions themselves; as causally contributing to the physical abuse of children by adults. In reviewing studies of physical abuse of children in the United States, Gil has reported that a contributing phenomenon to this typology is: "persistent behavioural atypicality of child, e.g. hyperactivity, high annoyance potential, etc.". He further states that cases of such a type "may be considered as child-initiated or child-provoked abuse" [D.G. Gil, 1973]. Though interaction between adults and children depends upon the implementation by both of speech practices, the expressions of children are taken to be uninteresting except insofar as they conform to some conception of what childhood should consist of. This can be seen in the categorisations reported by Gil, who glosses the normative conception of 'the child' in his reference to non-childlike behaviour by children [persistent behavioural atypicality]. Such a viewpoint which measures actions implicitly against what they should ideally consist of not only cannot recognise the social practices of children as such, but finds it impossible to understand them in practice.

With the view of positive realism it is not possible to examine the processes for the accomplishment of understanding which occur in everyday life and in sociology. Not only are the practices by which children express themselves taken to be uninteresting by adults, but so are the very ways in which adults and children communicate and understand one another. The social nature of a person's activities in unison with others, is unavailable to him except in terms of the positive

motive, which is taken as a self-evident state rather than a social product. The 'good' or 'bad' of an action, the 'truth' or 'falsity' of a statement, are to be discussed in factual terms [i.e. the state of affairs under which actions and utterances are taken to reside]. These terms are taken to be immutable. Though there may be conflict over what the facts really are, it is as if people doubt one another's perceptions but have faith that the truth of what they are talking about exists somewhere 'out there'. In this sense, when interacting with children, adult reasoning does not recognise its own reflexivity. The adult fails to recognise and examine that the ways in which he or she makes sense of the child's actions and talk - and vice versa - are the very ways in which those actions are talk are produced.

Children and Time: A dictionary definition of the word 'child' approximates to the term 'a young person'. Central to this conception is the transforming and developing character of time. This view of time refers to cosmic or outer time, and not to inner time; the stream of experiences which connect 'here and now' with 'then' and 'the future' [cf. A. Schutz, 1972. M. Farber, 1967. H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Cosmic time is related to the positive correspondence theory of truth, where for the purposes of co-ordinating his and other people's practical activities the adult assumes "one big clock identical for all" [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

These two conceptions of time are recognised in interaction with children. Adults have an awareness of children's experiences [inner time], but because of the dominant world view [positive] and the practical organisation of everyday affairs [cosmic time], these experiences are distorted.

Rather than being regarded as unique features of a child's world in which and through which he must express himself, these experiences are seen as features of the child. A correspondence is built up between time co-ordinated events and the child for which he becomes responsible, and which eventually constitutes him. In this way events and experiences are distorted from being meaningful and unique, to ideal-typical references concerning an objective and universally understandable time-series. The continually experienced rupture and break of daily life is papered over to become a unified whole.

Within specialist disciplines such as sociology and psychology, inner time is not distorted. Rather an attempt is made to transform it. Whereas 'growing up'[cosmic time] and 'getting to know things' [inner time] are implicit assumptions in everyday affairs, within specialist inquiry they become specific topics such as maturation and learning, role play and socialisation. The experience and constitution of inner time would appear to be accounted for in these disciplines by such distinctions. However because learning and socialisation are approached in terms of concrete, objective indicators rather than social action and understanding they are transformed into cosmic experience. For example, this can be seen in a quotation from a psychologist on the process of development in children: "a characteristic is said to be developmental if it can be related to age in an orderly and lawful way" [W. Kessen, 1960].

Another view of "the process whereby the individual is converted into a person" is as a reinforcement history of particular situations [K. Danzinger, 1976]. Such a history

links situational features and people's actions in a temporally causal succession. In sociology, Parsons' views socialisation as the "acquisition of the requisite orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role" [1970]. Moore sees it as learning the norms and role requirements for membership in a social system [W.E. Moore, 1963]. These four views from psychology and sociology on the process of becoming human, transform it. The unique, disjointed, jumbled experience becomes either a uniform, observable process or the straight, trouble-free transmission of a culture [cf. D. Wrong, 1969].

Meaning: Just as cosmic time has a constituting place in the maintenance of the socio-structural category of 'the child', so have typical social meanings and assumptions. For example, adjectives associated with the word 'child' spring from and enforce the qualitative distinction between children and adults. The words 'childish', 'childlike', and 'immature' introduce and reference unstated assumptions and attributes which specifically belong to children. Such assumptions might consist of things like 'innocence', 'simplicity', or 'stupidity'. All concentrate upon the undeveloped and socially incompetent nature of the child. Such typical meanings and assumptions often find expression as terms of derision for use against adults. For example, Dorothy Smith has presented an interviewer's account of how someone became mentally ill. The report stated that the person under consideration would make "childish inane remarks" ["A Sub-Version of Mental Illness", unpublished paper].

What Smith's teller of the story does is to produce a report upon a decaying social relationship. Neglecting the intricate details of the story, the theoretic approach of the

account is to order events according to a notion of incompetence. From this basis what Smith calls "radical processes of selection" are carried out which order the detailed events and "provide a coherence for the reader which was not present in the events". In order to read the account as one which presents the process of 'becoming mentally ill', the ongoing assumption of incompetence is crucial. As with children, those branded mentally ill are treated and spoken about in terms which produce their linguistic and behavioural particulars as merely behavioural rather than meaningful social action.

The withdrawl of competence throws doubt upon and breaks up the normative expectations associated with doing and saying things; that people are entitled to claim that they know what they are doing and saying, that this is understandable and ought to be understood [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. The language of relationships which produces the conceptions of 'the child' and 'the mentally ill' differ on a socially perceptive level. The location of mental illness depends upon the evaluation of utterances and actions on a topical level. Interest is in the status of scenic particulars as 'ordinary' or 'peculiar', and their relation to a particular person for his possible discredit. In relation to children, language-use is not so protracted or topical. Rather than being immediate it is embedded. The language of relationships within which children exist is a powerful one which discredits them from the beginning [on the distinction between being immediately discredited and the process of becoming discredited cf. E. Goffman, 1976].

Normative and Interpretive Outlooks: In order to clarify the relationship between the 'realness' of actions and their socially produced nature, the ideas of normative and interpretive outlooks can be introduced. These ideas are drawn from Wilson's exposition of them in sociology, where he metaphorically regards them as paradigms. The purpose of using the term 'outlook' here, rather than paradigm, is to broaden the use of these descriptive devices to include not only sociology but other social situations, particularly those involving children, within them. As a result the specificity which Wilson's paper has [T.P. Wilson, 1970], is to some extent lost. However these ideas do prove helpful in depicting the mechanisms and resources available in social situations for establishing accomplishments and outcomes of action.

In sociology the normative outlook is characterised by two features: the view that interaction is rule governed; and that explanations of action should emulate natural science and be deductive. This outlook is present in everyday affairs though in a weaker and less specific form. In the ideas of the ability to 'know' and describe events as they have actually happened, the organising and orderly idea of time as "the successive positions of the hands of a clock" [H. Garfinkel, 1963], and the grounds which occasioned knowledge of typical ways of acting brings to events, members of everyday situations account for events post hoc. The outcome of this reasoning is also a function of it; people are seen to act in terms specified by the adopted theoretical position. The world and events within it are indeed real, but it is in the position which people adopt towards them which produces the way in

which they are real [H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks, 1970].

The interpretive outlook on the other hand is characterised by the use of the documentary method of interpretation. This is a method whereby an event is an indicator of a wider and underlying social pattern, so that it becomes meaningful in terms of pre-existing knowledge. The purpose in employing the documentary method is for all practical purposes to repair the indexicality of actions and utterances. This means that the conclusions which are reached in this way are provisional and contingent. They are open to reformulation and review whenever necessary. Because of this accounts of actions do not stand as correspondences to actual activities themselves. Instead such accounts are interpretive descriptions which can differ between people and change over time.

Though Wilson does not make this point obvious, the accomplishment of the features of the normative outlook [for all practical purposes] consists of the adoption of the interpretive outlook. In everyday situations of use, combined as a mode of reasoning, these notions of the theoretic [normative] and the practical [interpretive] produce an orderly stream of experience with stable outcomes. In situations in which children figure, as the examination of the nursery has shown, a central role in the normative outlook is occupied by the ideas of incompetence. Because the use of this concept transforms the identities of children in actual occasions of use and places them in an inferior position in terms of other social types [e.g. adults], a particular demonstration of the accomplishment of incompetence can be regarded as a "status degredation ceremony" [H. Garfinkel, 1956].

IN CONCLUSION: In locating the existence of incompetence (the normative outlook) in children, adults transform them and their identities in terms of the motivational grounds for action. At the same time, in growing up in an adult dominated world children acknowledge their inferior position; not in theory but in practice. In an attempt to 'make out' they try to circumvent normative constraints, use them as solutions to their problems, or attempt to keep a breach of such constraints secret. This is while producing and maintaining social relationships amongst themselves and demonstrating a competent use of understanding in interaction with adults.

This chapter has attempted to show that the position of children in society is interesting in terms of the interactional role which they occupy. In focusing upon this role we are lead to questions of validity and reason; to inquire into how taken for granted matters are possible and what their accomplishment depends upon. This has consequences for both everyday treatments of others and for sociological inquiry; that appearances are not brute facts but the result of interpretive negotiations. To regard such outcomes as independent is to fail to recognise their uniqueness and to indulge in a language which produces objects and fails to understand people. On the other hand, to focus upon the methodicity of how people achieve the objectivity which they do is to look to the possibility of reality, and not take for granted that it is possible. This topic, as a member's concern for 'how' to regard an event, is dealt with in the following two chapters.

SECTION III

Practices – Determinants In A Case Of Assessing 'Justice'

The involvement with contact actors described in Section I demonstrated that the practical theorist is not so naive as professional theory allows. The everyday member has knowledge of his social surroundings, and can where and when necessary 'play about' with that knowledge to produce differently structured social situations for others. This may be regarded as a case of deceit. Perhaps so. However I would suggest that it does provide an insight into the differential and shifting character of interpretation which is of more general interest. Section II showed this, where the assumption of incompetence belonging to the type 'child', as factually defined through historical development by legal, political, and medical means, overrode all interactive considerations. This was while adults relied on the social and linguistic competence of children in order to accomplish their type assumptions.

The analogy with professional theory is clear. Because of a commitment to a specific tradition and a supposed relation to and reliance upon formal methods – more for professional community recognition than revealing the 'truth' – the professional theorist transforms everyday, coherent people into unwitting actors. Though these people have views, ideas, and theories on their surroundings, their development, and their tradition, it is taken that it is only the professional theorist who can really judge the structure, texture, and importance of their world. Yet while confining everyday, ordinary people to this unwitting role the professional theorist relies through and through, wholeheartedly on the sociality which connects people together. What would occur however if the privileged

position of the theorist were lost to him? If his professional knowledge had to count for something im the 'real' world? Or again, what if the professional theorist's knowledge and utterances were treated as a child's are? How would his professional knowledge and actions fare if they were subject to the same doubt and scepticism as a child's?

Section III enacts the above questions im a 'real life' situation. It presents an account of an experience with the police which I had. Having been involved im an 'incident' I found that I had been charged with malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon. The experience with the police and my experiences in court so unsettled me and made me question my and others' accounts of the event, that I have sought to document what happened to me and locate the processes and features involved im accounting for and locating a definite sense of outcome. While focusing upon the processing of people suspected of a crime, Section III shows that a concentration upon the formal, theoretical categories of typologies results in a different order of events than occurs im practice. In other words, as formal theorists magistrates, policemen, and sociologists do not focus upon what is becoming, but upon what will be, and progress towards that. This of course at times results in a shift im reality such that what was 'supposed' to occur does not. This im turn results im a reinterpretation of the earlier events. This chimerical character of formal interpretation is consistent with its concern to locate and accomplish definite sense im relation to specific, methodological, and traditional concerns rather than a loose, wait-and-see sense as in everyday life; or alternatively indicates a reflexive sense which locates the texture of a particular order in the here-and-now system of relevances, expectancies, and utterances.

CHAPTER SIX

AN EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLICE

I am suggesting that the routine problems, which law-enforcement agents encounter in accomplishing their daily activities, provide excellent sources of information for understanding how researchers come the characterize objects and events in particular and general formulations over time.

[A. Cicourel, 1976]

I take it as axiomatic that for any set of actual events, there is always more than one version that can be treated as what happened, even within a simple cultural community. This is because social events or facts at the level of those I am analyzing here involve a complex assembly of events occurring in different settings, at different times, sometimes before different collections of people; and that secondly the moment of actual observation is at that point where the consciousness of the individual is and that any process of assembly from the past can no longer draw on the total universe of resources which were successive "moments" present to the observer.

[D. Smith, unpublished.]

INTRODUCTION: In this chapter and the one which follows it, there are two underlying themes. Firstly there is the ever present feature of indexicality. This, as was shown in the examination of contact magazines, may be remedied by members for all practical purposes by the practice of constructing and transforming ideal-typical patterns of action. This is essentially the documentary method of interpretation [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. The second theme is the reliance by actors upon the constructive character of their descriptions for accomplishing the practical adequacy of their everyday affairs. The fundamental importance of this reflexivity for the orderly outcome of actions was shown in the discussion of interaction amongst children.

The area of social practice which the two chapters will focus upon is that of 'breaking' and 'enforcing' the law. It has been written that people become criminal "because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law" [E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressy, 1960]. As Cicourel has pointed out [1976], such a view as this imposes an order upon activities rather than seeking out the nature of the social organisation and production of 'criminality' and 'crime rates'. Rather like the topic of suicide [cf. J.M. Atkinson, 1973. J. Douglas, 1967], the decisions made in actual instances about what constitutes a violation of law, what does not, and the methodical assembly of such decisions are generally neglected and treated as a passing matter of fact by both sociologist and everyday member alike.

These matters will be dealt with in the following chapters. Here will be shown some of the components which go into

making up an entry in conviction and acquittal rates by documenting a case of 'malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon'. Chapter Seven juxtaposes the roles of policeman, magistrate, suspect, and sociologist as alternative and competing theoretical positions, in order to focus upon the texture of practical reasoning.

A NOTE ON METHOD: The methodological principle which is being used here is interesting. As Zimmerman and Pollner have argued [1970], sociology generally assumes that it is fully competitive with accounts in everyday life. It also assumes that it is superior to those accounts. These professional views are contained within a sense of social structure [occasioned here in an ideal sense], which posits a gap between professional and everyday life. Though the researcher seeks knowledge about some order of life, his professional stance 'makes sure' that he has no personal interest in it. This mistaken duality of interests is not present in the situations of the policeman and the suspect. Their interests are eminently personal and practical, because they are concerned with 'doing a job' and 'going to court'. Interests are tied together because the pathway to court resides in the policeman's judgements over the comparative competence of the suspect's account and his own for producing 'what happened'. Where conflict over accounts does arise, the subsequent appearances in court becomes a competition of accounts. Noting this competitive character of accounts is helpful because it focuses upon the constructive nature of descriptions. Seeing accounts in a possible case of 'breaking the law' in this way leads to an attempt to make sense of formal courses of treatment and outcomes by recourse to the properties of

practical reasoning.

Whether like Cicourel the sociologist's focus is upon practical reasoning, or like Sutherland upon definitions operating when a crime is carried out, his allegiance is to a system of relevance radically different to those of the policeman or the suspect. He is not concerned with 'getting his shift done' or with having a description of what happened believed because punitive measures depend upon it. Rather the sociologist is concerned with producing a report which is an authoritative version of events. This is produced over some time and with much thought. The assessment of his account does not depend upon a few moments of paper work prior to going back to his beat or going home; or to verbal answers to a policeman's questions.

It would be interesting if it were possible to place the sociologist in the suspect's place; in other words for the sociologist to experience the police and courts from the 'inside', in order that his account should be not only assumed to be competitive but to protect his personal freedom should have to be competitive. For the sociologist this would result in a shift of emphasis and attention. The sociological account would not be based upon the 'thought objects' of people in daily life as they would from the traditional position of observer, but would have to meet and come to terms with them face to face [A. Schutz, 1962].

By fate this was the position in which I found myself. I witnessed and took part in a series of actions which were later formalised into offences: three charges of malicious wounding; one charge of malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon. The event concerned five participants and two policemen. Consequently there were seven accounts of

what happened. These were differentiated into three different 'schools of thought' by the apportioning of blame and intention: three participants laid blame upon the other two; similarly the accounts of two of those involved blamed the other three; finally there were the policemen's accounts [available only as verbal representations, and incomplete].

Below will be documented the interaction which occurred between these accounts and the outcomes which followed. Initially this will be done from the position of a suspect. The story which will be told is not that of how the police acted as seen by an observer, but how they behaved in regard to an apparent witness and possible law-breaker. In this way it will be possible to identify some of the police and court practices which members have to attend to. Furthermore, it will also enable a reconstruction of 'what it was like' to be suspected of a crime; a feature which is normally outside the sociologist's grasp. Looking at my story in this way enables an examination of the structures which make formalised statements possible [e.g. sociological reports, police charges, court findings].

The account which follows is my description of what happened. It is partly a reconstruction of the story which I told to the police. It is also a further 'first time' telling; it structures various actions into a scenic and temporally progressive unit so that they can be seen to occur 'again' in this telling. The account is also more comprehensive than that which was presented to the police; outcomes which were not then known, are known now, as are various 'bits and pieces' of information which enable a more comprehensive story to be told. The problem which had to be faced in presenting the account

to the police, and in its presentation here, is the remedy of indexicality. Consequently it contains details of 'who?', 'where?', 'why?', and 'when?' in order to make observable each time it is occasioned its sensible character. Scenes are revealed as understandable and actions as reasonable, in the presentation of the account. These features for the practical remedy of indexicality are regarded as enabling an account to be presented; as being present in my interaction with the police, and in this presentation.

ACCOUNT PART ONE - SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING: I was walking along Park Street on a Saturday night; in the police statement the precise time and date were called for. Ahead of me at the junction of Park Street, Park Lane, and Old Park Lane I saw a group of people. Earlier that evening, together with a neighbour and my dog, I had been to a public house. We had gone to see the landlord to contribute to a collection for some flowers for the funeral of a man who had recently died; an ex-employer and friend. Upon leaving the public house I decided to take my dog for a walk on the way home and chose a longer route home than my neighbour, Roy.

As I approached the group of people, who I could now see consisted of four young men [although in the darkness they were indistinct], I left the footpath and walked in the side of the road as they occupied the footpath. All the time walking along Park Street my dog had been running free, off the lead. As we had approached the group of youths my dog had gone onto the triangle of grass which formed the junction of the three roads. As I drew level with the young men some kind of disruption occurred which for a moment I could not grasp. What had happened was that one of the group had come

from the centre and was shouting me by name. He cried either "For God's sake help me" or "For Christ's sake help me". He went on: "These three have got me". It was my neighbour Roy, who had blood running down the side of his face.

As Roy had moved towards me, the three other members of the group began to move away. I moved to stop the nearest one to me, C, but he jumped over a wall and ran across the triangle of grass towards Old Park Lane. The two other youths moved left and began to run up Park Lane. I began to chase them. The dog was running by my side and as we began to approach the first youth, A, the dog snarled and jumped at him. Running as fast as he could in the centre of the road A turned to see what was happening behind him. As he did so he fell to the floor.

I reached A and pulled him to his feet by his coat. As I did so he struggled and struck out with his fists and feet. I struck him two or three times in the face and he stopped struggling. When this happened I told him to stay where he was. With hindsight ordering A to stay where he was seems childish, yet at the time it seemed perfectly feasible. I then went after B who had begun running up Park Lane. He had been standing further along the road than A and myself, presumably having stopped when I caught A. Though I tried to catch B, he was too far in front. I stopped and shouted for him to come back. Upon turning round I saw that A was no longer in the middle of the road. Instead he was lying on the pavement outside a newsagent's shop. With his feet on either side of A's body and holding his head up by the hair was Roy. He was hitting A in the face with his fist and counting out loud each time he did so. When I first saw this

Roy had counted up to sixteen. By the time I reached them the count was eighteen. I pulled Roy off the youth, helping him to his feet. He struggled a little to get away but after I took tight hold of his arm A became quiet. His eyes were cut and blood was running down his face.

Having caught A and with the other two youths out of sight I told Roy that we should get the police. We walked down Park Street towards a public telephone box. As I kept hold of A, Roy pointed to a garden where the three youths had given him "a kicking". On reaching the telephone box Roy held A while I telephoned the local police station. I told the officer who answered what had happened, and that we had caught one of those involved. He asked where we were and upon being told, said that someone would be down. As I turned to leave the telephone box a police car pulled up outside. I later learned that the swift appearance of the police was due to a telephone call made by a lady in whose garden Roy had been kicked. The police officer got out of his car and I told him what had happened. He asked where B and C were. On being told that they were somewhere around Park Lane, he [Glyn as I later came to know him] told Roy and A to get into the car. Glyn began to get in himself and I asked whether a statement would be wanted from me, and whether I should walk to the police station. He said that I should go to the station and began to drive up Park Street. I turned and together with the dog began to walk to the police station.

As I approached the police station there was a police van and car outside. A, B, C, and Roy and three policemen were entering. I went into the station and stood at the desk. A policeman asked me what I wanted. When I told him that I was

involved with those who had just come into the station he asked me what had happened. When I told him the story he asked me to wait. A few minutes later a police constable [Nigel] came into the foyer and asked me to go with him. We went down a corridor and entered an interview room. Sitting down at a table Nigel asked me what had happened. Having gone through the story once more, we proceeded to make out a statement. I told the story piece by piece while he wrote it down, leaving out parts of it [e.g. where I had been, where I was going]. The exact names of the streets where the incident occurred were unclear so Nigel went to get a map. On his return he was accompanied by two other men, both dressed in suits. Nigel stood by the door, one of the men leant against some cabinents behind me, while the other man sat on the table with his feet on the chair once accupied by Nigel. The feeling in the room had somehow changed; there was a presence of suspicion, doubt, aggression and in me, fear.

The man sat on the table did not ask what had happened, but asked what I had been doing. Taking this as a question to do with a possible act which may have been an offence [e.g. hitting A], I answered "nothing", and began to tell the story once more. He stopped me short by asking if I had a dog lead. I answered in the affirmative and he asked me where it was. I replied that it was in my pocket, where it had been since we left the public house. I took the lead out of my pocket and the detective [for that is what I presumed the man to be] took it from me. He looked at it, got up from the table, and walked around the room with the ends of the lead held in each hand. The dog [a labrador] jumped to get the lead and the detective pushed him down. I told him not to do that as the

dog thought he was playing. The lead was then handed to the other detective while the first one asked if I had hit anyone with the lead. I answered that I had not, and the detective asked if I was sure. After I repeated that I had not hit anyone with the lead the detectives and Nigel left the room.

Nigel returned some minutes later. I asked him who the two men had been, and he said they were "C.I.D". When I said that they were not very pleasant he said that it was because of the job where they have to deal with not very pleasant people". We then continued with making out the statement. Part of the way through doing this I asked where the toilet was so that I could wash my hands. Nigel said that he would show me, and we both went to the toilet. It was only later that I realised that Nigel would not have let me leave the room unaccompanied; that the purpose behind my exit from the room was under suspicion. On our return we finished the statement. I asked Nigel if I would be charged with anything given the interview with the detective. He said that he thought not, and they had just been checking. When the statement was finished he said that I could go and accompanied me down the corridor. As we walked along, B and C with Glyn came out of a connecting corridor. I could see A waiting at the desk in the foyer. B and C began shouting. It was something like: "There he is the bastard. We'll bloody get you. Where's your dog lead now?". As they did this they moved towards me. Glyn and a sergeant who came from behind the desk pushed them back. I was then allowed to leave the police station. It was three o'clock on Sunday morning.

When I arrived home my wife knew what had happened. Roy had called and told her. When I had been home for a few

minutes there was a knock on the door; it was Roy. He told me that at the police station he had told them what had happened and had been asked to sign a complaint against A, B, and C. A constable had then driven him to the hospital where he had been treated and told to return on the Monday. He returned to the police station and asked about my whereabouts. Roy was told by the police that I had gone home. This was at two o'clock in the morning. Roy also told me what had happened prior to my arrival in Park Street.

Roy said that he had been walking along Park Street and A, B, and C were a little in front of him on the other side of the road. They were walking along eating chips. He could hear them talking but not what they were saying, when C threw his chips into the gutter and ran across the road. C said to Roy: "Give us a fag". Roy said that he did not have any cigarettes. C grabbed hold of Roy by the neck of his jumper and hit him in the face. By the time C had hit Roy and they had begun fighting, A and B had crossed the road to them. Somehow Roy and C went over a garden wall into a garden, where they were joined by A and B. All three youths then began to kick Roy, counting the kicks as they delivered them. Roy said that he rolled up into a ball and lay still. The kicking stopped and the youths picked Roy up, carrying him out of the garden and up Park Street. They sat him on a stone wall which bordered the triangle of grass and began to discuss what to do. According to Roy there were three suggestions: to take him round the back of some shops and "dump him"; to "do him again"; and to get an ambulance. As this discussion was going on Roy saw my dog, knew that I must be near, and so jumped up and shouted me.

I was also told by Roy what had happened as I walked to the police station. The police car containing Roy and A had driven along Park Street and onto Park Lane. As they moved along Park Lane a police van came from the other direction. B and C were outside a shoe shop from where they had telephoned the police, because we "had" A. They had knocked on the shop door and asked the owners if they could use the telephone. In the police van were Nigel and another constable. B and C were shouting and threatening Roy as he sat in the police car. They were then placed in the back of the van, and both vehicles drove to the police station.

When Roy had gone to the hospital he had twelve stitches put in a cut in his head. Injuries to his chest were supported by bandages. On returning to the hospital on the Monday he had X-rays taken, and was told that he had a fractured rib and fractured arm. This was in late September. In November I was issued with a summons to appear in court charged with malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon; section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act which carries a maximum sentence of five years [E.E. Baker and F.B. Dodge, 1976].

SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING REVISITED: How can the policeman's job be characterised? What form of consciousness goes along with it? What is the essential problematic which faces those with whom I was involved in the police station? As reported in the press, the image of the policeman has changed in recent years. He is now no longer characterised as a folk hero, but is now subject to scrutiny and investigation of a critical nature [cf. S. Chibnall, 1977]. In sociology the dominant conception of the policeman is of his coming

to terms with individual actions in accord with the general values of society. It has been suggested that because of this he draws public co-operation and esteem [M. Banton, 1964].

Jock Young's view is that the police "mismanage" encountered actions and produce deviance: that which is dangerous to the individual and wider society. This process is based upon "false concepts" held by the police which generate stereotypical conceptions of the criminal [1975]. Because of the overt organisational nature of the police, Young argues, they tend to negotiate reality so that it fits these stereotypical preconceptions [1973]. Such shared definitions and norms of behaviour enforce highly integrated and defensive structural properties which are prescribed by the police's formal organisation [M. Cain, 1973].

In an examination of the American police, Wesley has noted a feature of a policeman's life which may be transcultural. This is that the policeman sees the public as a threat. One aspect of this is that the majority of people he meets and deals with are subject to the legal powers of the police and because of this are antagonistic towards policemen. Sharing the theme of the public as enemy builds and binds policemen together in a secretive and isolated group. For the new recruit to the police, experiencing what he has been told about the public as enemy can result in a "specific shock" as his accent of reality is shifted from one finite meaning province to another [A. Schutz, 1962]. Wesley calls this leap "reality shock" [W.A. Wesley, 1970].

The historical development of the police as an organisation through industrial capitalism and liberal democracy, has led today to pre-emptive policing. This is characterised by the

assumptions that criminals are likely to commit further crimes, and that knowledge about people who are likely to commit crimes should be collected [T. Bunyan, 1977]. These are two examples of the police's formal organisational protocols which have to be accomplished through the everyday work activities of policemen. Such protocols have both prospective and retrospective qualities: they have to be both followed and accomplished [A. Cicourel, 1976].

The relation between the formal organisation of the police and the informal stereotypical preconceptions in operation in actual situations is formed by everyday work practices of policemen. This view treats the rational, planful, and formal concept of organisation as a commonsense construction; as an element in a sense of social structure. As such the meaning of organisation can only be located by an examination of its determination in actual cases of action; as produced by those persons who are judged to be socially competent to do so [E. Bittner, 1974]. In order to do this I want to now examine the above account of what happened to reveal what it has to say about the work practices of the police. This is not to regard the account as a sign and what follows as its sociological referent. It is not to distinguish between what was said and done and what was 'actually' taking place [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. In this common sociological practice, the former is regarded as an incomplete version of the latter [i.e. the 'complete' sociological account].

This section is seen rather as a continuation of the above account, and a complement to it. It seeks to examine how those involved spoke and acted. As such the section consists of one set of instructions for understanding what

occurred. Though the focus here is more upon how the policemen involved carried out their job, a more fundamental interest is in the resources and contexts which enables them to do so; the constructive methodicity of language in action. This feature, located by the maxim 'the sense of a statement resides in seeing how it was spoken' (H. Garfinkel, 1967), is not confined to sociological analysis. As a basic method for locating what happened and anticipating future developments in people's actions, seeing how someone spoke consists of an intersubjective meaning context available to interactants for interpretation (A. Schutz, 1972).

The Method Of Doubt: In all the dealings which I had with police officers, they stressed three dominant features in relation to accounts of what happened. They consistently maintained that 1) they must be impartial and 'sit on the fence' until 2) they had located what happened so that charges could be made. This had to be 3) done and completed according to the protocols of 'paper work'. In articulating these requirements of organisational procedure, the officers presented a method of impartial and professional doubt which extended to the factuality of the accounts of those involved in the event. The formal sense of this procedure was seen in its usefulness for locating 'the truth'. By this assembly of documents concerned with what happened, it was assumed that 'what really happened' would become self-evident. That this process was dependent upon a multitude of judgements and upon exactly which documents were extended credence to, were issues not formally recognised or mentioned by the officers. However in conversation with Glyn after the case had been settled in court, he "supposed" that he should have taken a statement from the woman who had telephoned the police, and who had

seen the initial fight take place in her garden.

As a means to locate the sense of an event, the method of doubt has been noted on separate occasions by Zimmerman [1970] and Sacks [1972a]. For Zimmerman examining the work of a welfare agency, the method of doubt is an "investigative stance". It consists of a "thoroughgoing skepticism". Sacks in examining police work, has called it "an incongruity procedure". This consists of treating routine appearances with doubt, which results in viewing stories and scenes as "not what they seem". The focus is on the way appearances and stories are presented; their style, ease of presentation, and so on. Sacks sees the general warrant for this method as lying in its plausibility for Anyone: "Its warrant in particular cases is that the inference made is one which ordinary persons would make".

From Sacks' description, the method of doubt provides for the accomplishment of two general features of police work. As described by the officers involved in the incident being examined here, it provides for an 'objective' state of affairs or at least the assumption of 'objectivity'. Secondly the method of doubt enables the feature of self-evidency to be located. Officers treat the search for the facts as a matter of location [i.e. as residing in documents and stories, waiting to be found], rather than as accomplishment [i.e. a product of the activities instituted in the search for self-evidency, impartiality, and rationality]. The idea of self-evidency has it that the conclusions reached upon a certain incident involved little or no choice on the part of the police officers; the consistency and texture of an event, in line with the idea of impartiality, are seen to select themselves.

Though the method of doubt I gleaned from police officers I was involved with was connected with fairly formal police work practices, it is possible and perhaps probable that it takes other less savoury forms. For example, when briefly questioned by the C.I.D. officers I felt that rather than standing back and being impartial [i.e. the formal statement of the method of doubt], they actively disbelieved me and were prepared if necessary to use pressure to challenge my story. The accounts presented by the uniformed officers are themselves suspect as descriptions of actual police practices. When first at the police station I met an officer I already knew, Ian. We talked and I told him what I was doing there. In my conversation with Nigel I asked him whether I would be charged, and he said that this was unlikely. Ian later told me that on this same night he had asked Nigel whether I would be "done". Nigel had replied: "Bloody well right he will".

The method of doubt appears to have two aspects. It is first of all a part of the formal police ideology as displayed by the police themselves. As contained within a body of knowledge concerning 'normal' police practice, it connects actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings or sense of social structure [cf. D. Apter, 1964]. From this aspect individual actions stand not only as documents of this wider set of meanings [e.g. seeing the policeman at work as 'protecting' the wider society], but are justified by that set of meanings [e.g. C.I.D. officers acting aggresively because they have to deal with people who are not "pleasant"]. In this form the method of doubt is a theorised entity. In its second aspect it is a situated practice of language and judgement, of question and style. Though here one label has been used for what occurs between suspects and policemen, it

is highly probable that the manifestation of the method of doubt in each separate case is subtly different. Whether a policeman questions a suspect calmly or aggressively, whether he decides the action he can take on a few hearings of the story or decides to question it further and more fully are matters which arise and become resolved in an interaction of social characters. The formal features of impartiality and self-evidency have no place in such a situation; they are post hoc considerations.

At the stage of questioning a suspect a policeman is concerned with doing his job [i.e. finding out what happened] and is not as such concerned with matters of formal organisation The policeman is more concerned with assessing and possibly challenging the plausibility of a story and its teller in relation to the set of legal rules available, and which he may judge to have been broken. This seems a fairly rational enterprise: matching the story with the rules and in comparison coming up with a logical outcome. For this model of action to exist as a rational strategy, it is crucial that before a choice is made the conditions governing the selection of alternative choices should be known [A. Schutz, 1953]. However, in respect to the deliberations of jurors, Harold Garfinkel has suggested that people may be more concerned with justifying the outcomes of actions than with engaging in the process of rational selection and decision making [1967]. Going along with this view, it may be more accurate to see the decision to make a charge against a person by police officers as an initial step, and not as an outcome of a process of rational choice. As a result of this, the procedures of questioning and amassing documents seeks to construct the conditions for and confirm the decision to

press charges.

Schutz [1953] suggested that the model of rational action was ideal-typical and absent from daily life. In talking to coroners, Atkinson found that the mode of a person's death was a key determinant in the selection or search for further evidence [1973]. From Atkinson's description it is as if the coroner makes a decision 'more-or-less', and then looks for a particular kind of evidence to substantiate it. In his study of juvenile justice, Cicourel similarly noted that decisions made by the police were retrospectively interpreted and justified [1976]. Such sociological ideas and reports as these suggest that a decision to institute charges against me came fairly quickly after I entered the police station. This is made clear by two things that happened: Nigel telling Ian that I would be charged while I was still in the police station; and A and B being asked to sign a complaint against me [C refused], again while I was in the police station making a statement. Both these events I only learnt about later and they resulted in the reinterpretation of what occurred to me that night, which forms my account above. I had decided what the situation consisted of [i.e. being a witness], and interpreted events and instituted actions according to that conception. It was only later that I discovered that my actions were being monitored according to the mode 'suspected of a crime'. This is perfectly transparent from the number of occasions I asked police officers if I would be charged, to which they insisted that they did not know. Yet on the night in the police station they had charged me with malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon.

The method of doubt has a place both in the official police ideology and organisation, and in routine police

practice. Though the sense of the method changes with the occasion, the formal and informal instances of it are related. The formal conception provides the informal employment of the method of doubt with a sense of structure and history; with a sense of place and direction. At the same time and on each and every occasion, the informal situation provides a case for the accomplishment of formal ideological states. As Zimmerman described it in his study of a welfare agency, these informal activities are consulted "in order to decide what the formal plan might reasonably be taken to mean" [1970]. Alongside this judgemental work are ideas on what rational outcomes should be like [i.e. a further impact of the existent police ideology]. The police officers that I spoke to had a sense of the future in dealing with cases in respect of the formal organisational constraints which they had to satisfy. They were concerned with legality and rationality in the form of rules [cf. M. Weber, 1970], as the legitimate parameters of their work activities.

Related to these concerns were other features which Weber termed rational. Police officers followed the legal code as embodying their work objectives and values, seeking to apply that code in specific cases. In this work they saw their duties as limited to specific tasks [cf. M. Albrow, 1970]. These features of rationality found in the formal method of doubt can only be produced by everyday methods and practices. This is a distinction similar to that made by Weber between formal and substantive rationality. The former relates to general laws or rules which apply to everyone, while the latter consists of free-flowing practical judgements and decisions [M. Weber, 1970]. The situated problematic consists

of the production of rule-bound formalism from the basis of everyday morality and instincts. The task of the substitution of context-free for indexical expressions for the practical purposes of police work uses, references, and relies upon informal and situated methods and knowledge.

Paper Work: It is a formal characteristic of organisations that they form and produce protocols for the collection and use of paper information and records. The factuality and objectivity which is accorded to a document may differ from occasion to occasion, from organisation to organisation. Here one instance of the production of a document will be examined. This is the production of a written statement.

A naive idea of what happens in being involved with the police and one which is regularly given in newspaper reports might run something like this: 'something happened, those involved went to the police station, and they were/were not charged'. Though this is an essentially correct description, it glosses the process of production which occurs in the bringing of charges by the police. The apparently unproblematic gap between going to the police station, making a statement, and being charged is far from unproblematic. It consists of the negotiation of an event's features into a legally and organisationally admissable form. The story is not set down verbatim, but is worked out between the police officer and the story teller.

The story is repeated section by section and reformulated into formal language by the police officer. In this way factors are inserted, such as time and the number of people involved or observed, and other factors are left out because "they don't matter" [Nigel]. Though the direction of this negotiation is controlled by the police officer, in

interpreting the verbal story he seeks agreement from the teller on the formal pieces of the statement. There is however a paradox. The statement that is produced is going to be the version of the person named at its head, yet it is produced in its 'objective' form by the police officer [cf. A. Cicourel, 1976].

A statement is essentially tied to the context of its production. Though it may 'speak' about an event such as a fight, as a version of an event it is constructed according to the relevances operating at the time. The features which are glossed and let pass become a requirement for accomplishing a legally admissable and objective document and not features of the actual event. In order to understand written statements they have to be viewed against some background; readers as a condition of understanding have to introduce a version of context. It is here, in the production and reading of a statement, that an important disparity exists between the police and suspects which is crucial for organisational outcomes.

In producing both the verbal and written accounts of an event, the suspect is not concerned with the requirements of literal description. He rather displays to those concerned how the people concerned in the event spoke and acted. The policeman on the other hand is interested in another situation; that of the workplace. He is interested in how the suspect speaks and acts in the police station and in making his statement in order to evaluate the kind of person he is. In this way a suspect becomes a cultural dope of the police's practice of simplifying "the communicative texture of his behavioural environment" [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. By the

concentration upon the behavioural structure of an event without regard to the intentional content that defines 'action' a situated understanding of the event in its own terms becomes impossible. Statements can thus be read, judged, and understood in strictly behavioural terms by the police to see if they 'fit' into a category of crime.

Truth and Doubt: In order to get his job done and to satisfy the formal features of police organisation, the police officer uses an informal method of doubt in order to assess the type of person who has been involved in an incident. However, to what extent is the use of this method a matter of choice over and above other methods? Or could this method be forced upon the policeman as a condition of the reality of his job? For the informal method of doubt to be a forced rather than a selected aspect of the policeman's work, an invariant property of accounts is required. This is that all accounts, and the people presenting them, are truthful. Though there are exceptions to this [e.g. jokes as a means for the introduction of 'taboo' subjects. cf. J.P. Emerson, 1973], when accounts are presented and in all subsequent changes to them a very condition of their seriousness is that they present the truth. As Harvey Sacks has written, the fact that something is uttered immediately constructs intended truth. For the policeman faced with a number of differing accounts of the same event, the status of intended truth is problematic. Because of this, doubt becomes a feature of the policeman's job situation and, moreover, a relevant means for locating the actual status of accounts.

The fact of differing accounts of the same event means that the background expectancy that the event in question can be routinely known in common with others disappears. One

feature of this expectancy as Schutz discussed, is that people assume,[assume that others assume, and that as they assume it of others, others assume it of them] that the elements which an account documents are 'natural facts' [A. Schutz, 1964]; that accounts display objectively determined scenes. For the policeman faced with different accounts, this background expectancy is breached. It ceases to be a normative rule for the management of everyday affairs, and is replaced by a rule of doubt. In this way the rule of doubt, produced by socially structured conditions, is for the policeman a 'natural fact' of his workplace.

This feature of a policeman's scheme of interpretation contrasts with that operated by suspects. As has already been suggested, accounts by suspects carry with them the status of intended truth. At the same time a description of how an event occurred relies upon the normative rule of a display of scenic particulars against the background expectancy of naturally determined fact. The suspect has to operate at the everyday level of presenting an account which hinges on the sanctioned use of doubt; that a story has an undoubted correspondence with the objects which it 'intends' in a particular way [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. This means that there is social distance between the policeman and the suspect as a condition of the interactional and structural roles which they occupy. The suspect is excluded from 'normal' forms of communication and information on his views and accounts because the collectivity into which he is drawn operates with a scheme of interpretation which focuses directly upon such views and accounts.

Exclusion is accomplished by the police not only by the

method of doubt, but also by visible means of 'not belonging'; police officers wear uniforms and the suspect does not. Also the very place im which the suspect finds himself is unfamiliar, while it is not for the policeman. Further to these ecological aspects of exclusion there are features of solidarity and loyalty displayed between policemen; they may be om the same shift, know one another's names, and be dealing with the same case (cf. E. Lemert, 1973). There is a paradoxical arrangement of feelings im this structure of doubt, truth, and exclusion. The policeman's task is to examine and make judgements om a variety of materials im order to arrive at a decision or series of decisions which can count as a true account of what happened. In order to do this he uses the method of doubt. Whereas the policeman moves from doubt to apparent truth, the suspect begins with making the claim of intended truth, which because of the structural arrangements of the situatiom im which he is im, is transformed into doubt. The suspect occupies the positiom of not knowing what is occurring or what may happem to him; not knowing that is until he is charged and held to appear in court or until some months later whem a knock om the door heralds a summons to appear in court.

The work of the police is towards a specific end: finding out exactly what happened when an event occurred and, where appropriate, beinging charges. Im this progressiom where a persom is found guilty the police have been successful; where he is not they have been mistaken. This simplified descriptiom of court-room conclusions points to the issue that within the court situatiom it is not relations between indisputable facts which are im questiom, but the very facts themselves. This is to say the different and competing accounts of what happened are

in competition. The final section of this chapter will detail this competition in relation to the event in which I was involved.

ACCOUNT PART TWO - AND SO TO COURT: I was summoned to appear in court in December. Prior to this I went to see my solicitor to whom I told my story. Upon hearing it he said that he thought that something had "gone wrong", and that "we have a very good chance". He filled in a form for me to apply for legal aid. All I had to do was to sign it and leave it with him. I was also asked to request Roy to be a witness for me.

In December Roy did not attend the court because as I was pleading not guilty, the case would not be heard then. When I arrived A, B, and C were there, charged with malicious wounding. I sat with my solicitor while other cases were dealt with. After an application for an extension of a liquor licence all our names were read out. I stood in the dock in front of the magistrates together with A, B, and C. The charges were read out by the clerk of the court and we were asked individually how we pleaded. I pleaded not guilty. A, B, and C did likewise, and we were bailed on the sum of twenty five pounds each. The cases were then adjourned until a later date. My solicitor informed me later by letter that this was to be in February. He also asked me to write down any reasons I could think of for the unjuries to A's face, since he had discovered that a doctor had made a statement saying that their appearance was consistent with that of being hit with a blunt instrument. This I did [e.g. A had fallen over in the road, I was wearing a ring, Roy had hit him numerous times]. Meanwhile I had been granted legal aid, having to contribute the sum of fifteen pounds.

At the second court appearance both I and Roy were present. He was a witness in the prosecution of A, B, and C. I was to be prosecuted. On the evening of the incident Roy had not made a statement, but had gone straight to the hospital after telling his verbal story. Later Glyn came to my house to go through my "antecedants" [e.g. previous convictions, colour of eyes, even whether I had false teeth], and while doing so asked me if I thought Roy would make a statement. I said that I did not know, and that he should ask Roy. By this time Roy had been to see a solicitor who had said that in any dealings with the police, he should refer them to him. Consequently Roy refused to make a written statement. Also, he had not been charged with any offence.

The court-house contained two court rooms. One was old and used for cases which were relatively minor and took up little time. The second one was new and used for cases which took up time. Our cases were to be heard here. Prior to the cases being heard, C changed his plea to guilty. His case was heard in the older court room. A police inspector read out the charges, C pleaded guilty, and the magistrates had a word with the clerk of the court. He was fined fifty pounds. A few minutes later the cases of A, B, and myself began in the second court room. A and B were sat with their solicitors at tables facing the magistrates' bench. I was seated with my solicitor behind them. The clerk of the court read out our names, we stood up, the charges were read, and we were asked how we were going to plead. We all pleaded not guilty and the case of A and B was to be heard first. I was to be dealt with after them. After four and a half hours A was found guilty and fined ~~thirty~~ forty pounds. B was likewise

found guilty and fined twenty pounds. There was not enough time for my case to be heard and it was fixed for the coming April.

The events in the court room were something of a dream to me. This was only the second time I had been in a court before, and I felt as if the ceiling were pushing my head down. At first it was all I could do to glance upwards, but after some hours this diminished to some extent. I had the same feeling when my case was dealt with in the April, though this time more acutely. The case of A and B itself consisted of Roy giving evidence for the prosecution, and then being questioned by A and B's solicitors. A's solicitor was also acting for C. She told the magistrates that C had pleaded guilty to the event in question, and did not want to be called as a witness. However the magistrates insisted that he gave evidence. A and B gave evidence in defence, and were questioned by the prosecution. Nigel and Glyn had given evidence for the prosecution, stating what they had seen and been told. After the prosecution and defence cases had been put, the magistrates retired and later gave their verdicts.

The details of what happened did not concern me directly as the event in question happened prior to my involvement. Roy's evidence stated that he was attacked initially by C, and then A and B joined in and all three proceeded to kick him. The story presented by A and B was different. They said that there had been a fight between Roy and C, and that was all. When the fight had finished they had carried Roy with them [and away from the nearest telephone box], in order to get an ambulance for him because he appeared to be quite badly hurt. The magistrates became interested in who could be identified

as having kicked Roy. While he was giving evidence they asked him about the type of footwear his attackers were wearing while he was being kicked. Roy stated that all he could remember was that one of those kicking him wore shoes with white on them.

A and B were questioned about their shoes but denied wearing shoes that had any white on them that night. When C was called to give evidence, because he had been outside the court room, he did not know of the shoe issue. The magistrates asked him about the shoes he had worn on the night and he replied: " Brown stack-heel boots" . He was asked if they had any white on them, to which he replied that they had not. The magistrates asked about the kind of shoes the other two were wearing. C said that A had been wearing brown stack-heel boots with white fronts. There seemed to be a silent gasp around the court room. The magistrate nodded his head, with his questioning over. The doctor, though he was not concerned with the cases of A and B but only with my case, should have been present in court. I learnt this in the recess for lunch when I overheard Glyn and Nigel talking. Nigel said that the doctor would not be attending court as " he's had to go to Crewe" .

When I appeared in court in April, Roy was the witness for my defence while A, B, and C were witnesses for the prosecution. Again the clerk of the court read my name out and I stood up. He then read the charges against me and I pleaded not guilty. The clerk then said that for the charge of carrying an offensive weapon I could elect for a trial by jury at the Crown Court. I declined, saying that I wanted the matter to be dealt with then. The clerk said that if I was found guilty and the magistrates decided that a more

severe sentence than they had powers to give was deserved, then I would be sent to the Crown Court for sentence. I then sat down and the prosecution began the case.

A said that he thought that I had hit him with the dog lead, but that he could not be sure. He said: " I saw something in his hand" . C was called, and he said that I had hit him with the lead. My solicitor asked why he had not made a complaint against me [it was then that I learnt that the complaint had been made by A and B]. C replied that as far as he was concerned the " whole thing" had finished on the night in question. Of the three prosecution witnesses B was the most precise. Whereas C said that other than hitting him, he had not seen me hit anyone else because he had run away, B said that I had struck both C and A. He said that having struck C with the lead I ran after A. While chasing him I struck him with the dog lead which caused him to fall. B said that I then wrapped the lead around my fist and struck A about the face numerous times. Before we had entered the court room my solicitor told me that the doctor would not be present to give evidence on A's injuries because, as it was stated in court, " he is out of the country" .

The section of the doctor's statement which said that A's injuries were consistent with being struck by a blunt instrument, were removed by the police; the rest of the statement was offered as evidence apart from this section. The two policemen concerned in the case were not present to give evidence. Nigel was supposed to be on holiday, yet I saw him on the morning the case was heard wearing police uniform under an overcoat. Glyn it was said had influenza, yet that evening I spoke to him while he was sat in his

police car. While I was giving my evidence and being questioned by the prosecuting solicitor, the magistrate raised the matter of the dog lead. He asked where it was. It was at this point that the non-appearance of the two policemen was explained. As Nigel was said to have the lead, his non-appearance meant the non-appearance of the lead too. Consequently the magistrates asked me to describe it, which I did.

In relation to the dog lead, the prosecuting solicitor referred to the precedent of a prior case, making the point that if I had struck out with the lead not realising it to be there, then that was admissable. I told the magistrates that at the time of telling the police what had happened and making a statement I was convinced that I had not struck anyone with the dog lead, and that I was still certain that this was so. I can remember the phrase which came to me and which was reproduced in local newspapers later: " I have never hit anybody, at any time, anywhere with a dog lead" . My solicitor concentrated on making the point that I was aware that an offence had been committed, and that my actions were directed towards apprehending those involved for the police.

After I had appeared before the court, Roy gave evidence for me. He said that he had not seen me hit anyone with the dog lead, and also that he had struck A in the face sixteen or seventeen times. After Roy had given his evidence the magistrates retired. During the course of the hearing one of the magistrates, a woman [the other two were men], kept catching my eye. She was middle-aged, wore glasses, and a blue suit and hat. At various points in the case she would give a look and a little nod to me. As the magistrates were

leaving the court room she again looked at me, gave a nod, and a little smile. Roy and myself went into the corridor. A, B, and C were there as well. Just as Roy and I had begun to light cigarettes the clerk of the court asked those present in court to rise, as the magistrates were coming back. As this happened I heard A say " not guilty" . We then moved back into the court room and the magistrates entered.

With everyone seated, the clerk of the court called my name and I stood up. The magistrates then said that they had found the case " not proven" . I thanked the magistrates, receiving a smile from the lady in the blue suit. The prosecution solicitor then rose and asked about costs. The magistrate asked about my situation and was told that I had been granted legal aid after paying an initial fifteen pounds. On hearing this he said: " Give him his money back" . The magistrates then stood, the clerk said rise, and they left the court. My solicitor shook my hand, and I went over to the prosecuting solicitor. He had his back to me, so I tapped him on the shoulder and offered him my hand. He took it, we shook hands, and I offered him my thanks. While I was doing this Roy was behind me. After having shook hands the prosecuting solicitor pointed at Roy and said: " It should have been you" . We then left the court room, with the matter finally over.

IN CONCLUSION: The relation between my suspect's account and the more formal sociological account is an essential one; the former underlies the latter. Yet the relation with the account of the outcome of being involved with the police is more problematic. The sociological account could not predict or state with any probability greater than a commonsense guess or judgement which of the competing versions of what happened

would prove to be 'sufficient' to provide for that night's event as a rational outcome. The sociological account had to 'wait and see' what the outcome would be.

The suspect's account in actual engagement with the police was not 'sufficient' to construct the event as a 'witnessed' event; other accounts constructed participation and involvement. The police could thus account for my version of what happened as showing and being in-accord-with-the-rule malicious wounding and carrying an offensive weapon. The account of the resolution of what happened in court stems from a comparison of accounts. However, what is the relation between the suspect's accounts and the outcome in court, and the sociological account? This will be examined in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

POLICE, MAGISTRATES, AND SOCIOLOGY

> The actual events are not facts. It is the use of proper procedures for categorizing events which transforms them into facts. A fact is something which is already categorized, which is already worked up so that it conforms to the model of what that fact should be like. To describe something as a fact or to treat something as a fact implies that the events themselves - what happened - entitle or authotize the teller of the tale to treat that categorization as ineluctable. " Whether I wish it or not, it is a fact. Whether I will admit it or not, it is a fact." If something is to be constructed as a fact, then it must be shown that proper procedures have been used to establish it as objectively known. It must be seen to appear in the same way to anyone.
> [D. Smith, unpublished.]

> The recognition of sociological knowledge as subject-bound to a self-interpreted field of experience is the first step in assuming responsibility for social science knowledge at the same time that it renews the necessity to inform it with moral vision. Sociological detachment built upon methodological dualism of subject and object must yield to a Reflexive Sociology more concerned with 'soul searching' than 'soul selling'.
> [J. O'Neill, 1972]

MAGISTRATES, POLICE, AND SOLICITORS - WILL THE ACCUSED PLAY THE GAME?: In England today the majority of criminal cases such as the one described in Chapter Six are heard in Magistrates' Courts. Such a court is defined by the Magistrates Court Act, 1952, section 124, as any justice or justices of the peace acting under any enactment or by virtue of his or their commission or under common law [R.J. Walker, 1977]. The process which is followed in such a court is that a charge is made and defended before magistrates who decide whether the charge is appropriate or not, and what punitive measures are required if any.

In deciding whether a charge is proven magistrates may follow various precedents: that which is laid down in English law; that which is set by a court for itself [e.g. dealing with similar cases in a similar manner [G. Schubert, 1975]. Whichever precedents are used in a particular moment, it is interesting that the underlying assumption in the judicial process is that magistrates can decide whether the bringing of charges by the police is a correct measure or not. It is assumed that versions of an event can be examined and decided upon in relation to their 'real' occurrence.

This background assumption of objectification, by which Cicourel [1976] means a person's attempts to persuade others of the credibility of what is being attended to as a basis for further action and inference, is to be found in the structural-functionalist view of the court. For example, the resources or 'inputs' for the purpose of deciding guilt or innocence consist of adaptive, goal-pursuance, and pattern maintenance features. Court room decisions require an examination of cause and effect terms; the court has to decide

upon the character of the past relationship between the alleged offence of the defendant and counter claim of the plaintiff, and the effect of any decision upon those involved. The court also requires standards by which to evaluate the competing claims of what happened and the effect of a court decision upon the wider society. These standards are in terms of what a system is organised for and the goals towards which it is directed, along with the situation to be created or maintained by the court's exercise of power. The pattern maintenance feature can be located as a willingness by the people drawn into the court to accept and abide by its decisions in accord with which it dispenses 'justice'. The adaptive and goal-pursuance 'outputs' of the court are an abiding interest in the pursuance of rights and obligations in the interests of efficient organisation, and the interpretation of a particular case in terms of the formal language of the law and society's ideals (H.C. Bredemeier, 1975). Durkheim saw this functional 'input - output' process as enforcing the collective sentiments of society through "authorized interpreters", who judged upon issues which were criminal because they shocked the common conscience (1964).

Both magistrates, the police, and sociologists' decisions of fact rest upon this kind of taken for granted assumption that they can engage in 'pure observation'; view things 'over there' independently of the act of observation in order to make the 'real' facts publicly available (cf. M. Phillipson, 1975). In order to attain this rounded off and abstract reinterpretation of an original event, the sociological and legal view of society removes or smoothes off the contingent features of everyday affairs to correlate relationships between focused upon action and sociological and legal rules (A. Cicourel, 1976).

As distinct from formal aspects of legal and sociological thinking, in court I was concerned with what was happening to me and what was to happen to me finally. Though in this sense there was a concern with 'inputs' and 'outputs', in a fundamental sense the texture and structure of court room events depended upon deeper forms of intersubjective relations of a fleeting and transitory kind. For example, though a decision of fact for A and B rested upon an amalgam of stories and reports, it was the way in which the hearing was conducted in terms of forms of address, questions, answers, and persuasive practices which gave sense to the body of assembled knowledge; it was occasioned in a particular form [i.e. supporting guilt] through court room interaction.

The major types of court room personnel are magistrates, policemen, solicitors, and the accused. As separate groups, police and magistrates enjoy an analogous position in terms of interpretation. Both are confronted by the task of interpreting the 'true' character of an event and instituting some form of action [e.g. prosecuting someone, dismissing a case, fining or imprisoning someone]. Magistrates however are distant in time from the action in question. The police themselves are often not witnesses to an actual event, but magistrates are even more removed in time. Though they have the same set of materials and people as the police from which to make their decision of guilt or innocence, magistrates do not compile those materials themselves as the police do, or have the same length of time to question and assess the people involved. Whereas the police can question people within the private confines of a police station without the presence of legal representatives, the magistrate has to carry out

judgements and assessments before an audience. He is involved in the public demonstration of 'justice', which is reportable in public terms [e.g. newspapers].

This public - private distinction between magistrates and the police can be seen in what the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir David McNee, had to say about present police practices of detention of suspects and the detention rules which the police would like. The Commissioner admitted that police hold suspects without access to solicitors for longer than three days without charging them. He also proposed that the police should be allowed to hold people without charging them for seventy two hours, and then have the duty to ask a magistrate for permission to detain for a further similar period ["The Guardian", 21st. August, 1978].

It appears that magistrates and the police are distinct groups. The magistrate is not part of or subject to the authority structure or work ideology of the police. He is separate and apart from the police organisation, in a position where he can cast a critical eye over police practice. However there may be a greater affinity between the police and justices of the peace in terms of shared values and norms of behaviour than the outward structure of each group indicates. For example, Bowes [1966] has presented a case for regarding the accused in court as at a disadvantage in regard to the joint forces of police and magistrates. He states that there are many instances of police conduct being condoned by magistrates without proper regard for and examination of that conduct. This is because of the belief that the police will not prosecute without proper cause; that magistrates should not hinder or interfere with the job of apprehending law breakers.

As a result of experience on the Bench, unfavourable attitudes against the accused are built up and the belief that the police are hindered in seeking a conviction by the restrictions of the accused's legal rights is formed.

Cohen (1972) has noted a shared purpose between magistrates and the police in defining possible criminal populations. In his examination of the creation of mods and rockers, Cohen reports that the police and courts joined together in viewing non-criminal acts under certain circumstances, as situationally improper. Furthermore, cases which appeared in court were the result of police discretion. This idea consists of the police having to make a choice between reporting a 'crime' or letting it pass (C.P. Freidlander and E. Mitchell, 1974). Because all violations of the law cannot be dealt with, this concept provides for a concentration upon more serious offences and a selectivity in enforcing minor violations, in relation to changing societal values (e.g. 'mugging'. cf. S. Hall et al, 1978). Via the mechanism of police discretion magistrates receive and endorse particular relevances about what non-desirable behaviour is. At the same time, from their position on the Bench they can transmit the court's views on the relevance of some action over another, if only through the severity of sentences imposed (cf. R. Hood, 1962).

In the court room the policeman is a professional at work, The magistrate on the other hand is there as a leading member of the community. However, in court this professional and non-professional disparity is dissipated. Even though the magistrate is partially trained in law, and is advised by the clerk of the court, hearings are dependent upon commonsense. In order to accomplish an obvious demonstration of causality

and what happened, police, magistrates, and solicitors employ what Cicourel has termed a two-valued logic [1976]. Everyday and taken for granted aspects of the common world are formalised and ambiguities in language are closed while judgements are made and decisions validated in terms of taken for granted assumptions concerning everyday life.

In this matrix are embedded the central problematics for police, prosecution, and magistrates. For the police and the prosecution the task is synonomous; the prosecution operates with the version of events selected by the police, and attempts to demonstrate in respect to a particular person what 'this man did'. In reviewing an unfolding case from the Bench, the magistrates face the question: 'could this man?'. In organising the court's social scene around this indexical area, the court's personnel constitutes the 'original' scene through methods for producing rational appearances and clear and coherent fact [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

To produce 'this man did' as a plausible outcome the prosecution for the police assembles witnesses as a series of relevant facts. Witnesses are not in court to tell all they know. They are there to be led by the prosecuting solicitor into revealing certain pieces of information which the prosecution knows about beforehand, and which are relevant to the version of events which he is attempting to construct. Each bit of information is brought out by a questioning procedure on the part of the prosecuting solicitor, and consequently the witness tends to confine himself to the questions rather than reflect upon the 'original' event. What this means is that there is no conscious attempt at a presentation of the 'whole' or 'complete' story by witnesses.

In the questioning procedure the prosecution not only attempts to present a version of what happened, but also to demonstrate the 'kind' of person the accused is in relation to the charge against him. In other words the prosecutor attempts to present to the magistrates a character which testifies to the police's claim of 'this man did'. It is difficult to say whether this strategy is consciously adopted by the prosecutor or a result of a concerted attempt to 'get at the truth' in court. However it is certainly a consequence of the questioning procedure: cajoling; using sympathy and irony; berating the suspect; making accusations; interrupting people while they are speaking. Though the solicitor's knowledge consists of a grouping of legal norms and rules for their application, his competence is only indirectly connected with this legal knowledge. In respect to changing situations, contexts, and an awareness of the intersubjective interpretation of events the solicitor has to employ 'non-rationalised' skills [D. Rueschemeyer, 1975]; to flexibly ad hoc various strategies and approaches in order to achieve his ends [i.e. prosecution or defence] through the 'objective' legal code.

At the moment the prosecution has presented its case against an accused in the Magistrates' Court, the onus probandi or burden of proof comes into play. This has two meanings. Firstly it is a rule of law which requires the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt. In this definition the burden of proof lies wholly with the prosecution. However in practice the more general meaning of the burden of proof is that it lies upon the party who would fail if no further evidence were called at that point in the proceedings. Because of this,

unless it is decided that the prosecution has not presented a case, it becomes the defence's problem to demonstrate the state of innocence; or at least to show the accused's actions cannot be confined within the legal boundaries specified by the charges against him. In this sense, innocence is not a condition of an original event but a negotiated and contingent feature of a specific here-and-now situation. It is defined not by objective indicators, but by constructed, interpersonal relations which are played out in terms of persuasion, rhetoric, and argument.

In rebutting the prosecution's case, the defence solicitor has to reconstruct and replace the facts and character which have been awakened in court, under a different sense of possibility. He may attempt to show or hint that a mistake has been made by a witness; that a statement is not plausible; or that a witness's character is unreliable [e.g. " This was after you had savagely attacked Mr. X?"]. Cicourel [1976] has described the task of prosecution and defence solicitors, set by the adversary principle of law, as " minimizing or maximizing the problematic features of decisions" contained in the descriptions and facts presented in court. The solicitor has to present a coherent version of a social reality which he is seeking to persuade others was the case. He seeks to show the relevance of a general rule [e.g. helping the police] as the accent of social reality in respect of which he organises the rationality of everyday and legal actions. This is with regard to the plausibility of an outcome as a widely shared decision of what should have happened or been done.

Though both prosecution and defence solicitors have to face this task with a strategy of free-construction, they are

not without restrictions. For example, Sudnow has described that those involved with settling matters of fact in court have a regard for a body of knowledge and recipes for deciding outcomes. In negotiating outcomes in court solicitors and magistrates operate in respect to such a body of knowledge; comparing for example between a described event in the past and shared conceptions of 'normal' crimes; typical knowledge of the typical forms crimes display, how they usually occur, and the type of person who carries them out [D. Sudnow, 1975].

The magistrate has to decide a case in terms of addressing the question 'could this man?'. The prosecuting solicitor has to show that 'this man did', while the defence has to counter this with 'this man could not'. Amid this unfolding triadic relationship of argument, counter argument, and decision stands the accused. He is in an unfamiliar situation both in terms of place and process relative to other court personnel. Arranged to discuss him and deal with him are a series of people he does not know. Both because of a lack of experience and [or] the structural position in which he finds himself, the accused is an outsider. He is in this position because the court is a closed community. It is bureaucratically and structually organised to process people, and is filled with personnel who share professional, economic, intellectual, and social ties. Because of such ties, coupled with pressure from the high number of cases to be heard and a sense of belonging antagonistic to criticism, Blumberg has called a court's social structure " an organised system of complicity" [A.S. Blunberg, 1975].

In court the defendant has to rely upon both the advice and actions of his solicitor, though free to specify his own

personal decisions [e.g. pleading guilty or not guilty, electing for trial at a Crown Court]. However even before he has said anything, the accused is under scrutiny. Sitting in court his dress, manner, and behaviour are available to all present as a possible example of what he is accused of. In order to dispel and counter any thoughts or claims that this is so, the accused must from the outset begin and continue to act and speak as if he fits in with the court's organisation. In Goffman's terms, both examiners and examined must attend to normal appearances; rather than appearing out of place the accused must appear in place [E. Goffman, 1971]. Like Goffman's perrenial actor [1969], the accused needs to become engaged in the art of impression management. However, whether or not he does so or the extent to which he succeeds or feels comfortable doing so is a contingent matter.

Unlike the continual dramatist the accused experiences a split between the natural flow of things and the court situation, rather like a person labelled mentally ill experiences his behaviour and the hospital organisation as a disjunction [S.L. Messinger, 1968]. Being under test, the accused experiences his surroundings and character as a constructed or "assembled object" [H. Garfinkel, 1967], whose management presents unknown and untold difficulties. This is in distinction to both other court personnel and the dramaturgic theorist; court personnel are grounded in the routine and natural court room attitude, while the dramaturgic theorist attributes to all actors the strategy of staging basic and fundamental qualities [cf. S.L. Messinger, 1968. H. Garfinkel, 1967. J. O'Neill, 1972]. The accused on the other hand has had the natural attitude of everyday life

[A. Schutz, 1953. A. Schutz and T. Luckmann, 1974. J. Heeren, 1970. D.L. Altheide, 1977], disrupted and in order to counter the bewilderment which this engenders and re-establish some sense of order, is required to manufacture a semblance of belonging.

The interactional structure of the court produces 'fitting in' and 'being yourself' as a great problem for the accused. For the magistrates another structural property of the court room situation has predominance in relation to the accused's behaviour. This is: is he being himself or merely acting? Is he sincere or not? Whereas the accused has to establish and maintain his character as an appropriate and moral one, the magistrate has to monitor this activity in relation to the problematic of 'could this man?'. An historical example of this problem has been edited by Foucault [1978], which presents documents concerning three murders carried out by Pierre Riviere in 1835.

The crux of the case was whether Riviere was mad or not. A series of behaviours was assembled which showed that irrationality was a feature of his character. Riviere himself produced a detailed memoir of his circumstances and the events surrounding the murders, which the judge described as being written with " clarity, order, and precision" . Though it would seem that the 'rational' memoir would throw light on the 'real' character of Riviere, it complicated it. He stated that his first explanation for carrying out the murders [" God made me do it"] which was accepted as an indicator of madness by some doctors, was an act. Fontana [1978] summed up this situation by posing the problem which Riviere presented to doctors and judges: " if one is mad and

one pretends to be rational, and if one is rational and one pretends to be mad, which is one in reality?" . Present day magistrates share this problem, though in a different form. They have to take documents and their own perceptions of the accused and use this as evidence of some underlying reality. The problem resides in whether or not to treat behaviour as what it 'seems': does appropriate court room behaviour indicate allegiance to an acceptable moral order, or is it a mask constructed in order to escape punishment?

The accused in court walks a judgemental tight-rope. His behaviour and speech are monitored to assess the form of social order in which his character is grounded. To appear as a moral person, the accused has to engage in the rules of rational discourse which are in operation at the time. He has to use official titles and forms of address in talking to magistrates; his speech has to be clear and concise; in relation to the police he has to use acceptable terms rather than slang; he has to demonstrate his character in answering questions as honest and plausible by offering logical and rational argument; by being calm and not shouting. In doing these things, he has finally to be persuasive. This strategy as a series of acts, places him as belonging in the court; as a 'good' person who shares the form of social order which the court is meant to implement. Yet if his construction of the moral person in court is seen as a construction and the magistrates regard it with doubt, he will formally find himself labelled as an outsider.

POLICE, MAGISTRATES, AND SOCIOLOGY - DECISION MAKING: Harold Garfinkel has proposed that sociology should cease treating the rationalities of science as methodological rules for the

interpretation of human action (1967). Rather he suggests that social situations should be examined im order to account for the presence of such rationalities. Not only is such a direction of thought rare in sociology, but in the work of the police and magistrates such a self-consciousness for the related forms of 'action' and 'inquiry' is absent. Though these three areas of inquiry are different ways of deciding upon the texture of a state of affairs, they are comparable. This is to say that though sociologists, police, and magistrates differ at a practical level, they share fundamental characteristics as theorisers about the world in which they live.

Whereas the substantive ends which police, sociologists, and magistrates seek and the situational means and resources which are available for them to do so differ, the process of reasoning which is employed in accomplishing 'truth', 'justice', and 'fact' can be examined in similar terms. This is to see the professional sociologist's programme extended into areas other than social science. The sociologist has to describe and account for others' actions and knowledge, and cannot avoid working with some conception of rationality. This is equally true for the police and magistrates. An examination of these three groups as comparable theorisers should enable a review of the taken for granted processes in the production of 'truth' and 'justice' and contribute to the re-examination of the common features which sociology shares with other enterprises. These common features are not taken into account by sociology though fundamental to its accomplishment of 'superior' fact.

In order to locate similarities between the reasoning of

the police, magistrates, and sociology it is necessary to examine the various layers of consciousness which fuse and mix together. The most fundamental layer is that which is most commonly shared: the attitude of everyday life. Built onto this corpus of knowledge about interpersonal and interactional relations is a further layer of consciousness which characterises the form of what is 'real' at a particular moment. So for example, the concerns about the world and how that world is seen are different between those who experience chronic paim and those who are homosexual (cf. J.A. Kotarba, 1977. C.A.B. Warren and B. Ponse, 1977). Similarly, the views and relevances which A, B, and C mobilised in court about 'how' the event in question happened were much different than that shared by Roy and myself. Heidegger described these degrees of the representation of reality as "the constancy of the continuous", where the form of reality is produced by a particular kind of representation for itself (M. Heidegger, 1975).

For law and social science this second level of consciousness is concerned with formality and order; they are formality and order. Arising out of this specification of how the world 'is' and how it is to be treated and approached are particular concerns which form both the daily and the ongoing goals and purposes of the theoretic approach to reality (i.e. that which characterises Man). It will be suggested here that within this layer, sociology is concerned with scientific rationalities which are shared at a comparable level by police and magistrates.

The Attitude of Everyday Life: Schutz (1974) described the world of everyday life as "man's fundamental and paramount

reality" , which is taken for granted in the attitude of commonsense. Within this attitude, events and actions are experienced as unquestionable and unproblematic " until further notice" , and the constitution of the world is one of a coherent arrangement of objects within determinate properties. This self-evidency of the daily world is embodied in an assumption that it is essentially the same for all men, both in terms of the experience of objects and consciousness. Because of this, a feature of the natural attitude is its recognition of intersubjectivity; that reality is fundamentally shared. It is assumed in the natural attitude that as knowledge of the experiences of others can be gained, it is just as self-evident that the reciprocal relation holds for the person. Similarly it is assumed that the objects in the world are experienced and held in significance in similar ways. These assumptions are pervasively present in experiences with the police, magistrates, and sociologists, and in the account presented above of my experience of the police and the courts. These assumptions also make it possible for the evaluation of accounts, to see if they 'ring true' as typical descriptions of normal events.

The dominant motive of the natural attitude is pragmatic, where actions follow in accord with personal goals towards modifying reality. At the same time however, because the world is experienced as a natural and existent object, a person's actions themselves can be modified and changed. The understanding and explication of events is based upon a prior corpus of experience and knowledge, so that new situations are faced and brought into relief in their typical character. It is assumed in the natural attitude that this process of explication and understanding is continually

possible through the validation of prior experience and the ability to act upon the world.

The situation of certainty which the natural attitude surveys is bounded by an horizon of indeterminancy, but which in principle it is assumed is capable of explication. This situation comes into actuality once the experienced horizon 'surprises' the already existent corpus of knowledge and calls into question what has previously been taken for granted. The process of resolving the discrepancy between prior and immediate experience is carried out with regard to practical considerations; the job at hand and the discomfort brought about by the discrepancy of knowledge itself are the prime forces for the resolution of conflict. New experience is included into the existent corpus of knowledge by modifying it [e.g. the continual reviewing of the above account in respect of subsequent outcomes], but only to the extent that practical considerations dictate. This means that the explication of some problem is only partial, being suspended until further notice [i.e. until it again becomes relevant].

A consequence of the pragamatic motive is that the knowledge available to the natural attitude is not a logically integrated system. Rather it is opaque. It is directed towards the routinisation of action; towards accomplishing ends again and again. The corpus of knowledge is opaque in this way because the natural attitude has no interest in the transparency of knowledge as such. The natural attitude proceeds to continue accomplishing practical acts and encompass new situations with regard to practical ends, from the standpoint of a series of assumptions about the world. These are: the bodily existence of other people; the sharing of similar consciousnesses; the similarity of experience and

meaning of the world; that communication and action can be carried out with others; that the person can be understood by others; that a natural, historical, social, and cultural world is transmitted as a common frame of reference; and that situations are as a consequence socially, historically, and culturally determined with the individual only creating a small part of it.

The Formal Attitude: The formal attitude corresponds to the attitude of scientific theorising described by Schutz [1953, 1971, 1972], and Garfinkel [1967], though in a form found in other areas of inquiry. For example the theoretic attitude of both the police and magistrates like that of the scientist seeks to follow an interpretive procedure of 'official neutrality'. Unlike everyday life where the actor manages to order events while sustaining a belief in the reality of the world, in the formal attitude actors have no interest in the belief that events and situations are as they appear. A result of this is that those who adopt the formal attitude do not recognise or abide by the normative constraints imposed by social structures, but use an ideal of doubt with regard to those structures [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

A similar situation occurs within the formal attitude in relation to deciding the sense or appropriateness of an explanation. Whereas in the natural attitude it is assumed that actions can affect the person and be affected by his actions, the formal attitude is conceptualised as a withdrawl from involvement. The sociologist, policeman, and magistrate within this attitude can be seen as attending to andmeasuring an event 'as it really is'. Though it is the theorist who acts, the interpretive rules of the formal attitude somehow

are seen to guarantee that the place, value, and disposition of the theorist and his relation to the character of an event are not a part of the process of inquiry. By seeing the sense of their actions through the formal attitude sociologists, policemen, and magistrates are engaged in attempting the dramaturgical process of suspending the relevance of their knowledge and place in the world in relation to the judgements which they make.

The central and most pervasive characteristic of the formal attitude is the attempt at the production of objective, non-indexical knowledge. The process of inquiry is thereby attuned to accomplishing knowledge, results, or findings which can be seen as clear outcomes of fact by Anyone. Deciding what is objective is not seen as being done according to the intersubjectivity of the world and a sharing with others of a common scheme of interpretation. Within the formal attitude decisions about the status of an event or fact should be made according to abstract notions of proper procedure. The actor's part in the process of inquiry is to reveal what a situation is, rather than to have a part in its construction. The resulting outcome of knowledge is therefore not seen as tied to the context of its production, but a 'true' account of what happened which is transparently obvious. It follows that in situations where the formal attitude is employed, notions of secrecy or private knowledge have no place. Interactional relations between the practitioners of formal inquiry are, for them, a public matter.

The public character of formal inquiry can be seen at one level in such things as a marking out from others by specific modes of dress and the use of special titles, where the holder

of the office is approached according to the interactional conventions which that position specifies. Within the theoretic level of the attitude itself, all relevant facts and matters are regarded as 'on the table' and open for use, discussion, and publication. This is in direct contrast to the form of relations which is assumed in everyday life. There the scatter of knowledge is not regarded as universal or public. It is assumed that a gap exists between the knowledge that others have of a person which he attributes to them, and the knowledge which a person has of himself in front of others. This assumption progresses a little further in that it is also assumed that this same disparity of public and private knowledge exists for other individuals with regard to the person. Along with a shared common world there goes an area of non-public knowledge which may be the grounds for action; that is, rather than seeing existent knowledge as producing an action, the everyday theorist searches actions for their meaning; for a display of motives and interests which are not 'on the face of it' available. In the theorising of the formal attitude no such disparity exists. It is taken that for deciding objectivity and matters of fact all knowledge is publicly available; or at least in respect of the formal attitude, publicly available in principle.

Rationality: Everyday life and more specialised branches of inquiry are populated by rational actions. It is a condition of contexted life that some action appear normal and proper, while some other does not. It is the same between domains of knowledge; what is rational to a community of drugtakers may not be to someone outside that community. This itself may be part of a problem of understanding [cf.

K. Stoddart, 1974]. Between different courts and branches of the police force, what is appropriate action or response within one context may be out of place in another. It would seem that as rational action is a feature of being in the world, so is its unequivocal nature. Alfred Schutz listed some meanings of the terms rationality [1953], which have been used by Garfinkel [1967]. This list of rationalities conforms to two distinct groupings which are tied into the contrasting everyday and formal theoretic attitudes. Everyday meanings of the terms rationality may be located within the formal attitude, but the natural attitude of daily life is marked by the absence of formal meanings of rationality.

An everyday understanding of rationality may refer to an examination of one situation in relation to another in terms of typical features or characteristics. Within this meaning a process of comparison and categorising occurs whereby existent types are located within new situations and made deliberate sense of. Or as Schutz has described this meaning [1953], it is " the applicability to a present situation of a recipe which has proved successful in the past" . A further and related meaning of what is rational is the degree of attention which a person pays to the relation between an experience and a theory by which experience is formed as a sensible object. So for example, one situation may be characterised by a high degree of attention to the consistency of an observation while in another,such intensity may be wholly inapprorpiate.

Further concerns with rationality in everyday life may be to do with: the consequences of a decision from among a set of alternatives; the strategy which is adopted in relation to

alternative courses of action and future states of affairs; and a concern for the timing and predictability of a decision. Rationality can also be to do with the rules of procedure under which actions are viewed. For example, abstract talk requires the selection and use of non-partisan or universal rules while group talk [i.e. practical talk] abides by the use of partisan rules. What is rational may refer to both the appropriate selection of a set of rules, and to having a concern for non-partisan rules [e.g. being a 'fair man']. Central to all meanings of the rational is another. This is an awareness of choice, and the grounds from which a choice is made and can be justified. The grounds of choice and the extent to which a decision may be held to be rational may be seen to stem from a rigorous body of knowledge, embody loose or fine characteristics, or may be found through a post hoc examination of the context of an action.

In everyday terms the word rational may mean reasonable, planned, predictable, or likely. All these meanings congregate around or have crucial to them the selective process of choice. Schutz [1953] noted that rational choice can only be accomplished if a person has sufficient knowledge of the goal to be realised and the different means available for this act. This ideal of selection for Schutz had certain implications. It would imply for the person: knowledge of the desired goal in relation to a framework of plans; a knowledge of the interrelations, compatibility, or incompatibility between other goals; knowledge of the consequences of the realisation of the goal; knowledge of all means available for the accomplishment of the goal; knowledge of the interference, consequences, and effects of available means with other goals

and means; and knowledge of how available certain means are.

This situation is further complicated where the ideal of rational choice is adopted as a measure of interactional situations. The person must be aware of right or wrong interpretations of an act, the reactions and motives which an act elicits, and the extent of knowledge about the social world and what rational action consists of which others possess. The rigour of this ideal conceptualisation of rational choice, both as a selective and an interpretive device, contrasts sharply with the accent which is found in everyday life. More properly the ideal of rational action and choice belongs within the formal attitude, and underlies specific strands of meaning which endow events with a specific formal sense of being. The formal attitudes of sociology, police work, and judging others are adorned with specific interests. There is a concern for comparability of an outcome with rules which define proper procedure as a series of means-ends relations. Also concern is with the conceptual and methodological clarity of a body of knowledge and rules of procedure as a task in its own right. Finally, projected actions are required to stem from verifiable assumptions based in and compatible with the formal corpus of knowledge.

A Mode Of Reasoning: The discussion of the natural and formal attitudes and the senses of rationality which attach to them has been necessarily distinct. These 'objects of thought' have been examined as if they were individually occurring phenomena. Is this the case? This question prompts a contexting operation. It requires in the case of the topics under examination the formation of an answer to a variety of situations. Questioning the relation between the natural and

formal attitudes is of sociological interest. Addressing the relation between being a member of daily life and a policeman or magistrate is of topical interest. To look to the connections between being a sociologist and a suspect, between ordinary accounts and sociological accounts of what happened is of reflexive interest; here there is a distinction between a thing being reflexive in terms of interest and an action being reflexive. In the former the question is being posed as to how an account is constructed, while in the second it is to assert that reflexivity is a part of its construction.

Though these interests are highly varied, they come together through the focus of the resourceful texture of theoretic life. Whereas sociological and topical interests are primarily of a practical nature, they gain sense and order from the reflexive assembly work which members do. An attempt to account for the differences between and within these separate interest situations does not require a chain of different answers. Their separation can be found through focusing upon a shared theoretic stance towards events which is used and modified by actors from situation to situation.

Garfinkel [1967] has written that passing between the natural and formal attitudes produces different sets of social order for the actor. Thereby the sociologist may apprehend 'delinquents' as the product of practical decision making [A. Cicourel, 1976], rather than inherently bad or 'plain daft'; a policeman may locate a fight as a Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act rather than a disagreement; and a magistrate look upon a person as a football hooligan rather than a football fan. Such formal categories gain their sense not from the situations in which they are 'seen' to

reside, but from the formal context of examination with its associated forms of rationality. As a result of the kinds of categories and findings which are produced, there is a viable distinction between everyday and formal attitudes. On the other hand, the move from daily member to specialist member does not require a radical reorientation towards the subject matter.

The attitude of daily life is modified by the specific concerns of the formal inquiry. What this means is that both attitudes are in simultaneous use; commonsense models of types of action and actors form the material from which judgements and decisions of what happened and 'really was the case' can be made. Such decisions and judgements however have to pay particular concern to the sense of inquiry; for the production of particular forms of objective, non-indexical meaning in its own right. In this way the 'loose' concern of the natural attitude is transformed. The formal attitude is attuned to locating scientific fact, truth, and justice. At another level the natural and formal attitudes interact. Whereas an event is inquired into according to pre-existing formal properties, the extent to whch this formal inquiry goes is not or need not be strictly controlled by those properties themselves. As a course of action, once the process of inquiry into an event has progressed sufficiently to satisfy the prior stipulations or assumptions of the formal properties, then other material or avenues for investigation may be let pass or glossed over.

It is at this point that the prescriptions of formal inquiry meet the 'good sense' of everyday life. While it may be the case that letting pass pertinent evidence or glossing

details and arguments is a product of inadequate or 'bad' inquiry, it is more genrally a feature of the pragmatic motive of everyday life. Thus even in social science, police work, and judging others there are parameters and degrees of inquiry which are taken to be sufficient or otherwise from a commonsense point of view.

The formal attitude and its attendant concern with rationality has as its central topic the remedial treatment of the topic of indexicality. If this is not explicitly stated, it is certainly the topic within a topic around which the particular inquiry revolves. In everyday terms the occasionality of expressions and scenic particulars is a feature of daily life which need only elicit interest so long as the pragmatic motive remain unfulfilled. Being unconcerned with a form of language which Anyman can understand and attaining objective truth in his inquiries, the daily member uses his activities to accomplish the rational properties of indexical expressions in relation to his practical concerns. For the member inquiring into social topics through the formal attitude, the indexical texture of practical actions and interrelations are a huge probelmatic to the orderly and uniform objective metatheory. When a person does not subscribe to the formal attitude and comes into contact with it, reactions may vary depending upon the kind of situation within which this meeting takes place. For example, reactions towards sociologists collecting data may be treated with little interest at all, or perhaps mild concern for close attention to trivial issues, or even panic if the topic of inquiry is somewhat secretive. In situations which involve the formal attention of the police and magistrates, because of the powers over the person which both groups have, the accused as a daily member [i.e. using the natural attitude]

is forced to pay attention to the ways in which the police and courts operate.

The suspect's interest is both in terms of what will or might happen 'next', and the forms of reasoning and treatment which police and magistrates employ. These two areas of interest are related, for clues or hints towards future developments may be gained from what officers and magistrates do or say. By being in the situation where the formal attitude is in use, suspects have to pay attention to it and the concerns which it displays. Because the concerns of proper procedure, conceptual and methodological clarity, and planned actions based upon verifiable assumptions are sanctionable ideals and stable properties only in the case of situations governed by the formal atttitude [H. Garfinkel, 1967], the suspect experiences something of a 'culture shock'. Actions based in the natural attitude do not have regard for the formal ideals as either stable properties or sanctionable ideals. Yet in dealing with the police and being in court the suspect has to pay attention to such rational properties as a condition not only for deciding what happened but for the possible allocation of punishment to him.

Because the formal attitude, in contrast to the natural attitude, makes use of the principle of unlimited doubt, the suspect experiences bewilderment and a lack of trust in his actions by others and consequently distrusts others' actions. This results in facing the relations and interactions with police and magistrates as anomic patterns of time. Being in the police station and court are crystallised as specific times of unease; as periods of breakdown of daily normative relations, characterised as a loss of belief in the substance of reality

and a lack of a sense of purpose. It may be that the unsafe position which the structural mix of the formal attitude places the suspect in, can only be eased by a lengthy period of familiarity with police practice, legal procedures, and assessing what happened; this is a post hoc review both of the original event and the subsequent experiences. During this period the suspect may be able to orient himself to the procedures of the formal attitude, and thereby appear in court willing and able to demonstrate an attention to matters which display his 'reasonableness'; to present an account of his person, history, and experience which makes his judgements and decisions understandable as normal and appropriate to Anyman.

This description of what can happen to a suspect in his dealings with the police and courts, and the way in which he might begin to establish relations in order that he can have a creative part in the situations, locates a particular mode of reasoning. Moreover, it is suggested that assigning sense in a post hoc manner is a mode of reasoning shared by police, magistrates, and sociologists. For the formal attitude this is an important area, for it is to do with the nexus of ideal properties, formal decisions, and the practical actions of others. Formal decisions must be made about actions, such as who did what or what 'really' was the case, which satisfy the ideal properties of the formal attitude. This means transforming people's actions; they are measured not in their own terms (i.e. as methodic, making situations 'visible'), but according to the rational properties of the formal attitude. This results in a person's actions being viewed and measured in terms of a universal and ideal actor (i.e. the rational man).

Accounts of what happened are in this way compared with

what should have happened if decisions had been made according to rational choice. Yet as suggested by Schutz and discussed above, the ideal of rational choice cannot be found to be a feature of everyday decision making and cannot, as a consequence, be used as a measure or interpretive device of social action by inquiry. It may be more fruitful to look rather to the occasionality of everyday contexts to see just how formal categories are accomplished, rather than imposing these categories without respect to the integrity of social phenomena.

Looking at the suspect's methods for making sense or at the employment of the natural attitude in everyday life as typical of the way in which decision making gets done is to question the accomplishments and findings of the formal attitude. The rational properties to which sociologists, the police, and magistrates subscribe are behavioural ideals. Though they are ideal there nevertheless operates some pragmatic standards of accomplishment: for the sociologist, statistical tests and critical community examination; for the policeman, the 'fit' between organisational rules and actual work practices; and for the magistrate, the satisfaction of legal rules through evidence, documents, and behavioural displays. Though there are these means for satisfying the formal rational properties, it is open to question whether or not the formal attitude stipulates the kinds of decision required in a variety of situations.

It is more the case that situations in which the formal properties are found to be satisfied, are based upon 'irrational' features [i.e. irrational because they are not within the confines of the formal attitude]. So for example, the formal category 'deviance' may be found through methods

such as random choice, using 'hunches' and 'guesses', invoking imagination, and the use of cognitive mock-ups of 'what it is like'. Such features as these are ways and means for approaching the temporal problematic which faces the formal attitude: the reconstruction of the past.

It is clear that the majority of materials with which the police, sociologists, and magistrates are concerned with, have happened already; the topic of inquiry is in the past. This is evident for the police and magistrates in dealing with an event which is referred to them, but applies to sociologists inquiring into existent social formations and structures. Exploring the past has also a stricter meaning, where " actual observation" occurs " at that point where the consciousness of the individual is" . Assembling what happened therefore cannot " draw on the total universe of resources which were successive moments present to the observer" [D. Smith, unpublished]. This means that the details which an inquiry is concerned with [e.g. who did what action, what someone said] are never present, but always in the past.

The police reconstruct the past by documenting an event. Magistrates locate what happened through reading documents and hearing people's stories. The sociologist's account draws on such things as surveys, attitude tests, or recording what people have to say. In doing this reconstruction of history, each group is assigning a legitimate history [i.e. a satisfactory account] to a settled outcome; something is already in existence and a series of connections are established which 'fill in' the past and provide for its production. The practice of assigning legitimate histories may however be taken a step further.

Garfinkel expressed the idea [1967] that in everyday situations of choice whose features are largely taken for granted, decisions are not made as required. He suggests that people engage in retrospectively defining the decisions which were made 'then'. Or as Garfinkel more succinctly states it: " The outcome comes before the decision." . What has this to do with the formal attitude at play in sociology, police work, and judging others? It consists in the possibility that the formal attitude is a programmatic task faced by sociologists, policemen, and magistrates which is essentially satisfied through a form of 'irrational' decision making. The formal attitude instructs its users to see a rational world. In using the formal attitude as a means of inquiry, that inquiry is somehow 'detached' from topical matters in the world. It does not have involved with it such as sexual desire, resentment, infatuation, competition, or fear [cf. J.M. Johnson, 1977]. Yet is it not the case that the rationalities are merely prescribed by the formal attitude, and not a description of what actually occurs?

Over and above this ideal view of formal decision making is one which sees the judgements and decisions of sociologists, policemen, and magistrates being carried out in a manner more like that of daily members. Like everyday members, do not formal theorisers routinely 'come up' with decisions on states of affairs upon which they can institute a course of action prior to or simultaneous with inquiring into such affairs? From this point of view it may be more correct to see the policeman as 'knowing' that he is to make a charge against a person, and then assembling evidence for the charge. Magistrates likewise can be seen as looking upon a suspect as

guilty or innocent before the legal process has been completed. Labelling people according to type in this way marshals documents and evidence according to that type. Amongst sociologists it is conventionally the case that 'tests' of null hypotheses or outlines of projects to be carried out contain well formed ideas about what will be found or 'discovered'. In this view formal outcomes, objective categories, and lists of statistics are produced by a commonsense form of decision making made in relation to the ideals of the formal attitude which require fulfilling in order to achieve 'official' status.

Accounts: Where an account is produced it constructs a way for seeing an event or action; the dialogue of such a report with the reader-hearer states 'see it that way'. In my involvement with the police and the subsequent outcome there were four main forms of account: mine; the police's; those of A, B, and C; and the magistrates'. Subsequently there has been another account: the sociological one presented here.

The sense of the actions which were presented by A, B, and C consisted of two temporally separate understandings. They had to account firstly for their involvement with Roy, and then their involvement with me. This separation of meanings was concretely replicated in the court appearances: A, B, and C appeared at different times as the accused and as witnesses. However this separation of meanings was not a successful strategy in court. My version of the history of the event as 'the apprehension of wrongdoers' depended upon the prior assumption that they were in fact wrongdoers. This 'fact' had already been settled by a court when my case was heard. This meant the problematic was not whether my actions were

legitimate as such, but whether their degree attested to legitimacy. In a similar way, when A and B appeared in court because C had pleaded guilty the question which the magistrates addressed was not whether they were involved, but the extent of their involvement.

My lay account and that which the police provided in the form of a charge and prosecution, assembled the outcome of the events of the Saturday night under different provinces of meaning. Mine presented a version of inescapable involvement in terms of apprehending participants in an attack on another person. The police's account reported my actions as criminal themselves. Yet why did the police fail to present a case against me, even to the extent of not having the 'offensive weapon' in court? This can only be explained in terms of formulating a person according to type and then collecting and assembling evidence to substantiate that typing and the related action as a legitimate one. In constructing that history for use in court however, the police have time to evaluate what the outcome of the presentation might be [i.e. what the situation 'was' when the charge was made]. As a consequence, the original formulation is reviewed; in effect the actions of the night of all those involved are re-examined.

All accounts of the Saturday night fight sought to attribute to a completed series of action a history which would report that series as rational and understandable. By the nature of the situation, that the accounts provided different 'kinds' of history to the series of action, some had to come to be regarded with scepticism and doubt by the police and magistrates. The relation between my lay and professional sociological accounts is conceptualised here as a reflexive

one. In making the scenes which they do observable, they do this in the 'doing'; this is reflexivity. The sociological account in Chapter Six and in this chapter, focus upon the ways in which my lay account was made possible in interaction with the police, magistrates, solicitors, witnesses, and the other accused. It also, as a product of this, discusses reflexive features which have made possible the sociological account itself.

IN CONCLUSION: Without having regard for the ways in which the common social world is constituted, and the inedequacy of 'rational method' for dealing with that world, the formal attitude of theorising can only make limited claims to knowledge about social situations and social actors. The suspect's post hoc analysis of what occurred to him and the assessment of why something was or was not done, concentrates upon the ways in which meaning is established within a social situation and how it changes between situations. The sharing of the mode of post hoc reasoning by police, sociologists, magistrates, and the suspect is subject to a difference of crucial importance not only for understanding social action but for the very act of focusing upon it. The difference is this: the police, magistrates, and sociologists operate from within the comfort of their sense of the orderly world through the formal attitude. Their interest is thereby only of a topical nature. The suspect on the other hand finds himself in an anomic situation which forces him to look to the part played by practical actions and practical circumstances in constituting the settings which they are a part of [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. In short, the suspect is forced to have a reflexive interest in his surroundings.

Professional accounts and decisions by police, magistrates, and sociologists methodically erase the socially theoretic character of the constitution of a meaningful situation. What emerges are coherent and consistent reports, decisions, and outcomes which have only an anomic relation themselves [like the person in the position of the suspect] with social reality. Forms of professional inquiry regard the persons with whom they deal as theoretically unsophisticated. This is not so. What such formal modes of inquiry do disregard are the practical means which they employ to establish and repeat 'professional reports' and 'theoretic sophistication' which lie outside their methodological prescriptions of what constitutes 'rational action'. In relation to this, Chapter Eight will examine a feature of professional theorising which was noted in the discussion of the formal attitude and rationality: the concern which professional theorising has for clarity.

SECTION IV

Theories - Difficulties In The Construction Of Theory

The forgoing sections have dealt primarily with practices located through an examination of specific areas of social life as substantive sociological topics. Throughout them selective and ad hoc instances of professional theorising have been used. However the general feeling towards professional theory which the thesis embraces has largely traded off and assumed the reader's knowledge of sociologically theory and 'what is meant here'. This is not so much a confession of limitation, but a valid observation of how accounts 'get done'. The following Section will focus directly upon professional theorising, and in particular how its accounts 'get done' according to professional ideals.

It is a fundamental assumption here that everyday social practice is by analogy a model of theorising; a version of how theory 'gets done', which has implications for how professional theory operates. As a consequence of this view, professional theory as well as being an icon of belonging to a specific form of life can itself be regarded as an instance of social practice given that it is in, shares, and seeks to understand the social world. The specific problems which professional theory addresses can be examined in order to see the relation between the particular, theoretical concerns and the means by which these concerns are taken to be accomplished. It must be stressed that this approach is not the same as a formal, methodological examination. It is rather an examination of the shared grounds which enable the accomplishment of professional theory which is generally taken to be outside its formal prescriptions and categories.

Because professional theory attends to its own ideals and accomplishes them for all practical purposes through unrecognised grounds, it is a further argument here that its attainments are illusory and transformational. They are illusory because what is 'being shown' in a reading depends upon 'going along' with the taken for granted auspices that are occasioned, but which are not the only possible version of 'what happens'. Further, they are transformational because the purpose of professional theory is ideal in its own terms: encapsulation of all knowledge according to scientific principles. Theoretical inquiry is thus not directly concerned with an examination and description of 'things' themselves, but with the ordering of phenomena in terms of professional, theoretical categories. Much like the adult in interaction with the child described in Section II, the professional theorist depends upon but at the same time is undone by shared, everyday social practices. The professional theorist's world is not a separate reality, but a version - granted it is different in substance - of everyday life and its assumptions, constructions, and neglects.

The features of everyday, practical reasoning located in the above sections can be regarded as an example of the means whereby professional theorists are able to orient themselves towards a 'subject matter' in a particular way. This is for the everyday, practical member and the professional theorist to consent together to present a situated version of events without concern for the ways in which such a version is constituted. All that is known by each - and for professional sociology they consist of one and the same person - is that it is constituted 'in some way'. Having constituted reality in common with others, the professional theorist can then proceed to reconstitute this pregiven 'data'

according to his particular, professional concerns.

It is with respect to this constitution and reconstitution that the chapters of Section IV are concerned. The first part of the Section is an exposition of professional theorising's ideal of clarity in relation to the indexicality of actions and utterances. T.S. Kuhn's Postscript to his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" is taken as an occasion for the examination of this topic. Kuhn's inclusion of the Postscript to his original work amounts not only to his stated concern to combat previous criticisms, but a further attempt to accomplish clarity. The instructions which Kuhn presents on how to address, locate, and 'see' clarity in a piece of professional theorising – his own – are demonstrated. Kuhn's remedial formulations in his Postscript show that as an ideal of doing professional theorising, clarity becomes a problem of accomplishment. This is because its attainment depends upon overcoming the occasionality of everyday constructions, while using and being a part of those self-same constructions. Because the accomplishment of the ideal of clarity cannot be granted by a 'being outside' social life, it is a problem which can be satisfied only for all practical purposes. The dynamic behind seeking its accomplishment is another ideal of professional theorising: the superiority of professional theory's knowledge. Through natural language and its practices, professional theorising seeks to accomplish its locutions as clearer than those of everyday life. In doing this, professional theory has necessarily to differentiate between structural realities and in this constructive way place a specific value on the knowledge which members to those realities produce. In other words, in seeking to establish the perspicacity of its knowledge as a superior accomplishment professional theorising has to confine other forms of reasoning to an inferior

position.

The second part of Section IV takes the superiority of knowledge as a topic and examines it in relation to Plato's dialectic. This is in order to locate the texture of its possible accomplishment. Is professional theorising superior per se, or is it a social accomplishment? The ideals of clarity and superiority are obviously related. In order to accomplish the structural division between knowledges, professional theory must demonstrate a concern for the clarity of its insights and methods. Within this relation the ideals founder upon a disparity between the adopted formal methods, the outcomes of theorising, the phenomenon of indexicality, and the situatedness of each particular theorising. The ideals of professional theorising can only be attended to and attained within a non-ideal situation. The methods for their attainment, however, are social and shared and by definition unclear, contexted, elliptical, and above all reflexive. The final part of the Section involves the examination of this central problematic for all formal social inquiry: that professional theorisers are themselves constituent members of the social scenes which they seek to present.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PROBLEM OF CLARITY

> theory is essential to practice, to the forms of practice that it helps to birth or to grow, as well as to the practice it is the theory of. But the transparency of this sentence is not enough; we must also know its titles to validity, so we must pose the question: what are we to understand by theory, if it is essential to practice?
> [L. Althusser, 1977. His emphases.]

> It is clear...that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes.
> [P. Feyerabend, 1978. His emphases.]

INTRODUCTION - THEORY: The previous chapters of this thesis on sexual contact, children and adults, and the police have all been concerned to demonstrate the theoretic nature of practical life. In the latter part of the thesis we are

concerned with the exact reverse; the other side of the coin. This is the practical nature of the act of theorising. It is to demonstrate that and how theorising is irremediably enmeshed in social practice.

The use of the world theory is common, and it varies in application from loose to fine meanings. In everyday situations this usage may approximate to a relatively unexplicated notion or idea, while in the methodological language of science it may refer to a system of explicated thoughts or the abstract principles of a subject. Inherent to the topic of theory itself is the theme of speculation rather then practice (i.e. conjuring up new ideas rather than producing socially structured conceptions). Theory produces new ideas in a realm separate from those mundane actions which are socially organised. Its development is viewed as independent of society.

Alan Blum(1974) has described the production of theory as the attempt to voice the experience of thought. The theory begins from "the Oneness of Being" which lies beneath men's mutual and common orientations. Blum's view of theory is clearly at a metaphysical level. At the other extreme is Ernest Nagel's approach (1971) to social action. Social phenomena for Nagel have a comparable theoretical status with concepts in natural science and can be systematically organised to reveal regularities. The build up of such knowledge into social theory stems from the process of discovery via controlled inference that something is a sign of something else. This process is seen as statable in the form of propositions which can be verified.

Harold Fallding (1971) has made the distinction between

'true' theory which is explanatory [which Nagel see as 'scientific method'], and theory in terms of sociology which he sees at a stage of developing concepts about the world. This means that sociology is in the pre-scientific process of producing analytical theory and not explanatory theory about empirical events. Parsons' work is cited by Fallding as an example of analytical theory, and this is a description which Parsons himself endorses. He has written [1970] that he has intended to produce a systematic theory, by which he means a " logically articulated conceptual scheme" which neither attempts to codify available empirical knowledge or to critically evaluate work on theory construction. Rather, Parsons' conceptual scheme depicts a prison of constraints upon the social actor. The societal norms of Parsons' systematic theory are seen as being internalised by the actor, who as a consequence is constrained by them [cf. B. McSweeney, 1973]. Parsons' systems theory occupies a position between Blum and Nagel; it seeks to avoid idealism brought about by unrestrained theorising and the rigorous emphasis on objectivity stemming from scientific method.

Blum and Nagel represent the two extremes of emphasis with regard to speculation in sociology: the free reign of theoretical thought and the concentration upon the verification of theory through method. Though radically different, these two types of approach share the limitation that they do not examine the texture or constitution of what is given as 'real'. In particular by concentrating upon either 'the essence' of reality in a metaphysical sense or the universality of scientific method as a pregiven structure for interpretation, the sense of particular realities and the consequences of

actions within them are lost (cf. A. Gouldner, 1973). Particular realities are transformed, and this is a function of the theorist's situation.

What is this situation, and how does the act of theorising take place? These questions have largely been ignored, though some sociologists have taken to examining what are in fact sociology's conditions of production (cf. H. Garfinkel, 1967. J. O'Neill, 1972. A. Gouldner, 1973. D. Walsh, 1977. P. Filmer et al, 1972). Barnes (1974) has noted that the majority of sociologists ignore the question of theory production, which he describes as "a difficult and highly constrained process" which is related to cultural factors and "innate gifts". Yet acknowledging that theories stem from specific backgrounds and are formulated by more or less talented people goes no further in approaching how theorising gets done. It draws attention to contingencies surrounding theorising, but does not touch upon the process of the production of theory itself.

This activity presents a fundamental problem for scientific sociology; on its accomplishment depends the attainment of 'science', yet this attainment is negated if the very activity of the accomplishment of theorising cannot be described. Such a description depends on pointing to the methods used in generating knowledge of social behaviour. However theory and method are interdependent. Phillips (1973) has described this dilemma as "a viscious circle". What is known about social action (i.e. theory) depends upon the methods which are available; the methods for the generation of knowledge depend upon existing knowledge of social action. For Phillips the problem consists in that to formulate 'better' theories of

social action 'better' methods are needed; and to formulate 'better' methods more theoretical developments are required. Unfortunately Phillips does not offer a solution to this circle, opting for the production of further, more radical theories.

From the present point of view, it should be noted that Phillips presents the dilemma as a problem in search of a solution. Let us consider it as an inherent contradiction in the act of theorising. In this context, just to raise the question of how theorising is done, is to challenge the ideal of the enterprise. What becomes clear is that sociological theory and method are not engaged in a clear-cut, explicated relation. Viewing this not as a problem for the accomplishment of sociological theory, but as a condition of it [i.e. theorising consists of it as an activity], produces an interest in how particular pieces or formations of what can be called 'theory' hold that position. In this formulation, theorising is an activity which proceeds according to a socially organised programme of practices which produce knowledge. Whatever subject is focused upon, the phenomena are set within this normative order and can only be understood and made sense of in terms of it [D. Walsh, 1977].

This view has interesting associations. It means that in terms of the accomplishment and understanding of forms of social phenomena, professional sociology and those who inhabit the multiple realities which characterise everyday life are engaged in similar activities. Also, where someone is engaged in the act of understanding [and thereby methodic, practical theorising], they are faced with the task of interpreting language which distinguishes the particular form of theorising.

This is because of the features of indexicality and reflexivity.

In order to more deeply address the question of how an act of theorising is accomplished, the Postscript to T.S. Kuhn's 1974 edition of " The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" will be examined. There are three interrelated themes in this examination. Firstly, the points which Kuhn makes in his Postscript are regarded critically as a response to the epistemological problem produced by the ideals of description and theorising to which he subscribes; seeking a definite, objective, recognisable ground for his model of the way in which science works. Secondly, the Postscript will be examined as a social document in order to highlight the difference between what Kuhn claims to be doing and the unaccounted for methods which enable this. The interrelation of these two features results in describing Kuhn's Postscript as an act of theorising which is itself an interesting and examinable topic, whereby a remedial programme for the attainment of the ideal of clarity is instituted.

It must be stressed from the outset that the examination of Kuhn's work is not an antagonistic one. Though the observations which are made upon his philosophy of science may present a 'fresh' way of looking at Kuhn's perspective, the concern here is not so much to contribute to the corpus of knowledge on scientific practice, but to that on method. In this sense Kuhn is used as a means for a cathartic exercise which attempts to reveal the bases whereby theorists, writers, and readers attain a form of understanding.

The topic around which Kuhn's Postscript is organised is not an arbitrary one. He is concerned with " gratuitous difficulties and misunderstandings" , which he seeks to

eliminate. The Postscript can thus be described as a programme for the attainment of clarity, and examined with regard to how it institutes and organises this programme. We must begin our examination of this programme with the original text of "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions"; the point of departure of Kuhn's attempt at self-clarification.

A SUMMARY OF PARADIGM ANALYSIS: In "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", Kuhn uses the idea of shared paradigms. These commit the practitioners of science to agreement; sharing the same ideas and standards of scientific practice. The structure of science as a universal reality and in its sub-realities is specified by a dialectic which provides for anomaly, crisis, discovery, and change.

Kuhn recognises various definitions of the word 'paradigm'. In effect he has paradigm referring to various instances of scientific practice. Paradigm refers to the list of beliefs, values, and techniques common to the practitioners of a science. It also refers to the concrete puzzle-solutions which have a place in that list. Further, Kuhn recommends the use of the term "disciplinary matrix" as a remedy for the various meanings of the term. A disciplinary matrix is made up of all those components and objects of the scientific community's commitment. Such a list consists of: symbolic generalisations and techniques; shared commitment to beliefs; values which provide for a sense of community; concrete problem - solutions as exemplars, the difference between sets of which accounts for the community fine-structure of science.

Scientific research is based upon a paradigm. Researchers who share that paradigm are committed to the same standards and rules of practice. The "genesis and continuation of a

particular research tradition", which is styled as "normal science" (pII, I974), depends upon the sharing, commitment, and consensus produced by a paradigm. As a science's paradigm specifies and prescribes the 'things' which are to stand as problems for that science, normal scientific research consists of providing solutions to those problems (p24, I974).

The process of change between paradigms is instituted by an awareness of anomaly (pp52-53, I974); that in nature there exist structures of conditions not specified by normal science. Im such times of crisis, the practice of science shifts to accommodate the new-found peculiarity. Problems and normal science are related by networks of conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological commitments. These networks constitute a relation such that they inform practitioners of the state of the world and of science itself. These networks form a taken for granted basis from which to do scientific work. Though they provide scientific practitioners with rules of procedure, they do not specify everything that scientists have in common. The idea of a paradigm locates the source of a research tradition im normal scientific practice.

Rules are specified by paradigms, but in the absence of rules of practice, research can still be guided by a paradigm (p42, pII, I974). As Kuhn states it: "Rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rules.". With anomaly, crisis specifies the need to 'get the practice right' such that there is a concentration upon the rules of practice (p47, I974).

Anomaly is closely related to discovery. This displays the following typical structure: an awareness of anomaly; the emergence of conceptual and observational recognition of that

anomaly; and changes within the categories of normal science to which practitioners may display resistence [p62, 1974]. As a consequence of anomaly and discovery, theory change is required. There is large-scale paradigm fragmentation and moves in the problems and techniques of normal science [pp67-68, 1974]. Such changes of paradigm and theory are the result of judgements made by practitioners which involves the comparison of paradigms with nature and with each other [p77, 1974]. In this framework the process and development of science cannot be by articulation and the extension of knowledge. The development of science here becomes one of the reconstruction of the taken for granted auspices of the enterprise from new fundamentals. This results in the change of what were the most elementary propositions, generalisations, paradigm applications, and methods [pp84-85, 1974].

PARADIGM AS AN ANALYTIC METAPHOR: Kuhn's concept of paradigm in its original form must be seen not as a precise definition of a specific phenomenon but as an analytic metaphor; as a decoding device. To treat Kuhn's use of the word paradigm as an analytic metaphor is not to elucidate the features of 'concrete' formations, but to see it as a describing device which enables the user to engage with certain features in a somewhat new and different way.

Kuhn has been criticised [cf. M. Masterman, 1970. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 1970] for his ambiguity and lack of clarity. Rather than take this merely as a criticism, it can be asked how such a problem arises. What does it consist of? A central concern in the genesis of clarity as a problem is the relation between the theorist and his subject with regard to time. So for example, Kuhn uses paradigm as an

analytic metaphor to gloss the temporal nature of the processes he examines. Even small movements of history present dilemmas of 'objectivity' to those who study and document them; a study which occurs in everyday life as well as professional life. The unordered and problematic nature of action requires that people focus upon it in an attempt to obtain order, clarity, and objectivity; in order to make sense. However, apart from the difficulties in objectifying change, social investigation has a structure which makes the 'thing-like' treatment of its subjects peculiarly problematic. This structure is a relation between different phenomenal levels of investigation.

When one 'goes along' with Kuhn, topics are addressed in a specific way. For example, asking whether sociology is governed by a 'mature' paradigm or not. Being involved in framing questions about people's activities from this particular position, consists of the different phenomenal levels of investigation. There is firstly the level of the topic under investigation; this can be said to consist of members' descriptions of this level. Secondly there is the level of investigation characterised by the theorist's taken for granted assumptions and background; these play a part in specifying the parameters of an investigation (i.e. the relevant areas of concern). It would seem to be obvious that these two levels are not independent of each other. The ground level of people's descriptions is filtered through the theorist's initial understanding (just like 'another' member of a situation), and professional, conceptual concerns. The levels of the subject and the investigation are in a most intimate relation; this unspecified linkage is an essential proprty for the production of 'results' and conclusions, and

constitutes a third level of investigation which is coextensive with the production of 'findings'.

These levels of concern which are involved in the theorist's investigation can be expanded. Firstly, as already noted, there is time and history; as a condition of making sense all members engage in documenting some version of reality. Involved within this level is settled knowledge about the past which stands as a resource for interpretation. For each particular involvement of a person [whether everyday member or theorist], there exists knowledge of the types of situations, investigations, and methods which may possibly be available in particular cases.

A further and related level is that of knowledge of everyday life and social structures. Through their linguistic practices people 'know' and find their way around situations, and in this methodic process constitute them. Between historical and everyday knowledge there is an intermeshed engagement. Within this involvement, through historically constituted knowledge of linguistic practices, methods, systems of relevancies, and expectations, the typical nature of different situations and actions is produced. The accomplishment of this form of understanding takes place on a further level which is a concern for the theoriser's investigation: context.

Any context of interaction provides the observation that the course of its structure and constitution 'belongs' to other people as well as to the individual. Any 'conclusions' which a person constructs as to the nature or typical character of a context is thereby the result of an interplay between already held and constituted knowledge and the actions and utterances of other people. In this there is an almost

constant interchange between existent knowledge and context, causing a subsequent review within that corpus. The accomplishment of understanding a particular context is thus carried out through an assembled corpus of knowledge; and this understanding results in changing that corpus; and so on.

These related though different levels of concern for a theoriser's investigation can be illustrated in relation to Kuhn:

	Members' Level	Findings	Analyst's Level
Context	Specific scientific activity-topic.	Paradigm: the state of the community; the maturity, beliefs, values, exemplars, and puzzles of the community.	Specific investigative activity-topic.
History	Pre-scientific knowledge; the history of the community as taught and documented; members' personal knowledge.	Pre-scientific [pre-paradigm]; the specific values, techniques, beliefs, and exemplars of a science as specified by historical development and examined in retrospect.	Pre-investigative knowledge of 'this type of analysis'.
Everyday Knowledge	Members' knowledge of everyday life and social structures.		The analyst's knowledge of everyday life and social structures.

The vertical levels in this diagram are, in actual situations, integrally enmeshed together. The theorist has the problematic of disentangling them in order to produce what his system of relevancies defines as useful findings and conclusions. One idea of this sorting process is the location of the constituent features of the selected topic. In this case, the horizontal 'findings' and 'members'' levels of the diagram should replicate one another. The vertical 'analyst's level' should be in a statable form in order that its relation

to the other levels can be assessed. The 'findings' are the conclusions of a syllogism; the analyst's theory constitutes the premises and the 'members'' level the conditions under which they must apply.

In fact however, theorising is in far from this ideal state. The underlying basis of everyday knowledge which both the studied member and the theoriser share in some sense is in Kuhn's work ignored. The position found by cross-matching 'findings' and 'everyday knowledge' is left unexamined and unstated. It is only through the shared methods and practices at the level of everyday life that the theorist [Kuhn] can produce the level 'findings'. Further, as readers it is only through the methods and practices located in the 'everyday' level that the 'findings' level can be examined as sensible achievements and productions. This reading however requires supplementing with regard to the particular contextual form of language employed [e.g. talking in terms of paradigm analysis]. Everyday knowledge, specified in particular by the context, arms the theoriser [Kuhn] with a set of propositions with which to view his subject [science]. Events within the subject are understood and transformed through this resource; they are assembled according to Kuhn's formally stipulated theoretic perspective via unrecognised and unexamined means.

CLARITY: The work of Garfinkel [1967] has shown the importance of the idea of reflexivity. Given that the sense of an utterance or statement depends upon where and when it was provided, who its author was, and its serial placement, it is reasonable to suggest that professional theorists should experience 'clarity' as a problem. Because of the constancy of the indexical nature of language and action, the concern

with clarity for professional theory is ever present; there is a tension between the ideals of social science and the resources through which these must be attained.

Two programmatic concerns for professional theorists in the face of this situation can be recognised. Firstly, strict frameworks of procedure for operating upon the world can be devised and adopted. Secondly, theorising can be ordered not through using an uncompromising model of operation, but through a conceptual reorganisation of the experiential world. This latter approach recognises what the former uses but does not recognise: that to produce accounts theorists must at the outset 'know' the settings in which they are to operate, and that the form of this knowledge derives from the social practices through which these settings are experienced.

Theorists' language and their social practices are grounded in and are derived from the structures of practical action in everyday life. This is taken for granted within professional theory, though methods are employed which seek to warrant the authority of conclusions and findings. Durkheim for example, as well as providing rules for viewing action [e.g. treat social facts as things], held that it was only through sociological training that social life could be fully understood. A professional ideology of theorising requires that the theoriser must be seen as stepping outside the social world in order to understand it [E. Durkheim, 1964].

In perennially relying upon the essential reflexivity of language, theorists have to attempt and accomplish for all practical purposes the antithesis of the very properties which they make use of and experience through their work. The possibility of science, or the study of what Durkheim called

"the objective reality of social facts" (I964), fully depends upon the transformation of the indexical properties expressed in language, into objective formations. The reliance of theorists' constructs upon the reflexive organisation of settings, means that practices have to be used which are located outside the formal ideal of theorising; they are in a sense, the very features which this ideal seeks to transform. Faced with these problematics, and in conjunction with their ideals, theorists have a course of social reorganisation 'forced' upon them. Either they abandon their concern for understanding the social world, or they seek to clarify that world and thereby reach understanding of its constitution.

KUHN'S POSTSCRIPT: In his Postscript, Kuhn seeks to "articulate the intuitive notion of community" which underlay his original work (pI76, I974). Kuhn attempts to present the ideas of community which he used in producing his original work, and to show how that idea is intuitively linked in with and helps to constitute scientific practice. In this second sense, the paradigm linked and intuitive notion of community enables practitioners of science to have a full yet unstatable basis of knowledge. It permits them to operate without being dependent upon articulated rules (pI9I, I974). For example, scientific problems are solved by analogy. Kuhn notes that it is tempting to regard such a process as being located in the use of rules (ppI89-I90, pI94, I974). He states that this temptation results "because our seeing a situation as like ones we have encountered before must be the result of neural processing, fully governed by physical and chemical laws." (pI94, I974). Via neural processing and programming, actions can be interpreted without scientists and presumably others

being aware of how that interpretation functions. In retrospect, these accomplishments are then regarded as if done-in-accord-with-a-rule.

This view makes it possible for Kuhn to say that once a recognition of similarity has been done and learned it becomes a 'natural process': " as fully systematic as the beating of our hearts" [p194, 1974]. In this outlook recognition is involuntary and cannot be " properly conceived" as having its source in the use of rules. Any reliance on rules involves different applications: mistakes; possible perversions of them; ignoring rules at will; disobeying them; having 'fun' or playing about with them.

Acts of recognition, because they are involuntary in the way Kuhn conceives of them, cannot have the properties of rules. They cannot be mistakenly applied, experimented with, or broken. For Kuhn they have a stable character across situations. For example, Kuhn notes that the history of scientific discovery displays the characteristic of theory change and goes further to say that there is evidence that this is built into the nature of the perceptual process [p36, 1974]. In relation to this, forms or acts of recognition have a stability which is difficult to shift and reorient [p64, 1974].

There is clearly a relation between acts of recognition and rules. For Kuhn, rules are applied retrospectively after an act of recognition; the perception of a sensation. Interpretation is an exercise of choice among alternatives which comes after and distinct from perception. The process of interpretation is based by Kuhn in neural processes which " are therefore governed by the same physico-chemical laws that govern perception on the one hand and the beating of

our hearts on the other." [p195, 1974. His emphasis.]. To maintain the stable and involuntary nature of acts of recognition, Kuhn states that there is " no reason to suppose" that the neural apparatuses of perception work in the same way in interpretation. Though there are differences among views this is not due to differences in perception, which is involuntary and stable, but in interpretation. This is an opposition to the view which regards perception as an interpretive process; Kuhn wants to deny analysis which has it that perception is an unconscious version of what is done after acts of recognition [i.e. for Kuhn, perception proper] [p195, 1974].

The incommensurable viewpoints of the different community members which Kuhn talks about [p198, 1974] can be resolved he says through their recognition of themselves as different language-community members]p201, 1974]. Here the resolution of communication breakdown is by translation [p202, 1974]. This is facilitated by features of nature itself; the stimuli which impinge on members of different communities are 'the same'; the neural apparatuses of those members, no matter how differently programmed, are 'the same'; because such communities share a common history, neural programming must be more or less 'the same'. Given these features of nature, it is possible for different community languages to be translated enabling a change of community affiliations.

For Kuhn, perceiving changes stimuli to sensations via the neural apparatuses employed which contain past experience. This, as an " appropriately programmmed perceptual mechanism" can perform as a functional pre-requisite for interpretation and be transmitted through history. The number of such

mechanisms however is limited, due to the fact that it is only those which are useful and functional which survive [pp195-196, 1974]. These mechanisms have the characteristics of knowledge in that: they are transmitted through time; have been found to be effective; and are subject to change [p196, 1974]. One characteristic however is lacking; these mechanisms are not available for examination; there is " no direct access to what it is we know, no rules or generalisations with which to express this knowledge." [p196, 1974]. If one were to attempt access to these mechanisms this would be through rules which would refer to objects [stimuli] and not feelings [sensations]. Furthermore, these objects can only be known through elaborate theory [p196, 1974]. Kuhn concludes that in the absence of such a theory, " the knowledge embedded in the stimulus-to-sensation route remains tacit" [p196, 1974].

Kuhn's discussion establishes a difference between acting in the world and receiving it. By having perception as stable and general, Kuhn can institute it as underlying his production of the original text and integrally running through and common to all the various communities which he references. As a remedial formulation this should then enable Kuhn's text to be read in a different way [more clearly], and make more observable the situation which he seeks to describe.At the same time the stress on the neural basis of paradigms offsets the relativism implicit in the original text; even if the content of paradigms differs, their genesis is universal to the neural condition. Remedially Kuhn accounts for differences of viewpoint through a general and shared level of perception which allows relative viewpoints to be dissolved.

This approach can be represented diagrammatically:



Before discussing the above model of Kuhn's perceptual process, it may be interesting to present his idea of the process of change within science:



These models bear a striking resemblance to one another. There is a 'state of the individual'. This results in a person being programmed for certain eventualities such as doing normal science, and seeing in a community way. In the event of being faced with a problem [e.g. something not 'seen' before] or an anomaly [e.g. something not specified or expected], recourse in both cases is to a form of resolution through discovery; that a new and different set of ideas enable a problem to be accommodated at a level of belief within the scientific community and the individual.

These models of Kuhn's approach towards perception and

change in science are not only similar; they are linked. Inherent in the idea of paradigm development and change is the intuitive notion of community. Any change or development in paradigms involves a subsequent change in the intutive notion of community via the model of perception. Similarly, changes and developments brought about through acts of recognition of anomaly through the model of perception, require reviews in the model of science.

In order to avoid confusion, it must be pointed out that these statements are being made in relation to what Kuhn has to say in his Postscript, and brackets exactly what it is that scientists actually do. Given this, it can be suggested that as a methodic consequence of his overall perspective and as a condition for its survival [to some extent], Kuhn requires scientists to act according to his assembled observations. For the sake of the continuation and use of paradigm analysis, those actors involved must possess the perceptual features suggested by Kuhn.

Turning to Schutz [1953], he stated that each person considers himself at the centre of his world. Every actor assembles this world around him according to his own interests. In the pursuit of professional knowledge and theory however, a change is brought about in the structural perceptual position. The inquirer has to put the subject of his interest at the centre of this world. As a consequence of this shift of point of view, the theoriser replaces observed people with puppets which are created and manipulated by him. It is this situation in an acute fashion, in which Kuhn finds himself in his Postscript.

Schutz can be quoted on this process of puppeteering, as

a comment upon how Kuhn has proceeded: "He observes certain events as caused by human activity and he begins to establish a type of such proceedings. Afterwards he co-ordinates with these typical acts, typical actors as their performers. He thus ends up by constructing personal ideal types which he imagines as having consciousness." (1953). Schutz makes a further comment pertinent to Kuhn's model of perception when he states that such a construct is a model of a conscious mind without the ability of spontaneity and without free will. It can be objected that Kuhn does not determine his actors' actions in this strict way by the introduction of a laxity in terms of tacit and taken for granted knowledge (p19, p44, p191, 1974). However where Kuhn speaks of the tacit and the taken for granted he references the intuitive. This usage according to the position it occupies in a stable model of perception, takes away from these terms their social nature which is produced by people in and through situations.

If one were to attempt to attach a label to the underlying conceptual base which Kuhn attempts to articulate in the Postscript, perhaps the most suitable would be some form of social behaviourism. This is because Kuhn orders his theorising in terms of the reduction of social phenomena; he locates 'overt behaviour' as stemming from stimulus and response situations. Such an approach fails to accommodate the character of the social world: its meaningfulness (cf. D. Walsh, 1972a).

UNDERSTANDING PARADIGM ANALYSIS: RULES FOR READING: In "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" and the Postscript Kuhn is quite obviously presenting a set of propositions about the concrete world of scientists. The accuracy or factuality of these propositions is not as such in dispute here. Rather

concern is with how Kuhn constructs and constitutes this set of propositions; with how they can come to be seen to be a sensible corpus of knowledge; with the methodicity that is employed as a means to assembling paradigm analysis as a viable way of looking at things. Though this is not to counter Kuhn's claims with an alternative argument in an attempt to replace it, an examination of the means used for the construction of a specific reality does have consequences for his views on another level.

In order for interpretation and understanding it is essential that the participants in some situation or enterprise talk the same kind of language, in order to mobilise specific and occasioned methods for the all-practical-purposes remedy of indexicality. As Schutz has described the situation to be faced from the perspective of the person: " Our knowledge remains incoherent, our propositions occasional, our future uncertain, our general situation unstable." [1953]. Whereas in everyday life the remedy of indexicality is occasioned and for-all-practical-purposes only, theorising and inquiry suggest and promise the complete remedy of indexicality; the substitution of objective for indexical expressions and particulars [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

Like all would-be social scientists - O'Neill has called the study of people " a human pastime with pretensions to science" [1972] - Kuhn is faced with this problem of remedy and substitution, and his Postscript can be seen as a further attempt to attain this. In order to see this, Kuhn's reaction to apparent difficulties [criticisms] with his original work can be examined. For example, Kuhn writes of " locating a particular community of specialists by <u>techniques</u>" , of

" isolating" such communities, and articulating " the intuitive notion of community" [p183, p176, 1974]. If these suggestions are taken seriously, they have the following consequence: Kuhn presents instructions on how to regard scientists' practice; and with instructions of how to understand [read] what he is writing.

The instructions and observations drawn from Kuhn's work and listed here, constitute normative prescriptions for seeing scientific practice. This is not in the sense that 'good' scientific work is done'so', but that scientific practice should be regarded 'so'; and that they are to be seen as concrete descriptions of that practice. There is a duality of effect in such a list of instructions, which is an indicator of a pervasive feature of language: such instructions manage to prescribe a social world while claiming to be description. This testifies to the reflexivity of language. A requirement to provide further instructions in order that one should be 'more fully', 'properly', or 'completely' understood [e.g. a Kuhnian Postscript], provides an instance of the fallability of remedial constructs and the central concern for the ideal of clarity.

Below are a list of rules drawn from Kuhn which have been constructed. It will be indicated how they provide for a problem of clarity as contexted utterances. In this list of rules, the constituting and stratifying element is contained within brackets. The prescriptive-descriptive guise is outside the brackets:

1: [In its situated use] 'paradigm' is [to be read as] 'collection', 'exemplar', 'disciplinary matrix'.

2: [In its situated use] 'patadigm-etc.' is [to be read

as] 'that which the members of the community share' [p176, 1974].

3: [In its situated use] 'community' is [to be read as] 'those who share a paradigm' [p176, 1974].

4: [In its situated use] 'community characteristics' is [to be read as] 'not being able to be grasped without reference to the shared paradigm' [p178, 1974].

5: [In its situated use] 'transitions of paradigm' is [to be read as] 'moves towards maturity and changes in the nature of paradigm' [p179, 1974].

6: [In its situated use] 'normal science' and 'revolutions' are [to be read as] 'community based activities' [p179, 1974].

7: [In its situated use] 'analysis of paradigm-directed and paradigm shattering events' are [to be read as] 'the work of locating those groups responsible enough to facilitate analyses' [p180, 1974].

8: [In its situated use] 'scientific communities' is [to be read as] 'being isolated without prior recourse to paradigm' [p176, 1974].

9: [In its situated use] 'paradigm' is [to be read as] 'being discovered in the behaviour of community members' [p176, 1974].

The elements of the list of rules outside the brackets are, on the face of it, remarks upon the practice of science and scientists. However an examination of this list shows that there are certain features and properties which are problematic. Rule 1 gets its sense from the underlying structure of rules. Rule 2 states that a paradigm is what a community shares, and Rule 4 that common characteristics cannot be grasped without reference to the shared paradigm. It is further stated that normal science and revolutionary activities for science are

based in communities (Rule 6). Transitions are moves towards maturity and in the nature of paradigms (Rule 5). Yet Rule 8 states that communities should be isolated without reference to paradigms. Rule 3 specifies the paradigm defined nature of reading 'community'. Rules 7 and 9 specify the temporal nature of investigation in relation to scientists' practice, where paradigms should be located in members' behaviour (Rule 9) after those members' community has been located via Rules 3 and 8.

Circularity is involved here. Kuhn recommends the correct methodological practice of 'locating' a community and then 'discovering' a paradigm. Yet this process is predicated upon 'community' already being defined and specified by that paradigm. The specification of the community by theorisers and the subsequent discovery of the paradigm is, as described by Kuhn, an elliptical process. It could be suggested here that Kuhn is involved in separating out his argument too much, which results in this circular logic. However, Kuhn's way of attempting to specify how to locate communities and paradigms may not be so trivial; and nor may the circularity of his argument. What Kuhn attempts to do in the Postscript is to state how to recognise paradigms and communities. This involves documenting the means and methods available for perception and interpretation (i.e. that which Kuhn writes about in relation to scientists' practice), to Kuhn and others doing paradigm analysis. Yet because Kuhn does not recognise the constitutive nature of language in forming relations of meaning, but rather adopts a 'scientific' stance of vague to-be-discovered physico-chemical laws, he cannot recognise what he has stumbled upon.

In short, the task Kuhn sets himself in clarifying his earlier position is the documentation of the methodic way for the constitution of 'seeing' paradigms. This requires that he become interested in the taken for granted ways in which he approaches and mundanely analyses the materials with which he is associated. If Kuhn were to become interested in this dimension of inquiry, rather than being disinterested, he would ultimately focus upon the incarnate expressiveness of language and its inherent reflexivity. Further, it is a feature of language which is being dealt with in the examination of the rules drawn from Kuhn.

These rules present a programme for the attainment of clarity. They seek to attain an agreement from the reader; that Kuhn's propositions are for-all-practical-purposes an adequate and warrantable portrayal of events. The accomplishment of this agreement is crucial for the location of Kuhn's 'description' in concrete settings; it makes available and observable scientists' practical activities in a 'paradigmatic way'. The use of Kuhn's rules is not as a judgement upon the correspondence between them and features of reality. The establishment of such a correspondence is tied into the socially organised occasions of language use. The list of rules as 'accurate description' depends upon their constitution as competent speech through social practices.

Certain features are also displayed by the list of rules drawn from Kuhn. In prescribing the conditions under which they are to apply, they are law-like. These rules are also spatio-temporally restrictive [to paradigm development and scientific communities]. Further, they are 'necessarily loose' because their characteristics cannot fully be given [e.g. " I

shall therefore here assume that more systematic means for their identification will be found." (T.S. Kuhn, pI76, I974). Kuhn's list of rules permits theorists to assemble and understand scientific communities and practices subject to the features of the rules. The features of being law-like, spatio-temporally restrictive, and 'necessarily loose' are features of language. They are part of a theorist's actual practices for accomplishing an objective description of the parts of the list of rules contained within brackets; they are reading devices with which to make certain events accessible to members and make them observable in a certain form.

PARADIGM ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES: It has been stated that Kuhn's list of rules for the location of paradigms and scientific communities depends upon the use of social practices. These practices are seen as underpinning the rules of correspondence, and in the act of engaging in paradigm analysis, enabling the assemblage of that project. Kuhn's Postscript contains a number of such practices which will be listed below.

There are instances in Kuhn's writing where he establishes a state of the taken for granted. That is, instances which can be taken 'as if' fully known, from which that being discussed derives its sensible character. This practice consists of both positive assumptions (e.g. "Communities in this sense exist, of course, at numerous levels.", pI77, I974. My emphasis.), and assumptions concerning what the future has to hold (e.g. "I take it that the job can and will be done...", pI78, I974), as well as referencing the expectably normal (e.g. "ordinarily more than sufficient", pI77, I974). Kuhn also seeks to treat

what he is writing about 'as if' it were the case, in order to further pursue his argument [e.g. " Grant for the moment that something of this sort does occur." , p194, 1974].

It is through practices such as these that Kuhn is able to state: " Communities of this sort are the subject of this book." [p178, 1974. My emphasis.]. It is also through such practices of language that a background of unstated understandings is constituted through which the writer has the reader understand that he is reasoning rationally. Via these practices Kuhn subscribes to a version of language which furnishes its own understandings, one of which is 'letting pass' possible contrary instances and not granting them credence as actual situations [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

It has been demonstrated that language exhibits the practice 'if not, except when' [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Kuhn uses this linguistic practice to establish the line of thought or form of reasoning which he wishes the reader to partake in. This has the effect that what may possibly have been a problem is dissolved through the application of such a practice. For example Kuhn states: " Any study of paradigm-directed research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups...in that way, several difficulties which have been the foci for critical attention are likely to vanish," [p180, 1974. My emphasis.]. Here the practice is established whereby the " unanimity of scientists" [p180, 1974] is guaranteed. Kuhn disposes of criticisms of a lack of unanimity among scientists by aligning unanimity with " responsible" . In this way, evidence of a lack of unanimity is evidence of non-responsibility [i.e. not associated with paradigm directed research].

In effect Kuhn is stating that

'unless' responsibility occurs among a group of scientists then unanimity will not be found; *if responsibility cannot be* found the criticisms hold, except when responsibility can be found. This practice thus provides for locating paradigms, and dissipates criticisms of a lack of community characteristics for that feature through an indicator of *something other than* a paradigm based community [i.e. non-responsibility].

An indication of the shifting nature of realities and the prevalence of indexicality, which can only be remedied for the *practical purposes at hand through the reflexive constituting* of social practices, can gained from the examination of Kuhn's work. A further practice which demonstrates the indexical and occasioned character of language and action is the 'et cetera' clause [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Through its use unstated understandings are referenced and established in a way that " much of what is reported is not mentioned" [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. This is attained through the establishment of the agreement or understanding that what is said or written references much more than is actually said or written. In this way the ideal of a state of strictness or clarity is traded off through such an understanding.

Some of Kuhn's uses of this device are: " Among other things" , " Though" , " sometimes" , " they usually do" , " Usually" , and " Probably" [pp183-184, 1974]. Through these diffusing and pervasive elements of language Kuhn seeks to institute his programme for the attainment of clarity while at the same time necessarily blurring his delineations around the edges. In everyday situations these instances of the 'et cetera' clause occupy an expected and routine place in furthering conversations and actions, and countering

disruptments. In cases of professional theorising however, the use of the 'et cetera' clause provides another example for the theorist of the practicality and sociality of his own work. Such examples are for the theorists 'uncomfortable' and point up the irony of attempting to attain rational ideals based upon occasioned and occasional social practices.

Kuhn employs another practice which temporally orders the descriptions and consequently the events about which he writes. This is done through the practice of 'stating before the doing'. That is, by stating what is to be done, which prepares the reader for 'seeing' what the text claims it is making available. 'Stating and doing' does not refer to an actual, concrete occurrence, but to what is observable in relation to this particular practice. It is a gesture to the reader which states 'see it this way'.

Kuhn operates the practice of 'stating and doing' in such ways as: " I suggest" , " indicate how this may be done" , " discuss some significant consequences" , " consider what occurs...by examining the behaviour of the members of a previously determined scientific community." [pp174-175, 1974. My emphasis.]. The device of 'stating and doing' has its place in such as introductions, prefaces, and as in this case, clarifications.

Its use is in the impact of instructing the reader what will be found, not what might be found. As such, practices like 'stating and doing' are " recipes for the social construction of worlds" [B. Sandywell et al, 1975]. However, the majority of professional theorists do not recognise and show little interest that 'actual situations' are established through the reflexive use of social practices. Contrary to this, 'actual situations' are viewed as

concretely available in the correspondence of a form of language with reality.

IN CONCLUSION: Kuhn's approach to clarity is an encounter with indexicality. It is also in a more material way an attempt to come to grips with being a professional theoriser. The way in which Kuhn exemplifies an attempt to remedy the problems which these features bring starkly demonstrates that his actions [the act of theorising] are not guided in the same way as he prescribes for the practitioners of natural science. In an attempt to ground his notions of paradigm at an interpersonal and interactional level Kuhn looks to physico-chemical laws and a theoretic process of social behaviourism. Yet his own theorising demonstrates the very ways in which 'talking the same language' can be attained, and through this the construction of a particular way of regarding a topic. Kuhn's paradigm analysis is not a paradigm of itself.

This examination of Kuhn's remedial formulations has treated them as an occasion to demonstrate an ideal of the formal attitude of professional theorising and its attempted accomplishment. Another and related ideal which professional theorists regard as adhering to their productions will be examined in Chapter Nine. This is the ideal of superiority.

CHAPTER NINE

THE PROBLEM OF SUPERIORITY

> The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. This doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
> [K. Marx, 1845]

INTRODUCTION: The search for truth is an historical quest which will endure. However, for all those who search for such a bright thing, no matter their standing, the ways in which they formulate their actions and how they justify them as accomplished are problematic issues. This chapter attempts to examine this topic in relation to the act of theorising. It examines theorising, as documented in the examination of Kuhn's work, in a deeper, more fundamental manner. The problematic is taken of examining theorisers' remarks and propositions and demonstrating how they can come to be seen as a set of procedural rules which govern methods and findings as the grounds for further inference [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. The basic assumption in this chapter is that the factual status [i.e. whether or not further thoughts can be based upon an idea] of any findings, remark, or proposition is a constant source of trouble for anyone involved in the act of theorising.

To accomplish the task of being factual, and thereby to be seen as doing warrantable theorising, it is necessary to

demonstrate that the particular subject under examination is in the form of a 'moral necessity'. What a theoriser presents must be regarded not as being compiled how he would like to see it, but 'as it really is'. This contextual and situated accomplishment is problematic. It represents to the theoriser the promise of success or the threat of failure.

As such the factual status of knowledge is a critical concern for theorising. This is im a double sense. Firstly, it is of literal concern im that one demonstration of being a professional theoriser is a 'critical attitude'. Secondly, it is a matter for concern because factual status has to be established before any progress can be made. The occasion of theorising then faces the duality of 'revealing' independent social features and, in that doing, accomplishing that act of theorising as having moral worth and high regard.

SUPERIORITY AS A CONSTITUTIVE PARAMETER: Lay and professional theorising face a similar problem of knowledge im their inquiries: its accomplishment. However, professional theorising is generally regarded as superior in fact. Mennell for example recommends: "Science can and must seek to correct commonsense." (1975). The expression of the superiority of 'scientific' construction as corrections of more mundane activities is the expression of a deeply embedded difference between the commonsense member and the professional; between the layman and the priest. Historical development has required that Man is alienated from himself. The concern with and truth of knowledge, and knowledge itself, is appropriated by select and differentiated groups. "Just as he estranges from himself his own activity so he confers to the stranger activity which is not his own." (K. Marx, 1844). Though this

differentiation and positioning of theorising as an appropriating activity is an historical production, its continuation and accomplishment is as a situated and occasioned activity.

Theorising warrants the presentation of its subject matter as morally worthy through practices which it shares with people who constitute that subject matter. In this sense, ideas on superiority form some part of a collection of parameters that are constitutive of theorising's problems and remedies [e.g. clarity] [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. To regard the idea of superiority as a defining parameter of theorising is to look to the integrity of the idea. If theorising's remarks and propositions are taken to be displays of the parameters of theorising, then a move is made away from merely regarding them as presentations of fact towards the constitutive status of ideas in inquiry.

From this viewpoint, differences between commonsense and science are not differences between 'worlds'. To legislate for what is 'sense' in everyday life from the realm of science requires that the professional theoriser has at the outset knowledge of the very social structures he seeks to 'discover' and describe from the 'outside'. The difference between commonsense and professional theorising is one of degree, which is apparent in claims to knowledge and the concern for those claims. These claims are operable in the lay and professional theorisers' 'here and now', but the concern is differentiated between meaning contexts: between 'just about' and 'quantification'; between 'more than likely' and 'probability'; between 'points of view' and 'conceptual frameworks'; between 'ideas on the future' and 'prediction'.

The relation between producing and accomplishing propositions about the social world and the integrity of the idea of superiority as a parameter of theorising, is an engagement which cannot be suppressed in the act of theorising. All occasions of theorising have as a source of energy a belief in the concrete and the actual nature of the topics which they make available. Factual superiority is the expected and relevant outcome of theorising, where superiority as a parameter is in engagement with the social practices of inquiry.

SUPERIORITY AS A CLAIMING ACTIVITY: Though science and commonsense can be discussed for the purposes of analysis as distinct, empirically they are fused and intertwined. Though there is some disagreement (cf. B. Hindess, I973), it is generally agreed that there is no sharp discontinuity between scientific and everyday knowledge, and that the commonsense world is the starting point of all scientific knowledge (cf. K. Popper, I972. H. Garfinkel, I967. E. Durkheim, I964). Some theorists however take this much farther, stating the massive problems which face the possibility of an objective social science.

Harold Garfinkel for example, has suggested that the difference between the "exact" and the "inexact" sciences is one of the accomplishment of the substitution of objective for indexical expressions; for the former this is achievable, while for the latter it "remains unrealizably programmatic" (I967). On the other hand, those theorists who see their programme as following natural science and its model of inquiry reject the idea of the equality of science and commonsense as specified by an approach which fully accepts the ethnomethodological bases of acting socially as its topic.

It concerns a conversation between a doorman and a young couple over entry to a private park. The young man asks the doorman whether it would be possible to look round the park: "What do you think we have rules for?', yells the doorman, suddenly... 'If we let everybody 'just step right inside for a minute', we might as well not have any rules! Right?". Like Wolfe's doorman, sociologists have a collective commitment towards their domain of reference which is 'their' business. They have a normative and moral concern for the 'state of the art', and uphold that concern through defining situations as in accord with this moral superiority as a constitutive idea.

The promised remedy of commonsense and its substitution by objectivity can only be upheld as an ongoing concern by the continued formulation of sociological theorising's claims. To continue to remain socially viable as an enterprise and practically adequate, requires the resourceful and artful use of practical reasoning: commonsense and specialised knowledge (i.e. what sociology regards as its 'own' methods) occasioned and assembled through language. It is through the institution of this programme rather than following the edicts of a scientific methodology that social theory can assume a sense of importance. Because theorising is a public activity, in that what it produces to gain any importance has to be proclaimed by other professionals, it has to portray itself as producing new and socially viable conclusions and findings. Whether or not it does so will not be argued here; interest is rather in the way in which it establishes itself.

The act of theorising is faced with the problems presented by its structural position. It has to face the tasks of remedying commonsense, and producing 'better', usable knowledge

in the process. In this situation, to question the viability of professional theorising is a suicidal activity because it at once questions its importance as a source of knowledge. To produce and protect that knowledge, professional theorising must as a consequence of its structural position in society and its remedial programme make immediate claims to a select epistemological form of life. To make such a claim is not merely to state that some knowledge is possessed; it is to claim that some knowledge is possessed which is superior to commonsense knowledge [and incidentally, which is competitive with other theorisers' claims to knowledge of the same subject]. Claiming is not the mere stating that something is known. To claim is to stake a title to ownership.

EIDETIC FORMS OF CLAIMING IN EVERYDAY LIFE: Claims to superior knowledge have outcomes; they are either influential or they are not. Such an outcome is the result of a set of facts having sought to secure election as the 'right' description of a subject or event. Where such a claim is upheld, it is done so at the expense of other theorisers' claims. In everyday life, the existence of competing claims has two possible outcomes: they can be forgotten or they can be maintained.

'Forgetting' and 'maintaining' claims are eidetic, ideal-typical strategies towards the ordering of conversation and interaction. Forgetting a once made claim consists of letting every possible occasion for stating that claim go by; for letting conversational signals for speaker change remain the interest of other participants in a topic based conversation. Motorcycle maintenance provides an example:" After two sentences on the subject his eyes go completely glassy and he

changes the conversation or just looks away. He doesn't want to hear about it." [R. Pirsig, 1974]. This description is based upon competing claims as to the best way to approach motorcycle maintenance. Deciding to forget a claim is a contingent matter. It may turn upon the inability to finally reach a satisfactory conclusion, because of the argument that nothing in everyday life is fixed. Claims are not always matters of opinion. Related to this, it may be that a person cannot be bothered or is too sensitive to engage in the necessary argument required to establish a claim as 'the best'. Whatever the reasons, forgetting removes from public scrutiny a particular claim to knowledge; it then only remains as an experience or memory of a once held view.

In everyday life the relation between differing claims to knowledge does not generally assume great importance. People regularly dismiss differences between claims as 'matter of opinion', and leave it at that. There are times however, when conversationalists maintain that their social perspective is the correct one. When at least two differing claims are operated in conversation in this way, it produces a context of 'issue'. Conversation, as a managed and ordered outcome of speakers' devices [cf. H. Sacks, 1974], is unsettled. It becomes instead, a scene of disruption. Before the normal, expected, and commonplace features of conversation can be resumed the issue of controversy which the differing claims provoked must be settled. This outcome can have many empirical forms [e.g. one of the claimers leaving the scene of the conversation].

Maintaining differing claims produces a crisis of dialogue. Conversational participants have to address and pay attention

to materials which are rarely questioned and examined throughout ordinary, perceivedly normal frames of awareness. This situation is not a 'normal' one; disruption means that it is not 'known in common with others'. The background features of everyday life which inform claimers of the real and factual nature of their claims [H. Garfinkel, 1967] are breached.

The background features of normal life, reported by Schutz [1974] and summarised by Garfinkel [1967], are based on the reciprocity of perspectives. This concept suggests that people hold the assumption that if places were changed with other persons in society, similar experiences would result: " if he were here where I am now, he would experience things from the same perspective as I." [A. Schutz, 1974]. It is in respect of this perspective that claims are made. A person making a claim makes certain assumptions which he regards others as making; he assumes that as he makes these assumptions so do others.

These expectancies are: a claimer's version of knowledge is required as such by the 'facts of nature'; a taken for granted version of the facts is the sanctioned relation between the 'actual' and the reported scene; a factual version is felt to be 'real'; a standardised process of naming produces the meaning of events; facts are identically intended across time; an interpretation of a version of facts has as its context a standardised system of symbols and an existent corpus of socially warranted knowledge; the determinants and constituents of a factual version are obvious and available to persons other than the claimer; differences in biography are irrelevant, where the elements of a factual version are selected in an empirically identical manner between persons

for all practical purposes; a disparity exists between persons' private determinations such that a factual version means for the witness and others more than they can say; that a claimer can freely alter this disparity [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

An occasion of maintaining competing claims of the same event breaches these expectancies [unless they are organised in institutionalised terms - e.g. in court]. Because orderly conversation and accounts depend upon them, a 'strange' displacement for those involved results. Harold Garfinkel has demonstrated the quality of background expectancies in everyday life through disruption procedures. These were based upon a particular condition: that where " the natural facts of life" are made incongruous a person will experience confusion. It is this situation which arises when competing claims are maintained. In effect the differing claimers question one another's factual demonstrations of knowledge. They thereby question the other's self-esteem, competence, and the right to manage everyday matters without interference [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

There are various social forms of resolution to this disruption. Often the claims bond the other members involved into a group with a coherent perspective. The resolution of controversy then has an array of possibilities available due to this social bonding. These range from the exchange of abuse, the withdrawl of negotiations, to physical violence. There are also management devices which are available to minimise confusion. The situation can be redefined such that the context is no longer one of confrontation. The 'real circumstances' of the issue can also be redefined in order

that claims are no longer in competition; they do not exist as alternative versions.

Maintaining alternative versions of knowledge does, of course, not have to be settled in just this manner. Because the more severely background assumptions and expectancies are violated, the less socially ordered the reaction of members, we can expect devices to be built into interaction which will organise and accomplish order in the event of competing claims. Thus they who participant in opposing versions of knowledge may institute resolution through recourse to a belief in the authoritative condition of 'nature' and the availability of this condition. The tension which has its source in the opposing claims of the participants is agreed to be settled through some independent source or extra-situational means, where each claimer makes publicly available the loss of his claim. The situation is changed from one in which an ordered resolution depends upon the overt movements and approaches of the claimers, to one where another source of fact and authority is employed which the participants agree will not be disputed.

Recourse to independent nature has another variation. The loss of the authority of a claim may be expressed in tangible form through gaming (e.g. making a bet). Gaming can subtly change controversy into a form of play where opposition can come to be regarded and conceptualised as 'betting talk' rather than 'serious talk' or 'arguing'. For example, a 'friendly' card game can exhibit the conversational feature of accusing other players of deceit. Yet because of the indexical grounds of language, this feature ceases to occupy something which might expectably be categorised as claiming knowledge: "You'll say something to the rest like 'nobody here is telling t

truth. Everybody is a phony.' Well, some of the guys may hit you on the head with something if you said that anywhere else." [card player quoted by L.A. Zurcher, 1973]. A betting occasion preserves as its serious outcome the settled nature of competing claims. The controversy and conflict possibly available through opposing claims is institutionalised into 'the bet' in order that the route to resolution is presented as a play or game.

'Betting talk' thus stands as a resource for accounting for the disparity between claims in an orderly manner. Factual status can turn on the device 'I bet it is', or some such like it. Further, the event of a bet not being taken up can settle the opposition of claims.

A claim is an accounting procedure [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. It seeks to make reportable the socially organised activities of an environment. Where the members of a situation have regard for this feature of accounts [i.e. their orderly nature], controversy can be resolved through concerted work for the establishment of order; towards managing the situation as a well-ordered one. In this case, the competing character of claims is negated through for example, members' constructions of them as equally possible and factual outcomes; as two groups or forms of the 'same' thing. Within this formation there are quite obviously other possibilities. The members can agree to disagree and resolve it later, to forget it, or to gloss over their separate claims for the sake of order. Such possibilities are tied into the constitution of the context and the systems of relevance which are in operation. Whichever possibility is actualised, its essential structure is directed to the management of situated problems as accountable phenomena through a

programme of language and devices which settles claiming matters for all practical purposes.

CRITICAL DEBATE AS PROFESSIONAL CLAIMING - PLATO'S DIALECTIC: In everyday life the disruption brought about by competing claims is generally regarded as critically unimportant, and is accounted for in this manner. The continued maintenance of claims without respect for the orderly nature of social situation erodes the background expectancies of everyday life and undermines the intersubjective bases of language and its accomplishments. At the level of professional theorising critical debate is an icon which exists as a structually proclaimed form of professional development and practice.

This feature is part of the tradition of science. It is one which goes back into the history of philosophy. One example of critical debate is the power attributed to the practice of the dialectic claimed by Plato. The views put forward by Plato in " The Republic" [Books V - VII] are here being used as an exemplary case of the treatment of critical debate in the act of theorising. This is not to attempt to present a comprehensive or inviolable account of Plato's work. Even for those who are involved in the production of such accounts there are various disparities of agreement [cf. G. Ryle, 1966. Cornford, 1970].

It might be objected that treating Plato's work as a resource for approaching one of the constituents of theorising is to do unnecessary damage to the work of a great philosopher. However, this approach is consistent with one aspect of Plato's thought which has been noted by Cornford [1970]. Analysis is not bound by the historical fact of what someone actually meant, but can accommodate various interpretations. To incorporate

competing interpretations into the analysis is fully in accord with Plato's dialectical method.

As a philosphical method, the practice of dialectic required the process of question and answer as the route to serious knowledge. Plato saw that the finest form of knowledge was reached through "the discourse of reason", independent of the senses. It consisted of approaching "the essential reality" and grasping "the very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is what we call the dialectic." (Cornford, 1966). The dialectic method then led to the pure ideas of reason; dialectic was seen as the discourse of reason. The location of these ideas as the essential reality resulted in the apprehension of the absolute good; the dialectic led to Goodness itself and not to mere perception.

For Plato there was a division in reality between intelligence and appearance, between knowledge and belief. What marked off each division and made them more or less available was the dialectic method. Non-dialectical studies were regarded as accounting for some version of reality. Yet because such accounts were seen as leaving assumptions unquestioned, Plato regarded them as obscure and "dream-like". He reasoned that if premise, conclusion, and the steps in between were not really known, and even if the reasoning were consistent with itself, "how can it ever amount to knowledge?". The alternative to this obscure reasoning was the dialectic, which questioned all assumptions and proceeded "up to the first principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there. When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous ignorance, this method gently draws it forth...". The use of the dialectic led to the apprehension of true knowledge as opposed to locating mere appearance. It also

provided a formal way of looking at the world. As a route to knowledge is provided a map of the possible degrees of reality.

Dialectic as the journey towards the essential reality provided Plato with the contrast between appearance and belief, and that which was eternal. This map of the degrees to which the world could be known was represented by Plato in the allegory of the line, and its four stages of cognition: imagining; believing; thinking; knowing. The lowest stage of cognition was seen to be imagining, because it took for granted sensible appearances. This state of mind, in accepting mere appearance as reality in an unquestioning way, could only apprehend images of images. As with prisoners in the cave, it recognises " as reality nothing but the shadows of those artificial objects" [Cornford, 1966].

This images-of-images situation arose because appearance was seen to be an image of reality and not reality itself. If what the senses perceive is taken to be reality, what happens is that an image of appearance is given this status. Since appearance is itself an image, the perceived reality is an image of an image. It is only when the essential forms of reality have been located that a move back to appearance can be made to locate in it what is real: " you will recognize every image for what it is and know what it represents, because you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in their reality." [Cornford, 1966].

The next stage of cognition was commonsense belief. Plato saw this as belief in the reality of that which was visible, tangible, and substantial: " the actual things of which the first are likenesses" [Cornford, 1966]. In this

stage are included those beliefs which are correct as strategies for action, but whose bases are not known. This is expressed where Plato has Socrates state that opinion without knowledge is blind: " One who holds a true belief without intelligence is just like a blind man who happens to take the right road." [Cornford, 1966].

The cognitive states of belief and imagining and their corresponding objects for Plato made up the visible world of appearances. Composed so, these states of mind could not locate the absolute ideals which Plato regarded as constituting the real: " So if the real is the object of knowledge, the object of belief must be something other than real." [Cornford, 1966]. An object of belief both 'is' and 'is not'; it lies between the perfectly real and unreal. Plato's view was that belief was an intermediate faculty with a particular field which produced a particular state which lay between pure knowledge and ignorance. He pointed this out in describing people who could see " beautiful things" or " just actions" without apprehending " Beauty" or " Justice" as merely having beliefs, " without any real knowledge of the objects of their belief." [Cornford, 1966]. Belief was regarded as fallible produced by persuasion. It could thus be changed by further persuasion, and could not examine or reveal the bases from which it sprang.

Plato's ascending intelligible world consisted of thinking and the higher section knowing. At the level of thought which was that of mathematical science, " the mind uses as images those actual things which themselves had images in the visible world" . Thought was conceptualised as beginning with assumptions and moving towards a conclusion rather than a principle [Cornford, 1966]. Plato points out that thought

procedures use diagrams and models which are imperfect and distorted attempts at representing true knowledge: " they make use of visible figures and discourse about them, though what they really have in mind is the originals of which these figures are images" . Alan Blum has called this feature a failure to hear origins [1974], because attention is with icons and not originals. As such thought concerned with icons is concerned with reflections of thought's ground. In the mode of thought however, icons are treated as actual representations; as objects of faith.

Another feature of thought procedure which Plato revealed was that it proceeded from unquestioned assumptions and deductively reasoned from them. In the form of thought data was seen as known and self-evident: " Then starting from these assumptions, they go on until they arrive, by a series of consistent steps, at all the conclusions they set out to investigate." This aspect of thought's procedure is a failure to hear foundations [A. Blum, 1974]. Thought does not seek to question or to reveal the grounds upon which it depends.

The highest section and state of mind in Plato's map is knowing the true reality through the power of the dialectic. At this level there is a contrast with the deductive reasoning of thought. Dialectic dialogue was seen by Plato as providing the logos of true being. The unquestioned assumptions which underlay the other stages of cognition, in the dialectic method constitute a beginning for dialogue. The philosophic move is not from premise to conclusion, but through the premise to the essential principle; to the Forms of the Good. From this procedure, Plato envisaged the movement being

completed by grasping a conclusion through the use of the Forms which could be apprehended in dialectic dialogue.

Plato's dialectic method sought to treat its assumptions as " hypotheses" rather than first principles, and proceed to " the first principle of all" . Having reached this position the inquirer could then " descend at last to a conclusion, never making use of any sensible object, but only Forms, moving through Forms from one to another, and ending with Forms." [Cornford,1966]. In this way Plato depicts the method by which the escape can be made from the world of appearances through that part of the intelligible world characterised by deductive thought, to knowing true reality. The hierarchical map which this method provides [through the allegory of the line], places the object which it locates at a higher level of truth and reality than the other objects-of-mind in the structure [Cornford, 1966].

The rational intuiting of the method of the dialiectic is " unaided by any of the senses" and does not make use of " any sensible object" . In the " Phaedo" Plato describes Socrates' last moments. Socrates reflects that thought is better when involved and reflected in itself; when mind is gathered into mind. In this state thought is not distorted by the elements provided by the faculties of perception and can leave the body and attempt 'true being'. Only in this way through rational intuiting can intellectual vision, truth, and wisdom be attained. Plato wrote that using the body for perception led to the changeable. Yet when the soul reflected on itslelf, this led to " the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness." . The soul, " being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state

of the soul is called wisdom." [B. Russell, 1961].

The relation between the method of the dialectic and the knowing state which it produces would appear to be a reciprocal one. It is clear that Plato saw that engaging in dialogue led to the most superior kind of knowledge. However, that engagement as well as being Plato's central epistemological principle is at the same time knowledge itself. Ideally the dialectic leads to true knowledge; but that requires the state of knowing to be in existence before dialogue is engaged in. The problem is where to ground the central epistemological principle of the dialectic; how to require it as an a priori. What Plato did was to look at each level in his hierarchy, each state of mind and the objects which they produced, as faculties; those powers which enabled people to accomplish what they did. In looking to a faculty, Plato reasoned that he could " only look to its field of objects and the state of mind it produces, and regard these as sufficient to identify it and distinguish it from faculties which have different fields and produce different states." Plato's reasoning was that a faculty enabled people to recognise objects in a certain form which were expressed through language. For example, through dialecic dialogue the philosopher could locate and recognise the absolute Forms of the Good which stood as an indication of the recognition of the state of mind of the performer [e.g. knowing].

To do recognising a faculty is then to apprehend the objects of that faculty; the underlying reasoning is that objects correspond to a state of mind, the power of which is the faculty. Though Plato's structures of states of mind and the corresponding objects has a necessary tension between

each stage such that object and state of mind can be said to produce one another, to account for the original flow towards knowledge of the Good he has to turn towards inborn dispositions and natures [e.g. philosophic nature]. This represents two central pillars of Plato's philosophy. The first is that of anamnesis, which holds that knowledge is gained by the recollection of the soul of truths and realities which were known before incarnation. Secondly, is the belief in the real existence of the intelligible Forms, separate from the objects of perception [Cornford, 1970].

The dialectic becomes the method of those who display certain characteristics which are congruent with what Plato saw as becoming the philosopher. That is, documentary evidence for the existence of the state of *anamnesis* as knowledge of the Forms. This evidence illustrates philosophic nature and the faculty of true knowledge. Examples of such documents listed by Plato are: a passion for knowledge; a love of truth; a love of wisdom; " temperate and free from the love of money, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice" ; " fair-minded, gentle, and sociable" ; " a good memory" [Cornford, 1966]. Having the faculty for knowing, as attested by such characteristics, the holders can then via the dialectic method of dialogue begin to rationally intuit the absolute Forms of reality.

As an exemplary instance of professional theorising, Plato's work revolves around and is constituted by the idea of true knowledge. It provides for the demarcation of possible realities and states of mind, placing this procedure [itself] above all others. The substantive differentiation between these states of mind is not so much a fact as an operation.

High placement and the accomplishment of Plato's programme depends upon the idea of superiority and the successful accomplishment of that idea through claiming.

The point of taking Plato's remarks on the dialectic as an ideal example of theorising is a varied one. It demonstrates the essential relationship which the theoriser has with his work and the world through his adopted method, and how he can effect structural divisions amongst phenomena as a central part of his project. This is not to deny that a theorist's remarks are 'real', but to point out that those remarks themselves are contexted and occasioned. As a successful accomplishment a piece of inquiry has object status; it can be passed on and taught. The dialectical method of Plato has also been used to example critical debate. In assuming the status of an object Plato's work itself is open to the method of critical debate which it projects. Amongst professionals and initiates it is available as a resource for their constructive approach, in order to provide an account which accomplishes a version of knowledge as superior. This demonstrates the division between that which is being theorised about [i.e. the subject], and the means that are used for that action [i.e. methods]. The constructive and structural potential of the idea of superiority which Plato demonstrates in his work, is prevalent throughout all occasions of professional theorising. Indeed, the characteristic of making claims to superior knowledge is a typical and essential characteristic for defining the term 'professional'.

THE IDEALS AND ATTITUDE OF PROFESSIONAL THEORISING: The location, accomplishment, and assessment of superiority lies in the idea of superiority; in the absolute forms of reality

which ensure that where this idea is drawn upon it will present the features of high location, high valuation, and high assessment. A theoriser's interest is in the place which an idea occupies; it is in the production of superior knowledge, enabled by the context of situated understandings mobilised between professional theorisers. These provide for superiority as a warrantable condition, while at the same time bestowing on other forms of knowledge the quality of inferiority. The provision of these conditions stems from a concentration upon a version of language which constructs and projects them. The idea of superiority in professional theorising has two moments: firstly the production of knowledge through the use of the idea which makes it transparent (clarity) in that knowledge; secondly the use of the idea as a resource for viewing and reading a piece of theorising.

Both these value moments express a commitment and interest in inquiry. A concern for the status of knowledge is a constant feature of professional theorising. It stands as a further resource for the production of superiority, for as commitment and interest are constant features of professional theorising, their presence and location in a piece of knowledge provides for locating that presence in the quality of superiority. In a similar sense the production of superiority stands as a socially and communally available instance for the replica-tion of that quality (e.g. Plato's qualities of "philosophical nature" and formal map of reference of the stages of cognition).

To claim superiority and attribute inferiority is both to seek election towards an ideal, and to forget how this ideal is accomplished. This neglects the activity of claiming as

in attempting to correct the indexicality of knowledge. The social relation between a theoriser and his work remains unexplored. Topic is recognised, but not resource. This means that a claim towards superior knowledge consists of questioning the grounds upon which other knowledge rests [i.e. as a function of 'critical debate'], while at the same time using as a resource similar intersubjective grounds which are not regarded with interest.

By taking for granted the grounds which language provides, professional theorising is purposeful in producing superior representations of nature and the inferiority of other knowledge. In terms of accountability the operation of the idea of superiority is a thoroughgoing practical matter. This accountability is not analytic; there is no interest in revealing the structure of understandings which produce and accomplish the idea of superiority. The organisation of this idea is based in social actions which from the perspective of theorising are sanctionable and warrantable. A theoriser must have regard for the social and communal grounds from which his theorising begins and in regard to which it will be judged. The prospective theoriser is thus constrained by the existential formations of theorising, and by the possible position his work will occupy in those formations.

The accomplishment of superiority and the structures upon which this depends are equally normative orientations of theorising and the conditions for the production of knowledge. This accomplishment is a consequence of professional theorising's communal character, and is a requirement which reflexively shows the quality division between different forms of knowledge.

It must be remembered that to follow the grounds of professional theory is to be constrained to grant as problematic that which those grounds specify. The provision of such problematics is carried out through ways which ensure their remedy, and by furnishing a practical system of relevances and expectation which specify the methods available for such repair and how this can be recognised. The theoretic grounds provide the concrete and practical understandings which are located in versions of language, and enable the demonstration of what 'a 'good' version of language is like. A version of language aimed at the manifestation of superior knowledge, carries with it the assumption that it can represent its subject matter in a way which is 'better' than other versions in producing an accurate copy of nature [e.g. the presentation of the Forms].

The superior genre of professional theorising is a necessary consequence of the dominant conception of science. The notion of the hierarchic relation between superior and inferior knowledge is practically replicated in the concrete production of theorising work. Scientifically influenced theorising, because of its ideal of the superiority of objectivity, has to provide for the very thing which it seeks to correct. In effect, 'inferior knowledge' represents a violation of the grounds and form of life of the stance which has faith in the superiority of objectivity. In practice, 'other' knowledge is seen as a contravention of nature in order to reassert theorising's grounds as a remedy of such an 'unnatural' view.

Plato's propositions on the dialectic and the formal map of reference display as an exemplary case the embedded structures which function as a framework for the possibility

of doing superior theorising. Plato's case provides for various communities of theorisers, structures their experiences, and locates exactly where and how superior and inferior knowledge can be found. This is supplemented by conceptual formations which enable the recognition of instances of knowledge as superior or inferior [e.g. objects, states of mind]. Plato thus provides through his language an hierarchic structure based squarely upon adequacy as superior being. The 'doing' of being superior turns upon providing for some sense of inferiority in need of correction; to claim superiority is to point to inferiority.

To produce 'better' knowledge requires methodicity [e.g. the power of the dialectic]. This aspect of theorising consists of publicly sanctioned methods for the demonstration of such knowledge. A central factor is that sanctioned methods require the establishment of agreement; it is this feature which establishes sanctionability. There must be shared agreement over the grounds of theorising for 'fine' aspects of this form of inquiry to be accomplished. The formation of this agreement is through the essential indistinguishability between what is written and how it is being written [e.g. a charge made by the police - H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Shared agreement on substantive matters cannot be taken to explain a particular feature of theorising. This is because to invoke such a notion would require that what was being written would have to be distinguished from how it was written. Since the sense of a written formulation comes from the methodic demonstration that what was done was done according to a rule, to fracture this essential relationship is to multiply the problematic features of formulation [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

In pointing out the linkage between the 'how' and 'what' of written [and spoken] formulations, shared agreement consists of locating 'what' was written in respect of 'how' it was written according to a rule. That matter of shared agreement is then based in the morality of language. That something can be demonstrated according to a rule brings with it the idea of rational language and its sanctionable character. Harold Garfinkel has discussed that matter of shared agreement in respect of everyday life: shared agreement " does not consist in demonstrated measures of shared knowledge of social structure, but consists instead and entirely in the enforceable character of actions in compliance with the expectancies of everyday life as a morality." [1967]. For theorising on the other hand, sanctionable features consist of the rationality of language, a natural, objective order of facts, and professional accounts as expressions of such states of affairs.

From Garfinkel's remarks it can be suggested that superiority as a stable outcome and property of professional theorising confirms the methodic social organisation of that activity. As a public outcome, superiority is a production which warrants the background expectancies of theorising, which consists of at least the background expectancies of everyday life [outlined above].

The accomplishment of professional theorising depends fully for its sensible character upon the expectancies of everyday life, which defines the rationality of actions in a number of ways: categorising and comparing; tolerable error; the search for means; the examination of alternatives and consequences; strategy; timing; prediction; procedural rules; choice and the grounds for choice. Professional theory is

distinguished by supplementing these means for judging the rationality of action with four others: compatibility with formal logic; semantic clarity and distinctness; the compatibility with scientific knowledge; clarity and distinctness im themselves as ideals (H. Garfinkel, 1967).

These latter rational ideals are warrantable properties based in the formal attitude of scientific theorising. This attitude consists of the following propositions: professional theorists hold that their relation to the normative social structures is one of official value neutrality. Theorists' commonsense knowledge as a resource for judgement is seen as capable of separation from the production and assessment of scientific findings. These findings are expressed in terms of a standard scheme of temporal determinations; standard time. In theorising all matters of sense and warrant are taken to be only and entirely public, with no disparity between the theoriser's private knowledge and others' knowledge. Theorisers take it that they need only know that which they have extended credence to through the abstract ideals of 'competent membership' and 'proper procedure'. Actual works of theorising are taken as forgiveable approximations of independent nature (H. Garfinkel, 1967).

As a public accomplishment superiority depends upon the existence of shared agreement and common understandings as to the form of theorising; and that in each particular case the condition of 'competent membership' is approximately fulfilled so that instances of theorising are seen as in accord with the rules and ideals of professional theorising. To carry this out requires a subscription to and recognition of the ways of language-use, where theorising provides the methodicity of

a communal grouping. This is to apply for and to subscribe to some particular form of membership (i.e. professional membership). The language of theory is then the nexus around which practitioners gather and recognise themselves; as particular practitioners who can be named as to their authoritative grounds and who follow or believe in those grounds as practical ideals.

To take part in the use and development of these ideals is to be seen as implementing rational forms of action towards rational ends. This commitment goes beyond the bounds of the practical ideals which the attitude of everyday life grants as rational and requires the modification of that attitude (i.e. the concerns with logic, semantic clarity, and scientific knowledge are both ideals to be attained and the means for transforming everyday knowledge). This is because the maxims of conduct which the rational ideals specify if performed in daily life and under the natural attitude would result, as Garfinkel points out (1967), in status changes (e.g. sickness or incompetence). In order to approximate the rational ideals of theorising, the practice of theory requires insulating from daily life. By modifying the attitude of daily life, groups and communities of professional theorisers produce and provide presuppositions for practice. They display their grounds for sensible practice which provides communal agreement upon rational ideals as relevant ends, attributes, and accomplishments. McHugh et al have written that "in showing its unity with nature, positive speech also shows its superiority, for it (unlike nature) can show its own constitution as the organised becoming that is method." (1974). The idea of superiority is thus

fundamental to professional theorising; it constitutes and pervades the attitude of professional theorising, its ideals, and its methods.

SUPERIORITY AND THE POLITICS OF THEORISING: For professional theorising the idea of superiority is a fact of life. It is also a demonstration and outcome of professional expertise as the 'fine' structure of theorising. Lastly, it is a rational ideal of theorising; an 'end' towards which the practice and development of theorising is dedicated. As a parameter of theorising superiority is also constitutive of its problems and remedies. Because the rational ideals of scientific theorising are too strict for the purposes of conducting affairs in everyday life, for one who wishes to follow them the division between superior and inferior knowledge is forced upon him. It is a fact of life.

For Plato to claim the state of knowing, he needed not merely to express that belief but had to demonstrate 'true knowledge' of the 'true reality'. In doing this he located and provided for pathological forms of knowledge. His claim extended to and rested upon the power of dialectic dialogue as superior method, and its users as the possessors of superior philosophical nature. Plato also saw the utility of his form of philosophical reasoning: "unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy meet together...there can be no rest from troubles...for states nor yet, as I believe, for all mankind" [Cornford, 1966]. Given the character of superior knowledge, it is perhaps no surprise that Plato describes practitioners of dialectic dialogue as philosopher kings and recommends them as political rulers.

Today there are still political facets, at various levels

of meaning, involved in the act of theorising. As Louis Althusser [1977] has stated, social practice is structured and consists in part of theoretical practice and political practice. Though sociological theorists are, no doubt, politically minded at the level of allegiance to forms of power, they are also involved politically at the level of knowledge and language; they are concerned with the domination of a form of knowledge and version of language over others. In this sense, theoretical practice is political practice.

What does the situation of theoretical practice as political practice consist of? Harold Garfinkel's discussion of indexicality [1967] stands as an authoritative insight into the constitution of the social world and the problematics that theory faces. Because indexicality references the situated nature of speech and action, the topics which theorising approaches thus pose an unlimited number of problems.

Faris for example [1973], has noted some of the problems faced by ethnographic studies such as the specification of " the cognitive processes or principles necessary to produce... empirical sets" , and the " circumstances in which the [native classification] processes become operative" . The primary problem which theorising revolves around is that of overcoming these features of indexicality in relation to the ideals of scientific theorising. Faris states this when he describes as " one major focus of attention" of ethnographic studies as " the objective description of native taxonomies and folk classification." [1973]. This problem becomes more attenuated when the sociological focus stands back from such a ground level approach as ethnography, and concentrates instead on statistical analyses.

The problem is one of satisfying programmatic ideals while in principle doing justice to the topic of study. The issue then, is the extent to which the indexical nature of 'native' phenomena will be examined. This is because any examination which ignores indexicality as a topic denies the purpose of its inquiry [i.e. to describe 'native' phenomena]. Yet a concentration on the situated nature of accomplishments makes it plain that the ideal of objectivity cannot be attained. The theorist is in somewhat of a dilemma: whether to remain loyal to the phenomena or to the ideals of professional theorising. In order to accomplish his acts of theorising as warrantable however, the theoriser must do so in relation to a collectivity of theorisers who are organised in respect of a set of ideals. He is thus constrained to order his theorising in relation to such a set, at the expense of 'native' phenomena, or be seen as an incompetent theorist. Keeping faith with a set of ideals ensures the repair of indexicality albeit incomplete, because such repairs are limited, with contrary instances.

Faris has pointed to the specifics of one such attempted repair in ethnography: " the overwhelming concentration on the ordering of perceptual domains or concepts whose boundary definitions are assumed" [1973. His emphasis.]. In ways such as assuming, glossing, letting pass, and the et cetera clause, theorising seeks to repair indexicality for its own practical purposes of providing an objective account. However, theorising's productions are just as indexical as 'native' accounts, trading and depending for their sense upon members' knowledge [i.e. presupposing a relevant community of readers]. For theorising to be regarded as 'adequate' depends upon the

demonstration of the rational nature of inquiry, through artful persuasion by reference to shared grounds. Within this situation 'inferior' knowledge is a requirement which lies in two assumptions.

The first is that through the education and socialisation which a person receives in learning to be a professional theoriser, he is taught that the people whom he studies cannot produce such clear and objective accounts of themselves as he can. Inferior knowledge is thus seen as a condition of the social world which can be corrected by professional theorising. Inferior knowledge here is a construct of professional theorising as specified by its ideal of superiority. The second assumption is that the particular school of thought within professional theorising in which a theorist has faith, is the most appropriate for examining the social world. For a theorist to accomplish acts of theorising and to pursue a career as a professional theorist, means that he has to have affiliation to communal grounds of authority. The idea of superiority is present here, for the theorist's faith in his particular communal method of theorising demonstrates and claims that it is better than other available methods. The adoption of communal method requires the critical examination of other methods in respect of it as the most superior; this is to charge inferiority in other methods. Inferiority is thus a charge of the incompetence of method.

The concrete situation of claiming superiority and pointing out inferiority lies in the belief placed in the quality of language. To accomplish superiority is to reveal 'the world'; to be inferior is to be seen as displaying unauthoritative self. This is the distinction made by Plato between knowledge and

belief. That which presents true knowledge reveals, copies, and pictures the real world and is selfless. That which is mere opinion and belief and is inferior cannot apprehend the real world because of the inappropriate nature of its method. Such presentations are thus selfish because they either disregard the notion of appropriate method or forsake the notion of method at all. In such a circumstance the theoriser is conceptualised as either incompetent or not understandable.

McHugh et al have made a similar point, where they point out that to be analytic is to have a language that is authored by nature. To be unanalytic on the other hand, is to be seen as projecting a version of language which does not represent nature and is no more than an illusion; it is inferior. For a theorist to have a 'good' version of language comes about through the claim as to the natural character of what he writes or states; as warranted by the structure of expectancies, understandings, and presuppositions of professional theorising [McHugh et al, 1974]. Charges of inferiority reference the inauthentic character of a version of language. What prompts this charge is the violation of what professional theorising regards as authentic language. Further, an account is not merely inferior because it is seen as misrepresenting nature, but because it does not respect either some particular community grounds or the dominant idea of scientific practice.

To be inferior is to contravene both the ideals and methods of professional theorising and thereby the sensibilities of committed practitioners. Non-communal language is that which is regarded as anti-social, and so disrupts the non-indexical, objective icon of theoretical practice that communities dedicated to producing 'true' knowledge endorse.

The development and progress of theorising is based in a political context: that of the dominance of one set of knowledge and ideas over others. This is accomplished through professional language and the structure of meaning which methodical language constructs for itself in assuming dominance, as political practice.

IN CONCLUSION: The following remarks are not conclusive in deciding matters of fact. Rather they finalise these discussions. Their purpose is to attempt to capture and elicit the feelings which the above discussions have provoked; that which these discussions have created. In this sense these remarks apply to what has been stated above as well as coming from there. If one wants to be sociologically reflexive, these remarks also apply to themselves.

In mundane argument the topic of critical debate undermines the background expectancies upon which factual nature depends. In order to escape this breakdown of the accomplishment of social reality, professional critical debate modifies and adds to the attitude and ideals of everyday life. One central and integral feature of this modification is the place occupied by the idea of superiority: as a production of theorising inherent in an act, as a constitutive parameter of that act, and as a description of the social world which it addresses (i.e. superior-inferior realities). To accomplish its work, theorising has to bring about the division between acceptable and unacceptable realities while still preserving the mechanism of background expectancies and understandings, and the reciprocity of perspectives by which understanding and agreement are brought about.

The description and discussion of superiority provided

an examination of the constitutive features of professional theorising which, via the appropriating and aggrandising character of its devices, takes the truth for itself. By the encapsulation of ideas on what constitutes true knowledge in the structural caucuses which the dedication to professional theorising provides, the knowledge which every man possesses is taken from him. What he has is only a mere shadow of the truth which can be found at the higher social, intellectual, and structural level of professional theorising. This activity surely takes for itself activity which is not exclusively its own. In that very taking it neglects to accord to its 'subjects' the status of competent users, producers, and assessors of knowledge. This is perhaps because, as Marx states, those members themselves have faith in and give to professional theorising the grant to produce the real and true knowledge. Whether or not lay members are conspiritors in the appropriation of knowledge it is most apparent that as a structural force professional, scientific theorising wrenches its subject-matter from its indexical grounds and subjects it to the cosmetic process. This results in 'authoritative' versions of contexted and sensitive realities. The professional production of such authoritative versions converts the essential reality into 'thingness' which as institutionalised knowledge can stand as a resource for institutional action upon those realities on behalf of 'society'.

CHAPTER TEN

THE PROBLEM OF REFLEXIVITY

In indefinitely many ways members' inquiries are constituent features of the settings they analyze. In the same ways, their inquiries are made recognizable to members as adequate-for-all-practical-purposes...In the actual occasions of interaction that accomplishment is for members omnipresent, unproblematic, and commonplace. For members doing sociology, to make that accomplishment a topic of practical sociological inquiry seems unavoidably to require that they treat the rational properties of practical activities as 'anthropologically strange'. By this I mean to call attention to 'reflexive' practices such as the following: that by his accounting practices the member makes familiar, commonplace activities of everyday life recognizable as familiar, commonplace activities...That accomplishment consists of members doing, recognizing, and using ethnographies. In unknown ways that accomplishment is for members a commonplace phenomenon. And in unknown ways that the accomplishment is commonplace it is for our interests, an awesome phenomenon, for in its unknown ways it consists [1] of members' uses of concerted everyday activities as methods with which to recognize and demonstrate the rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions. [2] The phenomenon consists, too, of the analyzability of actions-in-context given that not only does no concept of context-in-general exist, but that every use of 'context' without exception is itself essentially indexical.

[H. Garfinkel, 1967]

INTRODUCTION: The topic of this final chapter is that of reflexivity. It will seek to demonstrate that throughout the preceding chapters the idea of reflexivity has been used, made available, and addressed in order to enter into and examine the never clear engagement between theory and practice. The fundamental use of the resource of reflexivity by people in situations has been most profoundly introduced and examined by Harold Garfinkel [1967]. Other sociologists such as O'Neill [1972] and Gouldner [1973] have begun to examine this fundamental element in the production of senses of structure, knowledge, action, and experience.

Such moves towards a reflexive sociology, as distinct from the social conception of reflexivity, will be examined below. Following this, the chapter will examine the elements revealed in the above chapters as reflexive features in relation to the sociological concept of 'culture'. Finally the conclusion will be drawn that within the very practice of sociology itself, or any other practical activity, lies the possibility of a more fundamental understanding of the social world than has so far been realised. This is a sociology which is not [though this is essentially impossible] sociologically reflexive, but which is reflexive sociologically. Firstly however, the relation between theory and practice will be discussed.

THEORY, PRACTICE, AND REFLEXIVITY: Garfinkel's view of reflexivity regards it as residing in the fact that people's methods of inquiry and resolution in social scenes are constitutive of those scenes themselves. John O'Neill, in the language of phenomenology, has described the social existence of reflexivity "as tied to the textual structure of temporality and situation through which subjectivity

and objectivity are constituted as the intentional unity and style of the world." [1972]. In the interaction between ideas about the social world and forms of situational action, reflexivity as such occupies a crucial and fundamental role in praxis. This can be seen in cases of mental illness where the routine reflexivity of people's utterances are transformed into a diagnosis of illness [cf. E. Goffman, 1971. D. Smith, unpublished.]. For sociology this reflexive praxis between theory and action is central to its attainments, though of no interest for examination in its own right [cf. H. Garfinkel 1967. P. Filmer, 1975. Below.].

Conventionally for sociology there is a separation between theory and practice, between theorisers and actors, which ignores the unity of reflexivity. In order to illustrate the inescapable relation between theory and practice, where one presupposes and involves the other, they can perhaps best be discussed in terms of a subject-object dichotomy. In effect this dichotomy seeks to display the integrated and mutually dependent aspects of definite [object] and commonplace [subject] knowledge for both professional sociology and everyday life. The idea of object knowledge for sociology is that it is taken to be independent of contexts; it consists of existent formations of actions and actors which are related in determinate ways though with varying degrees of depth and clarity. This depends upon the interest in and relevance of these formations. So for example, it can be taken that there are differences in knowledge between sexual contact actors, adults involved with children, and the police in comparison to professional theorists who are concerned with assessing the quality of knowledge itself and who consequently develop

specific concepts for dealing with it.

But is this the case? Is what is being discussed here more to do with degrees of articulation as defined by situational factors [e.g. for all practical purposes], rather than different 'kinds' of knowledge. When one looks to subject knowledge, it can be seen to consist of an interest in the construction and constitution of actions and actors in context. The subject aspect of an action is open itself to varying degrees of articulation again depending upon interest and relevance, but actions can be further understood again and again according to the extent the sense of an action as subject is pursued [cf. A. Schutz, 1972. B. Holzner, 1978]. This can be seen in a comparison between the situated interest a person has in routine actions and that displayed by phenomenologists [i.e. a 'more-or-less', commonplace interest in relation to an essential, constitutive interest].

The element of interest which unites object and subject knowledge is that of reflexivity, whereby lay and professional renderings of accounts are in that very doing " constituent features of the settings they make observable." [H. Garfinkel, 1967]. Reflexivity transforms what appears as separate and discrete areas of theory and practice into a complex web of articulation and accomplishment. For the everyday member of a situation the reflexive relation between object knowledge and subject knowledge results in the demonstration of " the rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions" while interpreting essentially indexical actions in context [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

What occurs is that people understand and account for events and actions as settled and rational matters, while being aware of and relying upon the 'wait and see' and occasioned nature

of all actions. This results in definite and rational outcomes [object knowledge] to occasions of interaction, whose members have a reliance upon the commonplace, 'more or less' known practices whereby accounts get done. This reflexive relation between existent knowledge, the production of knowledge, and the essentially indexical grounds of interaction produces: a rational and definite sense of what happened; the sedimentation of knowledge as experience [culture], resulting in the existence of folk-tales, anecdotes, and stories; and an awareness that the rational character of actions depends upon the reflexive nature of accounts [e.g. emphasis and over emphasis, 'leaving out' pieces of information, euphemism, comparing, and ordering disparate events according to a standard procedure of occurrence].

From the reflexive connections between object knowledge and subject knowledge, the everyday member produces an occasioned corpus of knowledge, the features of which are " temporally situated accomplishments of parties to the setting" [D. Zimmerman and D. Pollner, 1970]. There is however an important distinction to be made between the professional sociologist's senses of object and subject knowledge. Like the everyday member of social situations he routinely engages in making sense of his environment. This is 'prior' to engaging in professional work, because it is 'routine sense' which underlies professional constructions. In the Schutzian perspective the sociologist as commonplace member of situations produces " first level constructs" upon which the social scientific " second level constructs" are based [1962]. Yet it is just this relation between the production of the rational properties of indexical expressions [object knowledge of the first order] and the analysis of actions in context [subject

knowledge], with formal methodological and professional principles [object knowledge of the second order] which is problematic for the professional theorist.

This problem is more thorny for the sociologist than it first appears. Conventionally it involves the subscription to one of two schools of thought. The one represented by Weber and Schutz makes use of the postulate of adequacy whereby constructs of the second order must be compatible with the constructs of everyday life [M. Weber, 1949. A. Schutz, 1972]. The other approach is represented by Hempel and Nagel [1952. 1963], where the subjective elements of action are seen as outside social scientific explanation. Interest is rather in " overt human responses to a variety of conditions" which allows " the formulation of regularities" of such responses, and the " systematic organisation of manifest data" [Nagel, 1963].

Schutz argued [1962] that it was possible to accomplish such a structure of constructions as this, while including members' intentions and motives through the postulate of adequacy. Nagel has stated that it is not necessary to take notice of such subjective states, where " overt behaviours" make it possible to discover that " something is the sign of something else" [1963].

In contrast to Nagel, Weber's work presents the possibility of an interest in reflexivity; this is not to say that Weber was involved in producing a reflexive sociology, rather that in his work there lies that possibility. For example, he writes [1970]that an essay in the sociology of religion is dedicated towards making a contribution to " the typology and sociology of rationalism" . Accordingly Weber's method is to

proceed " from the most rational forms reality can assume; it attempts to find out how far certain rational conclusions, which can be established theoretically, have been drawn in reality. And perhaps we will find out why not." [1949. My emphasis.].

From Weber's remarks can be constructed the view that his theoretically derived conclusions and findings should be examined as the conclusions and the findings. This is not in the sense of the correspondence theory of truth, where findings are a mirror or accurate representation of what actually 'is'. Rather in adding to the sociology of rationalism Weber is producing ideal findings, and in that sense they are the findings [i.e. sociology's object knowledge, which must be distinguished from subject and object knowledge of the first order - cf. A. Schutz, 1972].

In contributing to rationalism Weber was taking part in the production of sociology's stock of knowledge. This is also to constitute and extend knowledge found in everyday life; the rational forms are located in everyday life as typical instances and examples. However Weber was not merely content to extract from routine knowledge, but was aware that having produced his rational forms, his constructs of constructs, it was necessary to proceed to examine his topic and his findings in relation to the theorising which had been carried out. In raising the question of the non-occurrence of theoretical conclusions in reality, Weber directed attention the bases of inquiry. The concern is not only with topic and data, but with the activity of theorising in its relation to the social world. The focus on the status of theoretical formulations and the relations between them and everyday knowledge raises the situatedness of making sense.

Weber expressed his awareness of the contexted nature of practical reasoning where he wrote: "There is no absolutely 'objective' analysis of culture...[or] of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which...they are selected, analyzed and organised for expository purposes." [1949]. The realisation of the importance of context in assembling social constructs necessitates a focus on the act of theorising and its relation with the production of conclusions and the topics which it addresses. However Weber did not pursue his insights towards an examination of the reflexive relation which sociology had with the social world, but amended his practical sociological programme in respect of the postulate of adequacy whereby his object knowledge had to be compatible with the object knowledge of everyday life.

Neither the empiricism of Nagel nor the subjective sociology of Weber approaches the routine construction of practical action and circumstances as topic. This is rather a means for the demonstration and accomplishment of the topics which they address. Both members of actual situations and professional theorists accomplish sensible practical actions and utterances through the ways in which they make these actions observable. Yet because of the practical nature of sociological inquiries the sociologist cannot address the constitutive topic of reflexivity and still be seen as doing sociology. Though the sociologist relies upon the constructs of the first order brought about by the situated praxis of object and subject knowledge, because the practical nature of his inquiries are already specified by existent object knowledge of the second order which provides his tradition and orders his professional language, the reflexivity of his and others' accounts are produced as uninteresting [H. Garfinkel, 1967. P. Filmer, 1975].

Reflexivity however can cease to be treated as a resource. Instead it can become a topic for study by the sociologist regarding the situations in which he is interested and interacts as self or situated organisations of understanding. Further, that it is in this way and in these situations that the rational properties of indexical expressions and actions are continually demonstrated. This has the impact of making the sense of all the previous chapters, and this one, reside in just these social means for assembling demonstrations of particular senses of social structure and knowledge. An awareness of the problematic of the continual demonstration of the rational properties of indexical expressions and actions has led to an attempt to show the ways in which reflexive engagements occurred for those whom I was involved with, which unavoidably means myself and this piece of sociological work. This realisation leads to a reorientation towards theory and practice.

The conventional division between superior professional theory and mundane everyday practice disappears. Instead one apprehends the different forms of situated theory, produced by different kinds of sociologists [e.g. sexual actors, adults and children, policemen, philosophers], which are through and through of a practical nature. Professional theory does not have a monopoly of knowledge [though it might think it has], nor is it lacking in mundane social practices. Theory and practice are in an unavoidable engagement brought about by reflexivity, which is only capable of being apprehended through the topic of reflexivity.

SOCIOLOGY AND REFLEXIVITY: The connections between the rational properties of indexicality, the interpretation of

actions in context, and professional theorising's constructs of the second order are of interest to sociology. However they have not been seen as an interest in themselves, but rather as a threat to sociological work and as a problem to be overcome. The widespread faith in sociology with scientific method typically characterises the relation between the practitioner and his subject as problematic in terms of 'methodology'. On this view unless care is taken with method, observations can become contaminated by subjective elements and opinion be result rather than fact.

Lachenmeyer for example [1971] sees the non-scientific status of sociology as capable of remedy through increasing the precision of theory language, dealing with observable phenomena, and replicating research. He further states that sociologists "must be more concerned with the referential meaning of their terms. They must use explicit and rigorous definitions. They must formulate disposition concepts and definitions while using the most appropriate predictive form. Furthermore, they cannot be satisfied with conventional grammar as their systematizing device; they must express their theoretical statements in more precise form." [1971].

Lachenmeyer articulates a concern for the status of sociological language, arguing that while it uses conventional language it cannot be scientific. Similar concerns with the reliability of language are shared by other members of social situations. They are concerned with producing their utterances according to their practical purposes in an uncontaminated state; as authored by nature. Within situations members construct embedded relationships of understanding as to the purpose of their inquiries. In general terms, these consist of ideas on what reliable knowledge should 'look'

like even though there may be disagreements on particular forms of production [e.g. different kinds of game or play, different stories about an event].

Polanyi [1973] has recognised the relation between scientific ideals, commonsense conceptions of science, and the basis and effect of that relation. He writes that the dominant conception of science is based upon the split between subjectivity and objectivity, and seeks to eradicate from its programme humanistic explanations of its theories. Polanyi sees that: "modern man has set up as the ideal of knowledge the conception of natural science as a set of statements which is 'objective' in the sense that its substance is entirely determined by observation, even while its presentation may be shaped by convention." [1973]. Because the possibility of a scientific sociology is based in a conception of a scientific methodology, it seeks to assemble the properties of social relations and situations in terms of this. This is an attempt to capture the social, through what are regarded as asocial means. However, both commonsense and sociology are grounded in a cultural understanding of language for producing reliability and objectivity.

For example, the topic of "the impact of work on leisure" is attended by the more fundamental concern for language. This can be seen in a statement made by Kando and Summers, contemplating a paradigm and research strategy. They state that an "obstacle to a <u>systematic theory</u> relating work to non-work has been the widespread tendency to <u>overlook the complexity</u> of the possible relations between outward appearances, or forms of work and leisure, and the way they are experienced

and interpreted by participants in them." [1971. My emphases.].

Kando and Summers are not commenting upon a small thing. They are expressing interest in the relations between the quality of language idealised as "systematic theory", and the nature of the topic under study. This interest lies in the mastery of the topic through quality language, such that a fitting together of topic and theory takes place [i.e. describing members' actions 'fully' is systematic theory]. But it is this fitting together process which is so problematic. Kando and Summers invoke the idea of the complexity of relations in order to overcome this; it provides for an agreement that where a theory can be seen as consisting of a complexity of social relations [i.e. what are taken to be members' methodic relations], it is then possible for that theory to be regarded as systematic.

Kando and Summers pose the question of how quality language is possible, yet the very ways in which they and other sociologists assemble this question precludes its actual accomplishment, whether or not it is possible in any case. Asking how quality language can be achieved ignores the fundamental question of how language itself is made possible? This redirects inquiry away from the location of the invariant methods for inquiry, towards taking "members' own practices as the rule of the social construction of reality"; it is "an appeal for the elucidation of the everyday ways in which we know one another and the contours of the situations in which we find ourselves." [J. O'Neill, 1972].

It has been suggested that a sociology which uses and continually reassembles an idea of a fixed scientific tradition and outcome can have no interest in the topic of reflexivity as such. Instead, because reflexivity is constitutive of

the indexical character of rational properties, a sociology which seeks to follow a scientific tradition in fact encounters it as a problem. This is because as the rationality of a tradition is itself indexical, it has to be continually produced and demonstrated through sociological members' accounts. Because of indexicality, these accounts face their own problem of production: how to establish a fixed, objective tradition of inquiry. This can be attained for immediate, practical purposes in and through accounts [i.e. reflexively] but this is a contravention itself of the establishment of an objective tradition. Thus professional theory seeks to establish itself through a specialised language; but what it reveals about the social world is reflexively produced. Because of the inescapable use of the social feature of reflexivity, the programme for an objective, scientific form of inquiry is always beyond it. It is no wonder then that attempts at an objective sociology face not only indexicality as a problem for remedy, but the escape from reflexivity as well.

The prevalent remedy to this situation has been through formulated ideas on 'objective phenomenon' and 'observed regularities'. There have been other attempts to come to terms with the engagement which an inquirer has with his surroundings, his discipline, and himself. Some of these will now be discussed.

Edmund Husserl reasoned that wisdom is the personal affair of the inquirer, which must be self-acquired. He must be able to answer for it from the beginning and at each step through the facility of his own act of inquiry. Husserl states that a decision to begin in this way means that inquiry begins with an absolute lack of knowledge: "anyone who seriously

intends to become a philosopher must 'once in his life' withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting." [1960]. Starting in this way leads on to a search for a method which develops and progresses towards "genuine knowing".

What Husserl recognises is that anything that can be called wisdom or knowledge resides in and consists of the actual practices of those who would produce it. The decision to take part in such production then ideally requires the reformulation of the practical world as previously known. It is in these terms that Husserl speaks of "an absolute lack of knowledge"; it is as a reknowing and recognising of the previously known. With this beginning goes the search for a method of knowing. Husserl's ideal formulation posits a tension between knowledge of the world, the decision to know it anew, and the emergence of a method for true and genuine knowing.

However at this point, which offers for examination the process of how knowledge is formed and methods are used in reflexive interplay, Husserl turns towards the programme of constituting a transcendental phenomenology. This is through the theoretical attitude and the reduction or bracketing of practical interests [1965]. The topic of reflexivity is thus passed by in Husserl's phenomenology by ignoring the practical character of actions and circumstances. By seeking a method which wants to "reveal the essential and irreducible presuppositions of knowledge by providing an access to the essential structures of experiences and the basic patterns of interrelationships obtaining between these experiences" [E. Pivcevic, 1970], Husserl does not inquire into the

construction of contexts through the language of social relations. Instead he intentionally inquires into the constitution of pure consciousness.

The method of reduction or bracketing seeks to 'put the world out of play', in order to reveal the essential objects of consciousness. Yet it must be asked whether this method can escape the reflexivity of its own observations. Given that the language of Husserl's phenomenology is part of a socio-cultural formation, and can only express its intended 'escape' and method through that formation, it would appear that bracketing is more of a helpful device to the theorist to aid him in his theorising than an actual method of negating the influence of and reliance upon the social world. Merleau-Ponty adopts this position in relation to bracketing. He sees it rather than being a movement from existence to essence, as a heurism for locating the relations of experience; for setting the world in relief against a background of essences [1962].

The idea of bracketing has also been used by Alfred Schutz in his phenomenological sociology. For Schutz the phenomenological sociologist suspends his belief in the existence of the outer world for the purposes of his inquiry: "to refrain intentionally and systematically from all judgements related directly or indirectly to the existence of the outer world." [1962]. As with Merleau-Ponty, Schutz accepts Husserl's work but with changes. Returning to Husserl, it can be seen that the inquirer must perform the reduction on himself and become the 'single ego', which has the effect of transforming all subjects into phenomena. This requires that accounting practices as existent and intersubjective features, are transformed into and are grounded in the transcendental ego.

This position then has as its problematic: how does the transcendental ego intentionally account for the existence of others?

Schutz argued that the problem was deceptive. Intersubjectivity is not a problem, he suggested, of constitution which can be solved in a transcendental manner. Intersubjectivity is rather the pre-given baseline of the life-world which can be inquired into [1966]. At a mundane level, intersubjectivity consists of certain typical instances or "vacillating approximations" [1970], where the essence is preconstituted in terms of the type through experience and as such essence and type differ in degree [A. Schutz, 1966. Heap and Roth, 1973]. Experience is the ground of essence and the inspiration for typicality; types stem from members' pragmatic purposes. When the move is made from the transcendental sphere to the pragmatic, practical sphere as Schutz recommends, inquiry does not need to formulate intersubjectivity in absolute terms but should require its constitutive elements in terms of descriptions of their own practical purposes.

Schutz's programme was thus one of the constitutive phenomenology of the life-world, which sought to amalgamate the method of bracketing the social world with the postulate of adequacy derived from Weber. The arguable use of the method of bracketing in Schutz's case was to enable the production of the constitutive features of the life-world, which could then be compared with members' conceptions. Yet bracketing the social world shuts off from examination exactly how members and theorist construct and establish the baselines of intersubjectivity as a practical programme.

Whereas such as Nagel, Weber, Husserl, and Schutz have sought to counter and overcome the reflexivity of their

accounts through such concepts as 'observable phenomena', 'the postulate of adequacy', and 'the method of bracketing', other sociologists have approached the reflexivity of sociology's accounts with interest. Gouldner (1973) for example has stated that a reflexive sociology "is concerned with what sociologists want to do and with what, in fact, they actually do in the world.". In order to attain this kind of sociology, Gouldner makes a number of points:

1: The sociologist needs to be transformed in order to acquire self-awareness and "new sensitivities".

2: A reflexive sociology needs to be a radical sociology, because of the awareness that the advancement of knowledge stems from the sociologist's situation in the world which he must address not merely in terms of how to work but how to live. In this way Gouldner's reflexive sociology is radical because it seeks both to transform the 'outside' world and the 'inside' world of the sociologist.

3: A further aspect of this reflexivity is that the sociologist must "acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we now view those held by others." (A. Gouldner, 1973. His emphasis.). Consequently this means:

4: The abandonment of the professional view that those studied act out of need while sociologists proceed out of belief and study in logic, method, and evidence. For Gouldner the adoption of these points would result in:

5: Sociologists ceasing to formulate their programmes in terms of subject and object (i.e. layman and professional). Rather the topic of study for reflexive sociology would consist of empirical researches "about sociology and sociologists, their occupational roles, their career 'hangups', their establishments, power systems, subcultures, and their place in

the larger social world.".

Given Gouldner's programme for the establishment of a reflexive sociology, is it correct to state that he is interested in the reflexivity of accounts? With reference to his stipulations concerning the researches which such a sociology would carry out, it seems that Gouldner is more concerned with documenting the concrete situations in which sociologists find themselves. As to his other concerns about radicalising and transforming sociologists themselves, he ignores the question of how this is to be done. John O'Neill has pointed out that Gouldner neglects the philosophical foundations of reflexivity, and so is obliged to tie his programme into society's infrastructure [1972]. This neglect can be seen in what Gouldner has to say about Harold Garfinkel and his studies into ethnomethodology: "The task Garfinkel sets himself is to destroy this taken-for-grantedness and to strip the cultural foundation of its cloak of invisibility." [1973]. Yet Gouldner does not mention the constitutive features in social action of indexicality and reflexivity which are predominant in Garfinkel's writing.

Whereas we are here concerned with reflexivity as a constituting phenomenon of the social world, Gouldner's use of the word references a concrete sociology of sociology; the sociologist documenting his social world in concrete fashion. Also, Gouldner's sense of what is reflexive does not extend to a shared method of constituting situations, made use of by members and sociologists alike. Rather, he sees his concrete reflexivity as a means of reviewing his world.

The sociology of Harold Garfinkel is in direct contrast to that of Gouldner's. He seeks to examine "everyday

activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes" [1967]. Garfinkel sees this feature of reflexivity as pervading practical actions, circumstances, commonsense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning. He is thus concerned to see how in their activities people construct and make sensible those activities 'for what they are'. Unlike Gouldner who sees his task as transforming sociology, Garfinkel is concerned only and entirely with the situated methods of practical reasoning which he does not seek to correct or quarrel with [1967].

From this it can be seen that Garfinkel entertains two distinct though related forms of reflexivity. Firstly is the notion of social reflexivity, whereby the way a setting is organised is identical with the procedures used by members to make it reportable and observable. Secondly, by establishing this as a concern, Garfinkel focuses upon the ways in which practical reasoning is accomplished. As all sociology is a practical accomplishment, including Garfinkel's, this means that he is engaging in an examination of the methodic procedures used to accomplish knowledge but which are commonly taken for granted. In other words, by focusing on social reflexivity Garfinkel engages in a reflexive sociology.

In order to approach reflexivity as a topic, and as a condition specified by the fundamental organising features of this resource, everyday activities have to be approached as "anthropologically strange". In making this point Garfinkel outlines the requirements that for the sociologist to examine the constitutive properties of everyday life, it is necessary to question or disrupt situations. This is in order to reveal members' accounts of practical activities as constitutive,

practical accomplishments of those activities.

A further recommendation towards studying practical activities has been given by Garfinkel and Sacks [1970]. With regard to the adequacy, value, and importance of practical activities they have no interest, seeking rather to describe them. This stance is termed by Garfinkel and Sacks as "ethnomethodological indifference". In conjunction with the procedure of regarding mundane activities as strange in order to set them in relief, the recommendation of enthomethodological indifference seems to have a strong resemblance to phenomenological bracketing. There is a difference however.

Schutz's approach is designed to facilitate and contribute to a phenomenological sociology; it is to accomplish accounts which provide and add aims and achievements to that sociology's theory and research. Bracketing is seen as a means of doing this. Yet it is a means which is dedicated towards methodological development, and not a description of practical activities. On the other hand, where the concern for sociological method as a superior form of knowledge and knowing is of little or no concern it is possible to concentrate upon members' practical activities as practical accomplishments; as produced by 'our own' methods and practices of accomplishment. In effect, regarding everyday scenes as 'strange' and adopting ethnomethodological indifference results in a concentration upon practical sociological reasoning as a continual presence within and constructive of contexts and not a 'special' method available only to professional sociologists.

It is within this network of allegiance to either practical sociological reasoning or professional sociological reasoning,

that the possibility and future of a reflexive sociology lies. Garfinkel states in the Preface to "Studies in Ethomethodology" that research into practical sociological reasoning is "not directed to formulating or arguing correctives.". He further states that although such studies "are directed to the preparation of manuals on sociological methods, they are in no way supplements to 'standard' procedure, but are distinct from them." [1967]. The crux of the matter lies in "arguing correctives". What does this consist of?

Professional sociology is taken up with the related and dual concerns of its methods and the knowledge and conclusions which it produces. This focus on and concern with its methods and status of its knowledge stems from the fact that to accomplish being professional,its accounts must formulate superiority as a feature of its activities. As a consequence of this, professional sociology becomes involved with the dominance of its methods and knowledge, continually attempting to refine the former and producing the latter for official and institutional use within society. In this sense it is correcting and seeking to make 'better' its methods, while presenting the definitive account of the practical, everyday activities of members. The central concern of this professional form of life, even if not immediately apparent, is the correction of commonsense conceptions and theories about practical circumstances and activities. This is why reflexivity is a problematic phenomenon for sociology, for it unites the division between lay and professional in terms of practical reasoning. To become interested in the constitutive place of reflexivity in inquiry leads for the professional sociologist to a negation of his superior professional position.

Why is this? Garfinkel has written that for sociologists and other members of society to become interested in reflexivity "would consist of their undertaking to make the reflexive character of practical activities observable; to examine the artful practices of rational inquiry as organisational phenomena without thought for correctives or irony." [1967]. To become engaged in such an undertaking as this however, is not to be doing sociology as it is conventionally understood. As Paul Filmer has stated it: "sociologists trying to be reflexive are sociologists doing work which is not understandable as sociology; whose sense is not grounded in sociology's tradition of [scientific] discourse." [1975]. Thus, the immediate effect of this is to place any attempt at a reflexive sociology outside of the professional form of theorising.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY: In a paper concerning the concept of trust [1963], Garfinkel points out that Talcott Parsons' theoretical formulation of incorporating the common culture into the super-ego results in the interpretive consequence that an organised system of activities means the same thing as the way its organisational characteristics are produced [i.e. reflexively]. The implication of this interpretive formation is that sociology's concerns with 'culture' and members' actual practices as 'culture' are reflexively produced. Regarding sociological concerns with culture as reflexive accounts of members' activities as sociologically assembled, means that these activities may be differently assembled by other observer-members according to context. This comparison between different contexts of demonstration enables the location of the reflexive character of practical sociological reasoning.

The Sociological Concept of Culture: Within sociology and anthropology the concept of culture is general and non-specific. Accordingly, particular uses of 'culture' tend to be assemblages of contingent concerns [i.e. according to the concerns of the theoriser], which results in the consequence that defining the meaning of 'culture' consists of invoking and accomplishing 'a general concept'. Because of this it is perhaps more appropriate to term what is being examined here as a sense of culture. This formulates it as a product and an observable of professional sociological reasoning, rather than a concrete existent.

In anthropology Kroeber and Kluckhohn [1950] have defined culture as: "patterned ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional [i.e. historically derived and selected] ideas and especially their attached values.". The sense of this definition locates culture in structural regularities or patterns of predominant forms of action or behaviour [e.g. plow agriculture - A.L. Kroeber, 1948].

Another definition of culture has located it in historically generated systems of "explicit and implicit designs for living" [C. Kluckhohn and W.H. Kelly, 1945]. The explicit culture is made up of regularities of behaviour which can be apprehended by perception. On the other hand, the implicit culture is an abstraction by the anthropologist or sociologist, who 'recognises' common features which underly a variety of cultural contexts. In this formulation, the explicit culture consists of both structure and content [i.e. a sense of meaning and organisation], while the implicit culture is made of

pure or essential features [applicable to a culture].

For a sociologist such as Parsons, culture is regarded as "patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of actors, internalized components of the personalities of individual actors and institutionalized patterns of social systems." [1970]. Like anthropologists [cf. L.A. White, 1949], Parsons' definition locates the transmission of culture in the movement from sign orientation towards shared symbolic systems and the production of a cultural tradition. Symbolic interactionists such as Rose, regard culture as "the related meanings and values by means of which individuals interact." [1972]. Shibutani [1955] similarly pictures culture as "the perspective that is shared by the people in a particular group.".

A consequence of having 'culture' as a general and existent frame of sociological reference, is that its application to and production as specific realities results in the paradoxical appearance of various cultures [i.e. paradoxical because as a general concept of sociology it appears to have many specific and indexical instances and applications]. For example Friedson [1972] writes about 'doctor culture' and 'patient culture'. Similarly at the level of group interaction, Becker and Greer [1960] have differentiated between the forms of conventional understandings shared by the participants in an organisation; between different forms of culture. The understandings which originate from a group's problems are termed by Becker and Greer as manifest culture. Where membership to another 'outside' group is shared by the members of a culture, they also share a structure of understandings as latent culture, which has the potential to transform group behaviour and effect understandings.

These general recognitions of culture [i.e. general because culture is located between and among groups and individuals which go to constitute a whole 'society'], can be amalgamated for the present purposes as a list of features which professional theorists take to constitute culture. This list is drawn from Herkovits [1940]:

1: Culture is learned.

2: Culture stems from biological, psychological, and historical factors.

3: Culture has a structure.

4: Culture is dynamic.

5: Culture is variable.

6: Culture exhibits regularities that permit scientific analysis.

7: Culture is the means for individuals to adjust to the total society and for creative expression.

These features account for a professional theorist's sense of culture; for a way of regarding actions, instances, behaviours, and scenes as 'cultural'. In a way this is paradoxical since according to definitions of culture and this reflexive list of cultural attributes, cultural analysis can itself be seen to an instance of its own analysis [i.e. it is itself an instance of what it is addressing]. This provides for an unrecognised problem, in that to be scientific cultural analysis must cease itself to be a cultural activity.

In regarding the above list as providing for a sense of culture, the feature which is being addressed is that faced by the theorist who would 'do' cultural analysis. It is to seek to account for the provision of 'total' or 'whole' objects [e.g. society, belief systems, knowledge], while

having to rely upon contexted and limited viewpoints, which themselves are fundamentally problematic. This means that the sense of 'culture' has to be continually produced in the work of theorising. This consists of the formation and demonstration of a specific cultural tradition [i.e. the theorist's, which because it assembles 'culture' is the only 'true' cultural tradition], through negotiations between specific cultural concepts [e.g. patterns, traits, items] and actual actions-in-context. In addressing the problematic of the sense of culture, the theorist formulates these negotiations as providing for 'culture' in their doing. In this way, regarding 'culture' as learned, dynamic, variable, and regular formulates actual behaviours as learned, dynamic, variable, and regular [i.e. as reflexively 'cultural'].

Regarding culture as a solution to the professional theorist's problem of accomplishing accounts of context-in-general from the point of view of an essentially limited and indexical context, can perhaps best be seen in Pasrons' definition of culture [above]. He regards culture as an organised and structured system of symbols which provides three features: a focus for the orientation of action; a generalised and conventional organisation of objects which consists of society's structure; and components of people's personalities. It can be seen that Parsons' definition of culture provides for the accomplishment of a context-in-general [i.e. culture itself as "institutionalised patterns of social systems"] by providing this as the perspective of attention [e.g. "objects of the orientation of actors"] through internalising the general culture in the actor.

Because Parsons fails to recognise that the production of

senses of occasion [i.e. a sense of culture] depends upon the practical orientations with which members address topics of concern, he totally constrains people in situations to act in accord with the culture [e.g. for the doctor to be "affectively neutral"]. Parsons does not concern himself with the practical accomplishment of such contexts-in-general as culture, which he himself is involved in producing. By basing his sense of culture upon an ordered system of symbols, Parsons standardises people's common understandings towards actions. He shares this theme of standardisation with other theorists of culture [e.g. T.S. Kuhn and Plato]. They use the notion of standardisation [e.g. paradigms, the Forms] "to conceive the character and consequences of actions that comply with standardized expectancies. Generally they have acknowledged but otherwise neglected the fact that by these same actions persons discover, create, and sustain this standardization." [H. Garfinkel, 1967].

In conceptualising culture, cultural theorists begin at the 'wrong end'. Garfinkel can be quoted again: cultural theorists "portray what the member's actions will have come to by using the stable structures - i.e. what they <u>came</u> to - as a point of theoretical departure from which to portray the necessary character of the pathways whereby the end result is assembled." [1967]. This results in theorists such as Parsons, Kuhn, and Plato treating people as 'cultural dopes'. Garfinkel uses this idea to point up the procedure used by theorists of having people act in compliance with the theoretical structures <u>of</u> sociology. The idea of the 'cultural dope' makes reference to "the man-in-the-sociologist's-society who produces the stable features of the society by acting in

compliance with preestablished and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides." [1967]. This procedure embodies the concept of culture in the 'real' world by assembling types of event which are regarded as signs of the general concept; the 'real world' refers to and validates the sociological structure of culture [cf. D. Smith, 1974].

The sociological concept of culture provides an occasion for seeing it as an event for the demonstration of culture. Upon every occasion of the demonstration of such sense, the overriding rule of construction and interpretation is 'see it that way'. To 'find' culture, to examine it, to rearrange it, and draw conclusions from it, the theorist must necessarily seek to bridge the gap between his own and others' indexical actions and utterances, and the context-in-general which is to be accomplished as demanded by his tradition [i.e. science] and topic [i.e. culture]. The way in which this is done is by specifying what, if it were found to exist, 'culture' would consist of. Having formulated the kinds of event which would be taken to be and accepted as cultural, the theorist proceeds to incorporate actions and events into his theoretical work as 'actual' cultural instances.

It is only through juxtaposition and comparison in terms of professional theoretical relevancies, expectations, and formulations that indexical actions can be regarded as representations of and belonging to the general sense of culture. It is not the case that 'culture' as a context-in-general exists as a determinate object. It is the case that in the construction of his theoretical work, the professional sociologist makes this situation available for all practical purposes. 'Culture' is a sense of what can be done in terms

of the adopted form of practical reasoning.

A Member's Concept of Culture: The above section has located the professional treatment of 'culture' as an assembled object of sociology's ways of producing a sense of culture. In this section will be examined lay members activities for producing senses of occasion [culture] - particular and occasioned accounts which give structure, temporal progression, and social organisation to indexical actions-in-context. The position is taken here that an examination of members' activities and accounts as sociological formulations [i.e. activities and accounts of sociological theorists], permits the location and presentation of how objects, conclusions, findings, and facts get 'done'. The difference between this view and conventional constructive theory is a distinction between focusing upon actual practical circumstances and activities which lay and professional sociologists share, and taking these for granted in producing sociological accounts.

In relation to the activities of members of situations, what can a sense of culture be taken to be? We can again use Parsons' formulation because it is perhaps the most comprehensive and is not essentially at variance with other cultural theorists' formulations. Rewriting Parsons' definition, culture for the present purposes can be regarded as: [1] inside people's heads as a resource for [2] the orientation of their actions [culture-as-action-in-context], which [3] produces knowledge of the structure of the social system [culture-as-context-in-general]. The dynamic of this sense of culture is provided by natural language and its practices.

In essence Parsons' definition of culture states the

problem faced by the member of a situation; the accomplishment of culture as a sensible outcome and context-in-general. However rather than impose a structure of professional understandings here, I want to examine members' practices as ways for producing and their actions as accomplishments of, a sense of culture. By following Parsons and locating culture within people, it means that the elements of a sense of culture are also the conditions of the social world which have to be fulfilled. Members' activities as an organised system of events are thus produced according to the sense of occasion through which they are addressed. Accordingly, the relation between the constitutive features of a sense of culture for members and the organised means by which they are attained will be examined.

This will be done in respect of reflexive features encountered in the above chapters concerning sexual actors, adults and children, and policemen, magistrates, and suspects; this is distinct from the professional sociological notion of culture as a list of items [e.g. the above list]. Rather it is suggested that people described in the above chapters, and the chapters themselves, attended to 'culture' as a condition for and a production of actions-in-context, in relation to a general context. In this way, contexted events were established as of general and interrelated significance to 'wider society'.

In accounting for settled and past matters, people make use of the practices of relevance, comparison, unity, and difference. These features are used to assemble the texture and structure of a situation according to determining and formulating a legitimate history to that situation. As such the use of these practices consist in the use, construction,

and development of types and typologies of action and people.

The formation of such a typology and its subsequent changes was discussed in the examination of sexual contact actors, though without doubt the use of the reflexive features for assembling typicality was present both in the situations examined in other chapters and in those chapters themselves. For example, like sexual contact actors, and myself, the police and magistrates compared settled matters with 'new' events, related these to one another in terms of similarities and differences, and formulated a specific, singular type in relation to a context-in-general [i.e. a cultural actor]. This kind of accounting however neglects its own procedures for doing so. So for example, the part played in this process by persuasion, ambiguity, need, attraction, formulations of use and attributes, and quality relations are not recognised. Such features however are available for the fabrication or 'mock up' of a cultural actor [e.g. the male contact actor as 'a bisexual female', the witness as 'a criminal', the suspect as 'a witness'], and provide the means for the establishment of culture in general in relation to which the 'made observable' actor has sense.

Establishing the typicality of events, actions, and people by making them observable as cultural phenomena [i.e. types which go to make up the context-in-general of culture], people thereby construct experienced events into a [self organised] social order. Stemming from the procedure of assembling an event [e.g. a fight, a contact advertisement, a child's utterance] typical as a cultural item or trait [e.g. 'wounding', 'prostitute', 'incompetent'], the demonstration of a social order consists of the structuring of contexts-in-

general [e.g. law enforcement, sexual contact, child rearing]. Thereby, various levels, differences, and relations of cultural phenomena are established which consists of an indisputable and overriding consciousness of the existence of a wider scheme of 'things'. Yet the relation between the 'natural order' and the contexts within which this order is 'found' to occur [for it is only within specific contexts that the general culture can be apprehended] consists of the organisation of these two contexts in terms of one another.

In this way order is a continual problematic and accomplishment of contexted actions, which though routinely done and known is only fully realised when the background assumptions of daily life [i.e. the social world <u>is</u> orderly] are disrupted. This form of disruption as a normal, natural trouble is a constituent feature of the contexts in which suspects, children, and the sexually ambiguous find themselves. Because of the omnipresent nature of culture, these actors have to face the choice of 'going along' with the intersubjective sense of culture [i.e. engaging in its production themselves], maintaining their deviant positions in respect of the sense of culture and face sanctions, or focusing upon and proclaiming the socially constructed condition of cultural identities. In this latter case they would risk some form of categorisation and remedial treatment.

Members' construction of social order as a shared feature of social life results in the demonstration and accomplishment of the rational properties of indexicality according to the formulation of the order as a corporate construct of organisational motives. By methodically assembling and constructing rules and a sense of social order,

people in everyday life provide and demonstrate the conditions to be met and provided for the accomplishment of bona fide activity and membership. This is done for example, by enabling and judging that individual motives concur with organisational goals. This occurs most obviously where adults provide the conditions for a 'change of mind' in children, and regard the subsequent behaviour as satisfying [or not] those conditions. In a similar manner the organisation and social order of the court consists of the conditions in the form of language [e.g. address, explanation, description], to which the suspect must attend and replicate to produce 'good' character.

For those involved in sexual contact the production of a sense of organisation through contact argot is crucial. This is because unless the advertiser-replier constructs the expected socio-sexual attributes of the order, no contact will be made. The contact order is thus reproduced through the demonstration of use-value, commodity-for-exchange, reciprocal use, attributes for use, and the formulation of relations in terms of qualities [i.e.the contact order itself]. Through their reflexive language practices [e.g. 'discreet', 'kind', 'appreciative', 'genuine'], contact actors make observable their relations as material objects through the formulations of use, value, and exchange. This is a reflexive relation between theoretical products which construct and reflect the social order of the producers.

The features of structure and fact are produced in the construction of typical actors and a social order. This is brought about through the use and establishment of presuppositions which form a context. So for example, particular language patterns of particular cultural actors can come in for

examination merely because of the self-conceptions shared and involved by the members of a situation. As a consequence of this, such reflexive practices as questioning, checking, doubting, and ordering construct a context where an actor is seen at odds with the wider cultural context which such as the adult (in relation to the child) and the policeman (in relation to the suspect) are seen to represent. The provision of structure and fact through the demonstration of presuppositions by such reflexive practices as doubt and questioning, is founded upon other practices which produce the typical and orderly cultural tradition which is documented by the rational properties of indexicality.

By regarding the resolution and outcome of actions-in-context as members' accomplishments of a sense of culture, we are led away from the professional sociological assumptions upon the orderly nature of culture and into the actual sense which a context has for its members, and the ways and methods which are mobilised for the construction of that sense. Looking at members' practices as producing a sense of culture as context-in-general involves the examination of the resources which people use and share in constituting their (our) first order constructs. Because these constructs and the practices for their attainment are shared, it is a difficult, complex, and often ambiguous topic to approach and examine. However by seeking to regard the resource of reflexivity itself as a topic, the senses through which people (we) engage in a social and cultural life can be examined.

IN CONCLUSION: This thesis draws to an end. What are its findings and conclusions? This is a difficult question to

answer, but it is perhaps best to approach it through a summary of the structure of the thesis. Its findings are particular points made in relation to particular areas of practice and theory in the forgoing sections. What the conclusions are is much more difficult to state, because the thesis has not sought to deal in objective matters of fact and quantitative measures. The basic point of the thesis is better seen as an attempt to depict and to awake a realisation that men in concert construct their own realities, and that the capability exists for a humane understanding of this being-in-the-world through a reflexive sociology.

The structure of the thesis seeks to demonstrate this as a reflexive biography, and to lead towards it through the particular examinations of the intimate relation between theory and practice. The ability to categorise and typify events, to ascribe and accomplish type elements, and to differentiate between and judge the structural and cultural appropriateness of events, actions, and utterances are the routine attainments of social practice. They are mundane and taken for granted. Yet they consist of a rich and varied network of sociological knowledge upon which the theoretical relations of the context-in-particular and the wide-awake world depend. In demonstrating this in the sections devoted to practices, the thesis sought to inspire the conceptual re-ordering of general assumptions about the relations between everyday social practice and professional theory. It suggested that not only do routine and taken for granted practices underly professional theorising, but that they do so in a critical way. Taken seriously everyday social practice can be found to consist of formulations which present an alternative to professional theorising; that everyday social practice is more illuminating upon the procedures and programmes of professional theorising than vice versa.

The final Section of the thesis has shown through the examination

of particular examples of professional theorising that not only are its ideals of knowledge unobtainable in absolute terms, but that their possible attainment is an intimate occasion of taking up, using, and abiding by social practices for the practical purposes of the accomplishment of those ideals. Cast as they are in absolute terms, which makes them problematic to obtain, these ideals are paradoxically only realisable in specific contexts and readings through the very methods and practices which the dedication to those ideals seeks to subvert. This final Section has sought to show the incorrigible character of everyday social practices for profe-ssional theory; it constantly does battle with them while always depending upon them. Because of this the resource of social reflexivity is the nub of the problem for the accomplishment of the ideals of professional sociology.

In doing professional sociology, the use of reflexivity is inescapable and cannot be overcome. Yet because reflexivity forms the accomplishment of the substance of accounts it is not easily managed in terms of professional inquiry. As such it forms the antithesis of any professional sociological thesis unless it is addressed as a topic. Without a reflexive concern, the professional theorist continues to partake of and contribute to a pre-theoretical view of the common culture which is occasioned and structured according to the central placement of social scientific knowledge. As the final part of Section IV demonstrated in comparing lay and professional approaches to common culture, professional theory differs from everyday reasoning in relevance, orientation, and expectancy; yet it is really another mode of reasoning and not an objective, separate one. It is rather an abstracted and formalised form of everyday reasoning whose approaches can be found in a 'natural' form in everyday life (e.g. Sections I - III), via a

reflexive notiom of theory as practice. Regarding the work and accomplishments of professional theory as actual practice rather than a special and superior form of life results in approaching them as topics for inquiry, and viewing the idea of reflexivity as a means for developing a sociology concerned with practicality and methodicity (albeit 'outside' conventional sociology).

Im a world where expert knowledge is highly praised, professional sociology is at fault in disregarding its very own ways for inquiring into the social world. Where agencies and institutions perform actual actions against, towards, and in respect of everyday people which is either directed or influenced by professional theorists, the effects brought about by transforming social realities through the filter of professionalism can be harsh, cruel, and misguided. It is against the mistaken claim of professional sociology to be describing members' activities that I recommend the topic of reflexivity as a means for inquiry.

Not only do I regard the topic of reflexivity as a means for a more complete descriptiom of social realities, but the self-examinatiom which it requires in terms of the sociologist doing his sociology provides the opportunity for the examinatiom of what it is to live and exist socially; for the discussion and analysis of how people relate to one another. This of course forces the sociologist to examine and review his own power and authority for making claims to knowledge about others. It makes him question his knowledge of himself and his surroundings which is the true topic of sociological inquiry as a human activity.

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